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Preface 
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays. The essay in chapter 2 is written with 
my supervisor Jørn Rattsø, Professor of economics at the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU). The essay in chapter 4 is written with Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, Reader in 
economics at University of Oxford.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction, summaries and future research 
1
2
1.1 Introduction 
The dissertation sheds light on linkages between emerging economies and the international economy. 
Economic development is not achieved in isolation, but in interaction with more successful 
economies.  
A consensus view in modern growth literature suggests that, due to international spillovers, all 
countries grow at a common rate in the long run. Income level differences are therefore permanent 
(Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005; Parente and Prescott, 2005). 
Differences in growth rates across countries are only transitory, but open up for improvement or 
worsening of countries’ position in the world income distribution. A crucial question to developing 
countries is how to achieve improvements and catching up to income levels of developed countries.1
The “barrier model” of economic growth is consistent with the pattern described above. Removing 
barriers hindering spillovers from abroad can generate catching up towards the technology frontier. 
We can think of barriers in three categories: factors influencing the basic functioning of the economy 
(i.e. market structure, regulations, government institutions, and availability and quality of production 
factors), factors directly important for adoption of foreign technology (i.e. human capital and capital 
equipment), and factors “transporting” the technology across international borders (i.e. import, 
export, foreign direct investment).  
The dissertation focuses on the first and the third type of barriers. The interplay between the two is of 
special interest. The first type can typically be influenced by policy and facilitate the functioning of 
the vehicles of the third. .   
Trade reform in terms of tariff liberalization is a policy regarded as removal of a barrier to imports. 
Imports, for instance through embodied technology in production inputs, is believed to have potential 
of raising productivity. Interaction with competitors and demanding customers abroad through 
exports is also hypothesized as a vehicle of productivity spillovers. Two chapters in the thesis are 
devoted to investigate the links between trade and productivity in South Africa.  
                                                     
1 Productivity differences is the main factor to explain income differences between nations (Hall and Jones, 1999). 
Lucas (2007) suggests that international transfers of production-related knowledge is the main mechanism to reduce 
income inequalities between nations. Vehicles with proposed potential to carry such knowledge between countries are 
imports, exports and foreign direct investments.   
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Investment promotion and reforms of infrastructure policy are discussed in the two last chapters. The 
investigations - both in cross-country settings – suggest these policies to fuel linkages to the world 
economy.  
1.2. Methodology 
The main methodological challenge in analyses of effects of openness on productivity and outcomes 
of policy reforms is to handle the simultaneity of the measures intended to make a difference. Is the 
implementation of tariffs liberalization affected by productivity? Do productive exporters drift to 
sophisticated markets with attractive technology, rather than exports brining technology improving 
exporter-productivity? Is a positive association between investment promotion and investments 
driven by something else than investment promotion? These are methodological challenges the 
dissertation aims to tackle through its econometric methodology. Exploitation of panel data – offering 
comparability across units and within units over time –  in combination with variation generated 
outside the units studied is key.    
1.3. Summary of the essays 
Chapter 2 (with Jørn Rattsø, NTNU): “Industrial labor productivities and tariffs in South 
Africa: Identification based on multilateral liberalization reform”
Productivity growth in South African manufacturing sectors is found to be consistent with a growth 
model where productivity is driven by adoption of technology developed abroad. The catch up to the 
international frontier is disturbed by barriers to international openness.
The IMF-study of Jonsson and Subramanian (2001) finds that that openness can explain most of the 
productivity growth in South Africa in the period 1970-97.2 Their openness measure is the outcome 
variable of foreign trade’s share of GDP and the analysis therefore suffers from simultaneity bias. 
Fedderke (2003) finds more support for the importance of domestic factors for the productivity 
growth in South Africa. Also Fedderke’s analysis rests on potentially endogenous explanatory 
variables. For instance, sector specific R&D investments are used as a measure of innovation. While 
being a nice direct measure of innovation, it is not clear if innovating sectors become productive or if 
productive sectors spend relatively larger resources on R&D. We contribute to the literature on South 
Africa’s productivity growth by employing more exogenous drivers of productivity.  
                                                     
2 These studies focus on total factor productivity, while we here focus on labor productivity. Harding and 
Rattsø (2004) and Harding and Rattsø (2007) find the barrier model to be consistent also with TFP-
developments in South Africa. 
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The chapter focuses on sector specific tariffs as measure of barrier to openness. A massive trade-
liberalization – to a large extent the result of negotiations between countries in for instance WTO – 
during  the nineties induced large changes in tariffs in many of the sectors. Our identification strategy 
is to compare sectors with large tariff reductions to sectors with little tariff changes over time. 
Negotiated multilateral-liberalization is in itself a fairly exogenous change in tariffs, since different 
economies need to agree on a broad basis. On the other hand, there is some room for negotiations and 
economies may try to protect certain sectors. If economies for instance protect sectors with low 
international competitiveness (low productivity), this will turn up as a negative correlation between 
tariff levels and productivity levels. This could wrongly be interpreted as high tariff levels causing 
low productivity levels. To deal with this challenge we use the fact that the tariff phase down was a 
result of negotiations across economies and instrument the tariff changes in South Africa with tariff 
changes in similar economies. A qualified instrument should affect the potentially endogenous 
explanatory variable, but not the dependent variable beyond the effect through the potentially 
endogenous variable. To instrument the tariff level in sector i in South Africa we use the average 
level of tariffs in sector i among lower middle income economies in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East and South Asia. It seems reasonable that these tariff 
levels affected the South African tariff levels through the multilateral negotiations, while it is hard to 
make the case that tariffs level in, for instance, the automotive sector in Brazil should affect 
productivity in the South African automotive sector.  
A second innovation in the setting of South Africa is to use sector specific technology frontiers. Since 
the technology levels and gaps are different across sectors, it is logical to allow for sector specific 
catch ups. We let labor productivity in corresponding sectors in U.S. represent the technology 
frontier.
The results suggest a robust and statistically significant negative relationship between tariffs and 
labor productivity growth. A 10 percent higher tariff level is estimated to reduce the productivity 
growth by about 1 percentage point. The quantitative effect is quite large and the economic 
interpretation is that tariff reductions stimulate the transition growth of labor productivity.  
Chapter 3: “Does it matter to whom you export? “ 
Is observed higher productivity among exporters than non-exporters due to productivity spillovers 
from export-destinations to exporters, or are exporters more productive than non-exporters already 
before they become exporters? Despite intense research efforts the literature presents mixed evidence 
and does not seem to have settled for a consensus answer.
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Chapter 3 investigates the link between exposure to productivity through exports and total factor 
productivity. The idea is that if export is a channel of productivity spillovers from export markets to 
exporters, such spillovers should be higher from exports markets with high productivity than from 
exports markets with low productivity. Such a mechanism suggests a positive association between the 
productivity level of the exporter and the productivity level met in export markets. To measure the 
exposure to productivity through export we let us inspire by Hausmann et al. (2007). They launch a 
measure, EXPY, which classifies an export basket according to the “inherent” productivity level of 
products exported. We define a measure, EXCY, which classifies an export basket according to the 
weighted average productivity level of the importers served by the exporter in question.  
Exports may be a channel for productivity spillovers from the export destination to the exporter. 
Exporters may also be the ones able to overcome fixed costs associated with exporting because they 
are productive (Melitz, 2003). Causal effects of productivity on international interaction may 
therefore exist, and a hypothesized causal relationship of international interaction on productivity 
could be overestimated. We implement a two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS) attempting to 
handle such potential endogeneity bias. The instrument suggested is imports to South Africa’s export 
destinations from groups of other exporting countries. The common variation in imports from South 
Africa and imports from other countries is interpreted as demand shocks in the importers.  
Trade data from Feenstra et al. (2005) are combined with a panel data set of 25 South African 
manufacturing sectors, data on total factor productivity for US manufacturing sectors and GDP per 
capita data on the export-destinations. We exploit variation across 161 importers, 25 sectors and 24 
years in the first stage and the 25 sectors and 24 years in the second stage.  
The OLS-results suggest a link between the productivity of export destinations and export-sector 
productivity. The effect is robust to sector and year fixed effects, measures of the international 
technology frontier, export value at the sector level and different functional forms.  Comparison 
between OLS-estimates and 2SLS-estimates indicate, however, that the OLS-estimates are severely 
biased upwards. We do not find support for the existence of productivity spillovers through exports 
when endogeneity of export markets is accounted for.   
Finally, the chapter addresses a competing hypothesis proposed by Hausmann et al. (2007). Growth is 
in their paper found to be positively associated with the inherent product characteristics measured by 
EXPY. For EXPY we do not find support for a positive link either in OLS or in 2SLS. We suggest 
that more research is needed on the relative importance of exporting sophisticated products versus 
exporting to sophisticated destinations.   
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Chapter 4 (with Beata Smarzynska Javorcik , Oxford University): “Developing economies and 
international investors: Do investment promotion agencies bring them together?”  
Despite its importance for public policy choices, little is known about the effectiveness of investment 
promotion efforts. Our analysis employs data collected through a recent Census of Investment 
Promotion Agencies around the world. The Census contains information on investment promotion 
efforts in 109 countries, representing all income groups and geographic regions. About three quarter 
of responses pertain to developing countries. A unique feature of the Census is that it includes time-
varying information on the existence of an IPA, its status and reporting structure, sector targeting and 
incentives offered to foreign investors.
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the majority of IPAs target particular sectors in their 
efforts to attract FDI. Sector targeting is considered to be best practice by investment promotion 
professionals (Loewendahl, 2001, Proksch, 2004). Sector targeting allows us to identify the effect of 
investment promotion using the difference-in-differences approach. We compare FDI inflows into 
targeted sectors, before and after targeting, to FDI inflows into non-targeted sectors, during the same 
time period.3 Our analysis is based on US FDI data, disaggregated by host country and sector and 
available for the period 1990-2004, provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. We control 
for changes in host country business environment by including country-year fixed effects, for 
heterogeneity of sectors in different locations by including country-sector fixed effects and for shocks 
to supply of FDI in particular sectors by adding sector-time fixed effects. We also perform an 
exercise on aggregate data, which partially provide robustness checks and partially is complementary 
since some of the investment promotion variables available are only available at the aggregate level.
Our results suggest that investment promotion efforts lead to higher FDI inflows to developing 
countries. We find that targeted sectors receive more than twice as much FDI as non-targeted sectors. 
This magnitude is plausible, given that many sectors receive small amounts of FDI in absolute terms. 
For instance, the median sector-level inflow of US FDI to developing countries in our sample that 
received some US investment was 11 million dollars. Thus, the increase of 155 percent estimated in 
our analysis would translate into additional 17 million dollars of FDI.  
                                                     
3 Charlton and Davis (2006) use a similar identification strategy in their analysis of FDI inflows into 
OECD countries. 
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Chapter 5: “Export upgrading through infrastructure policy reforms: evidence from 10 new 
EU members” 
It is widely believed that infrastructure is an integrated part of economic development (Duflo and 
Pande, 2007). The World Development Report 1994 of the World Bank emphasized the importance 
of the quality of such services for development. In this chapter, we argue that better infrastructure 
policies, leading to improved infrastructure (quality and quantity), can increase unit values of export 
products as well as make a country’s export basket more diversified. We have two mechanisms in 
mind. Better infrastructure may increase manufacturing productivity. Higher manufacturing 
productivity may increase product quality and unit values. Better infrastructure may also reduce trade 
costs. Shorter delivery time to buyers, for instance, can be as valued as increased product quality and 
can result in higher unit values. 
There is a growing interest in the relation between characteristics of countries’ export baskets and 
economic performance. For instance, unit values of exports seem to vary greatly across countries. 
Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) present evidence suggesting a positive association 
between countries’ level of development and the unit values of their export products. The fact that 
export product quality seem to go together with the level of development poses an interesting 
question: how can developing countries upgrade their export baskets to rich country levels? The 
results of chapter 4 indicate that infrastructure reforms have potential to be part of the answer. 
To analyze the effects of infrastructure improvements on export diversification and unit values, we 
exploit data on infrastructure services reforms in 10 Eastern European countries. In the period 
studied, 1989–2000, these economies went from being governed by central planning to become open 
market economies. Service industries were not regarded as important during the era of central 
planning (Eschenbach and Hoekman, 2006), and since 1989 the countries studied have massively 
reformed these sectors.  
We estimate reduced form equations for diversification and unit values of exports. The variables of which 
we seek to estimate the effects are infrastructure reforms in the electric power, roads and 
telecommunications services sectors. The assumption we make is that reforms lift the quality and/or 
quantity of infrastructure services available to exporters. We do not think this is a controversial 
assumption as it is well know that bottlenecks—also in infrastructure—were common in centrally 
planned economies. Measures of infrastructure as such are not in our possession, and it is a task for future 
research to evaluate the exact channels through which the different infrastructure policies may affect the 
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export characteristics in question. We interpret these infrastructure policies as instruments for 
infrastructure services and use them directly in the estimations.  
Our findings are consistent with higher export unit values due to infrastructure sector reforms, as 
reforms of all three sectors—electric power, roads and telecommunications—are significantly 
positively correlated with unit values. The results for diversification need more careful justification.  
1.4. Future research 
In the light of the “barrier model” of economic growth, barriers to the spread of production-related 
knowledge across countries should be at the center stage of analyses of growth. The three categories 
of barriers mentioned above – “institutions”, production factors and vehicles – can independently and 
jointly affect catch-up to higher technology and income levels. International linkages can affect all of 
these different aspects and it is hard to separate out the different channels of effects from the global to 
the national economy. Future research should seek to clarify the different roles of, and the interplay 
between, these different aspects. 
An econometrically especially challenging area is the role of domestic factors. These are typically 
endogenous to the growth process, making it hard to identify their effects. That does not, of course, 
mean they are not important and it is a challenge for future research to include domestic factors in an 
econometrically satisfying way. More specifically, the dissertation is in the productivity analyses 
concerned with barriers to international spillovers. Import and export allows for instrument strategies 
exploiting variation abroad to identify the relationships of interest. Domestic factors likely to affect 
technology adoption, like domestic institutions, policies and economic variables are often outcomes 
as well as causes of the growth process. Randomization or other ways to control variation is typically 
not viable research strategies in the macro settings concerned.   
More research is specifically needed on the transmission channels of technology spillovers. 
Currently, policies like export promotion and investment promotion is justified partly because of 
positive externalities of internationalization. A better understanding of which vehicles that brings 
technology and under which setting such technology is attached to and develop the economy in 
question carry the potential of better targeting of the polices.  
Concerning exports and productivity, more research is needed to understand the positive correlation 
typically observed. Is it only about self selection? Is it about a process of self-discovery – being 
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relatively domestic in nature – or is it also about technology spillovers from abroad? Understanding 
the deeper causes of the positive productivity premium of exporters is a challenge for future research.  
Within the area of investment promotion, there is a need for more research on investment incentives. 
Many countries spend scarce resources on such – often expensive – incentives. To target them 
correctly or perhaps abandon them completely may be of fiscal importance for many developing 
countries. Also, a better understanding of what is driving such incentives could suggest ways of 
reducing outlays to them. If, for instance, competition among countries creates a situation where 
countries spend huge amounts on incentives, coordination should probably be high on the agenda. 
Data constraints and challenging policy simultaneity has created excess demand for empirical 
investigations on investment incentives.  
As the debate on exports and growth is turning away from exports as such, and towards quality and 
sophistication of export products, identification of policy measures available to developing and 
transition countries capable of raising export product quality appear to us as an important task for 
research. Infrastructure reforms seem to work differently in different sectors. To understand why this 
is the case could be important for improving policy designs.  The role of FDI and other factors 
accommodating infrastructure reforms is another interesting avenue for future research. The latter 
reminds us about the simultaneous character of the economic mechanisms studied in this thesis.   
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Chapter 2 
Industrial labor productivities and tariffs in South Africa: 
Identification based on multilateral liberalization reform
With Jørn Rattsø, NTNU 
13
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Industrial labor productivities and tariffs in South Africa: 
Identification based on multilateral liberalization reform 
Torfinn Harding, Statistics Norway and Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU) torfinn.harding@ssb.no and Jørn Rattsø, Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology jorn.rattso@svt.ntnu.no.
Abstract 
The analysis of the effect of tariffs for labor productivity faces the challenge of tariff 
policy endogeneity. Tariff policy is designed to promote economic development and the 
industrial sector tariff structure may reflect characteristics of the industries protected. We 
take advantage of the multilateral tariff liberalization and seek to identify the effect of 
tariffs using reductions in industrial sector tariffs in other world regions as instruments 
for sectoral tariff reductions in South Africa. Employing an industrial sector panel for the 
period 1988-2003 and various dynamic formulations we find that tariff reductions have 
stimulated labor productivity. 
Date: June 11, 2008 
JEL – codes: F13, F43, O11, O33, O55, Key words – Trade policy, policy evaluation, 
barriers to growth, technology adoption, South Africa, labor productivity 
*) We appreciate discussions at the TIPS South Africa Forum, staff seminars at the 
NTNU, Statistics Norway, and University of Oslo, and comments in particular from 
Ådne Cappelen, Xinshen Diao, Lawrence Edwards, Johannes Fedderke, Stephen Gelb, 
Steinar Holden, Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, Ravi Kanbur, Terry Roe, Dirk van Seventer, 
Terje Skjerpen, Hildegunn Stokke, and Kjetil Storesletten. The project is financed by the 
Norwegian Research Council.   
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1. Introduction 
Do tariffs affect labor productivity? We investigate this relationship using data for 
industrial sector development and tariffs for South Africa. The main challenge for any 
policy evaluation is to take into account the endogeneity of policy. Trade policy typically 
is part of industrial policy and the sectoral tariff rates are designed to promote sectoral 
policy goals. Correlations between tariffs and productivity may reflect political responses 
to sectoral productivity development. We take advantage of multilateral tariff reform and 
use industrial sector tariffs of countries in other world regions as instruments for tariff 
reductions in South Africa. The development of industrial sector tariffs predicted by the 
industrial sector tariff development in other world regions is assumed to be independent 
of domestic policy priorities.  
We apply the Trade and Industry Policy Studies (TIPS, 2004) industrial sector panel data 
for the period 1988-2003 covering 28 manufacturing industries in South Africa. The 
panel data allows for calculation of labor productivity and this is related to sectoral tariff 
rates. The tariff rates are instrumented using sectoral tariff rates for similar countries in 
three world regions, Latin-America, Middle-East and South Asia. Various model 
specifications are investigated to check the robustness of the results and reveal the 
dynamics of adjustment. The results consistently show that reduced industrial sector 
tariffs have contributed to higher labor productivities.  
The effect of trade policy for productivity and growth is a classic issue in policy 
evaluation and has been analyzed in an enormous literature including case studies, 
country time series and cross-country econometric analysis. The literature has exploited 
data at the plant/firm level, industrial sector level and country aggregates. The industrial 
sector level has the advantage of long panel data. Recent country studies, using industrial 
sector data and with ambition to capture causal effect of trade policy, include Ferreira and 
Rossi (2003) and Muendler (2004) for Brazil, Fernandes (2007) and Karacaovali (2006) 
for Columbia, and Amiti and Konings (2005) for Indonesia. All these authors apply 
instruments to represent changes in tariffs, and the instruments are typically constructed 
from other industrial sector characteristics than productivity. A related literature 
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addresses tariffs and productivity at the firm level (Pavcnik, 2002). While this approach 
certainly represents an improvement compared to the earlier literature, there are potential 
simultaneities involved in using sectoral characteristics to predict sectoral tariff policies. 
Alternative contributions are offered by Trefler (2004) and Romalis (2007). Trefler 
studies trade policy reform in the context of the Canada – US free trade agreement. 
Romalis uses US tariff barriers to predict the openness of developing countries in a cross 
country study. We suggest to use other countries sectoral tariffs to predict tariffs in South 
Africa and thereby avoid the dependence on internal industrial characteristics.  
The dominating understanding of productivity growth in middle income countries like 
South Africa is ‘catching up’. This approach has historical roots in Gerschenkron’s 
(1962) analysis of development out of backwardness and was formalized by Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) as technology adoption. They assume that individual country productivity 
growth is determined by the gap to the world technology frontier and factors affecting the 
technology adoption. Caselli and Coleman (2006) offer an application of the world 
technology frontier in a cross-country analysis using aggregate data. Recent theoretical 
advances are discussed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) in an overview of the 
literature on international externalities and economic growth. Aghion and Howitt (2005) 
elaborate various appropriate growth frameworks and their ‘Schumpeter meets 
Gerschenkron’ covers catching up to the world frontier. In this context tariffs affect the 
international spillover of technologies. Our analysis includes the world technology 
frontier described by sectoral labor productivities in the U.S.. The results indicate that the 
catching up model is relevant to understand productivity growth in South Africa. 
The econometric challenges are discussed in section 2, and section 3 offers a first look at 
the data. The econometric analysis is presented in section 4, and section 5 gives 
concluding remarks. 
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2. Econometric challenges 
Trade liberalization may or may not improve labor productivity. Trade policy is 
controversial because strong economic interests and ideological views are involved, but 
also because the effects of trade policy are unclear. In theory two strong arguments are in 
conflict, infant industry versus technology adoption. Protecting industries while they are 
fostered and made ready for international competition has for long been the main 
argument for import substitution policies. Such trade policy easily ends up protecting 
low-productivity industries, but can also be used to stimulate high-productivity sectors. 
Learning from international technological spillovers in an open economy has been the 
opposite strategy. Theoretically there are many potential linkages between trade policy 
and productivity. Empirical analyses have not solved the controversy as case studies 
always are open for interpretation and econometric studies have run into serious 
methodological problems of policy endogeneity. Rodrik (1995) offers a nice overview of 
the literature on the political economy of tariff protection, and his discussion shows how 
trade policy is part of industrial policy. 
Besley and Case (2000) present a simple model of political decision making in the 
context of policy evaluation with endogenous policy as right hand side variable in 
regressions. The endogeneity can be understood as an omitted variables story. In our 
setting policy output is measured as labor productivity, the policy is tariffs, and a set of 
economic variables explain labor productivity. The tariff policy is a function of economic 
and political variables typically not controlled for in the estimation of labor productivity 
equations. Given this broad understanding of the problem, the Besley and Case 
arguments imply that the probability limit of the OLS estimate of the coefficient for the 
tariff variable has two sources of bias:  
1. Bias due to the presence of unobservable variables that may determine both the 
tariff policy and the labor productivity.  
2. Omitted variable bias caused by observable variables that determine tariff policy 
and that have independent influence on labor productivity. Political preferences 
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for industrial sector production and imployment may influence sectoral tariffs 
over time. Controlling for such variables in practice is hard to do, in particular 
since they are themselves endogenous.   
When governments protect low productivity industries, high sectoral tariffs will be 
associated with low sectoral productivity growth. A simple econometric analysis 
assuming that tariffs affect productivity will conclude that tariffs hold back productivity. 
OLS will overestimate the effect of tariffs. When governments protect high productivity 
industries OLS will underestimate the tariff effect. 
The relationship between industrial characteristics and trade policy has been investigated 
recently. Ferreira and Facchini (2005) show that more concentrated industries are more 
protected. Karacaovali (2006) offers a two-way analysis of tariffs and productivity for 
Columbia. He finds that sectors with high productivity are liberalized less. Trade 
liberalization is used to increase foreign exposure for low productivity industries. These 
studies support the understanding that the design of trade policy takes into account 
industrial characteristics. The endogeneity of policy is a serious challenge for policy 
evaluation. 
The recent analyses of trade policy and productivity instrumenting trade policy represent 
an attempt at correcting for the endogeneity. Ferreira and Rossi (2003) discuss the 
endogeneity, but concludes that ‘endogeneity is not a problem with respect to tariff 
determination’ in Brazil. They base this conclusion on the observation that tariffs were 
reduced proportionally across industries. Muendler (2004) applies domestic and foreign 
price and exchange rate components as instruments. Fernandez (2003) control for 
endogeneity by using lagged tariff rates in Columbia. Karacaovali (2006) uses among 
other variables capital to output ratios and material prices to instrument the import ratio 
as determinant of tariffs in his analysis of Columbia. Amiti and Konings (2005) use old 
tariffs to instrument for present tariffs in a study of Indonesia. The studies referred to 
above all use instruments that are unlikely to be independent of productivity and 
therefore are not well suited to identify the tariff effect. 
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An alternative approach is to look for tariff reform. Trefler (2004) makes use of the 
Canada - U.S. free trade agreement as an experiment of trade policy shift. We study a 
more continuous trade liberalization process and must look for exogenous background 
factors driving trade reform. In the broader literature of applied political economy, 
characteristics of the political system are typically used to instrument policies. This is 
hard to do properly in a disaggregated analysis of industrial sectors. If disaggregated 
political factors relevant at the sectoral level are observed, such as lobbying, they are 
themselves endogenous to sectoral productivity. Romalis (2007) use U.S. tariff barriers as 
instruments for the openness of developing countries. Our use of other countries tariff 
liberalization as instruments shares the view that good instruments can be found abroad. 
Overseas tariff changes are correlated with South African ones and are expected to be 
uncorrelated with South African industry productivity. 
South Africa is one of many countries participating in multilateral liberalization of import 
tariffs under the coordination of GATT and later WTO. We use the fact that the tariff 
phase down was the result of international negotiations and therefore harmonized across 
countries. It should be noticed that the tariff negotiations have affected the bound tariffs, 
but actual tariffs that we use have broadly followed the course set by the bound tariffs. It 
is an empirical question whether actual South African tariffs have followed the 
harmonized pattern of actual tariffs and we show that they do. As will come clear, most 
of the world wide tariff reductions, and also in South Africa, came during the 1990s. 
Industry-specific shocks may have driven industry tariff rates across countries and will be 
a concern for the validity of the instrument. We use time dummies to account for such 
shocks. Data and econometric tests presented below confirm that international industrial 
sector tariff reductions can serve as identification of tariff policy effects in South Africa. 
The robustness of the identification strategy is further investigated and discussed below. 
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3. A first look at the data 
The analysis is based on the 3-digit panel data set of manufacturing industries in South 
Africa provided by TIPS (2004).1 Labor productivity, y, is simply sector value added, 
measured in 1995 Rand, divided by number of people employed (including casual and 
seasonal workers) in the sector. Appendix Table 1 documents the data, and the average 
South Africa labor productivity in our sample is 140 000 Rand per worker. The average 
logarithmic growth rate of labor productivity is 4 percent. 
We use applied tariffs, rather than applied and most favored nation (MFN) tariffs. As 
explained by Nicita and M. Olarreaga (2006), applied rates take into consideration the 
available data for preferential schemes.2 The tariff data are disaggregated at 3-digit 
international manufacturing sector level and classified according to ISIC Rev. 2.3
Appendix Table 2 shows the matching of the sectors. We apply sectoral tariff changes in 
countries in other world regions as instruments for tariff changes in South Africa. We 
focus on similar middle income countries and look at three regions – Latin-America and 
Caribbean (LAC), Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) and South Asia (SA).4
Beyond the analysis of tariffs and labor productivity we add the world frontier labor 
productivity represented by industrial sectors in the U.S.. Consistent with the above 
South African data we apply 3-digit U.S. data to calculate manufacturing sector labor 
productivities. The U.S. data are published by Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and 
are classified according to SIC 87.5 Labor productivity for the US, y*, is defined as value 
added in 2000 USD, and is found by deflating value added measured in millions of 
current USD with the published corresponding price indices. These indices are 100 in 
2000. As a measure of number of workers per sector we use the published full time and 
1 The data are now available at: http://www.quantec.co.za/
2
 MFN rates are those granted to all WTO members to whom no preferential access is granted. 
3 The data are available at http://go.worldbank.org/EQW3W5UTP0
4
 The relevant countries in these regions with tariff data that are included in the analysis: 9 countries in LAC (Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and Suriname), 6 countries in MENA (Algeria, 
Arab Rep. Egypt, Islamic Rep. Iran, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and 1 country in SA (Sri Lanka). 
5 The classification has been changed over time from SIC72 to SIC87 to NAICS97. We first merge the U.S. data 
according to SIC87 and then merge the U.S. data with the South African data. For access to and description of the 
data, see: http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn2/iedguide.htm#GPO
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part time employees, measured in thousands of employees. As shown in Appendix Table 
1, the mean U.S. labor productivity is 95 000 USD per worker in our sample. The average 
logarithmic growth rate of labor productivity in the U.S. is 2 percent, and consequently 
the raw data indicate catching up productivity growth in South Africa.  
The development of selected sectoral tariffs in South Africa is shown in Figure 1. The 
sectors shown are basic chemicals, basic iron and ore, basic non-ferrous metals, motor 
vehicles parts and accessories, other transport equipment, and textiles. The tariffs have 
been reduced for almost all industrial sectors during the period studied. The size of the 
full period reduction varies, but is about 50% on average. Tariffs have been reduced over 
the whole period, but with particular sharp reductions around 1995-96, consistent with 
the  multilateral reform promoted by the Uruguay round. The sharp reduction for 1995-96 
in particular is pronounced for basic chemicals and basic metals.6 The broad tariff policy 
of South Africa is analyzed by Edwards (2005). 
Figure 1 about here. 
The development of tariffs for the same selected industries in the three regions (LAC, SA 
and MENA) is also shown in Figure 1. Broadly the tariff reductions in South Africa are 
consistent with the tariff development in the three mentioned regions. World tariff 
reductions during the 1990s, certainly in the regions we look at, seem to have moved in 
tandem and then as a part of world-wide reform. The diagrams indicate that other regions 
sectoral tariff development may predict South African tariffs. 
The tariffs are related to labor productivity. The development of labor productivities for 
the same selected industries in South Africa and the U.S. during 1988-2003 are shown in 
Figure 2. Overall South Africa has had positive labor productivity growth in 
manufacturing industries, but across industries the performance is quite heterogeneous. 
The diagrams broadly confirm the strong catching up to the U.S.. Productivity growth in 
South Africa has been higher in basic iron and steel, basic non-ferrous metals and motor 
6
 Also electrical machinery, metal products, non-metallic minerals, plastic products, and other industries experienced 
such sharp reductions (not shown). 
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vehicles parts and accessories, similar to the U.S. in basic chemicals and other transport 
equipment, and below in textiles. The time paths differ, but many of the growth sectors 
have a take off around 1996-97.  
Figure 2 about here. 
Graphical observation of the raw data supports the understanding that the development of 
labor productivity in South Africa and the U.S. is linked and that a period of rising labor 
productivity has been associated with reduced tariff levels. The interaction between the 
three factors needs to be investigated econometrically. 
4. Econometric analysis 
The econometric analysis seeks to reveal a relationship between sectoral labor 
productivities and tariffs. Given the dataset for 28 industrial sectors during 1988-2003 we 
have all in all about 400 observations for South Africa. The two basic variables of the 
analysis are the growth rate of sectoral labor productivity ǻln ity  (sector i, year t) and 
tariff rate ittr . The econometric specification investigates alternative dynamics of the 
response of labor productivity to tariffs. The adjustment process towards long run 
equilibrium is expected to be much longer than the observation period. In this case we are 
primarily able to identify the transition effect of tariff reform. This motivates estimation 
of the effects of tariffs on labor productivity growth. Sectoral fixed effects take into 
account time-invariant variation in labor productivity across sectors. Year fixed effects 
control for common shocks and trends over time. In the benchmark relationship we 
assume one-period lag of the tariff effect: 
1ln it i t ity trD D E '            (1) 
The main econometric challenge in estimating the relationship is the endogeneity of 
tariffs with respect to labor productivity. To handle the endogeneity we apply a standard 
two stage least square method with instrument variables to predict the sectoral tariff 
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levels. In the first stage sectoral tariffs are predicted by sectoral tariff levels in three 
world regions assumed to capture the multilateral liberalization that South Africa was 
part of. In the second stage the predicted sectoral tariffs are included as independent 
variables in the analysis of sectoral labor productivities.  
In the first stage the one-year lagged South African sectoral tariff rates tr-1 are related to 
the two-year and three-year lagged sectoral tariff rates of the three regions LAC (Latin 
America and the Caribbean), MENA (Middle East and South Africa) and SA (South 
Asia). The first stage estimation also includes sector and year fixed effects. Column 1 in 
Table 1 shows the first stage regression for the basic model of equation (1). The sectoral 
tariff developments in all three regions seem to have predictive power for the sectoral 
tariff developments in South Africa. Columns 2 - 5 report first stage estimates of 
extended models presented in Table 2. 
Table 1 about here. 
Shea R-square and the F-test, reported in the second stage tables, indicate the predictive 
power of the instruments. Shea R-square above 0.10 and p-values of the F-test below 
0.10 is generally regarded as support of predictive power.7 We also report p-values of a 
Sargan test in the second stage tables. An insignificant Sargan-test, Sargan p-value above 
0.10, is taken as indication of a valid exclusion restriction, making us more confident that 
our instruments should not be included directly in the second stage. Our Sargan-tests are 
generally insignificant and supports our intuition: the South African productivity level in 
sector i in year t is unlikely to be endogenous to the average tariff level in the 
corresponding sectors in these geographically distant regions in year t-2 or t-3. 
The first column in Table 2 presents the second stage estimation of equation (1) and 
suggests a negative and, at the 5%-level, statistically significant relationship between 
tariffs and labor productivity growth. The estimated coefficient of -0.8 implies that 10 
percent higher tariff level reduces the productivity growth about 1 percentage point. The 
                                                
7
 See Shea, J. (1996) for an explanation of Shea R-square.  
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quantitative effect is quite large and the economic interpretation is that tariff reductions 
stimulate the transition growth of labor productivity.  
Table 2 about here 
This basic relationship between tariffs and productivity growth using year and sector 
fixed effects and instrumentation of tariffs represents the core of our analysis. Two 
specification issues are worth pursuing: the relationship between domestic and 
international productivity growth and dynamics. Discussions of the methodology and 
alternative specifications are offered by Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2004) and 
Rattsø and Stokke (2003).  
Productivity growth in the open economy is understood as ‘catching up’ to the world 
technology frontier and involving international productivity spillover. The barriers to 
growth model originated by Nelson and Phelps (1966) assumes a long run equilibrium 
where individual country productivity is proportional to the world technology frontier. 
The proportionality factor is affected by barriers such as tariffs and tariff-reduction may 
allow catching up to world technology. This is investigated in relationships expanded to 
take into account the role of the world sectoral labor productivity frontier, *ity ,
measured as the labor productivities in corresponding US industrial sectors. This variable 
takes out all global time-varying sector-specific shocks. Alternative dynamic 
formulations are investigated, first expanding the benchmark model with the world 
frontier and interaction with tariffs, then in an error-correction formulation and finally 
using the productivity gap as dependent variable.  
The extension of the basic model including the world frontier and interaction looks like 
this: 
1 2 1 2ln ln * ln *it it t it ty tr y tr yD E J G   '          (2) 
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Column 2 in Table 2 adds the world frontier sectoral labor productivity level.  The world 
frontier has no independent effect on the labor productivity growth in South Africa in this 
specification. This is still true when we in column 3 add interaction between the tariff 
level and the world frontier.  Our understanding of the lack of a world frontier effect is 
that time dummies already take care of the trend growth represented by the world 
frontier. Exclusion of time dummies does not provide robust and stable results. Table 3 
reports an alternative formulation of equation (2) as the world frontier is included on 
growth form. Again the world frontier has no separate effect on the productivity growth. 
The tariff effect is robust across the alternative model formulations, both in terms of 
quantitative size and statistical significance. 
Table 3 about here. 
To check for the robustness of the relationship we investigate alternative dynamic 
specifications. The error correction model separates between short and long run 
adjustments and excludes time dummies. The length of the time series allows for 
specification with lagged endogenous variable and sector fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is still the growth rate of sectoral labor productivity, and the full model is: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3
2 2 3
ln ln ln * ln *
ln *
it i it it it it it
it it
y y tr tr y y
tr y
D D E E J J
J
    
 
'    '   ' 

We start out in the first column of Table 4 with only the tariffs on level and first 
difference form. The coefficient of the tariff level effect is basically the same as the 
results in Table 2 and Table 3 above, about -0.8, and with the same statistical 
significance. The coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable is statistically significant 
at the 1% level and shows slow adjustment of labor productivity over time. The implied 
long run negative tariff effect on labor productivity is quite high, and our understanding 
is that the data sample is too short to identify the long run effect. The strong transition 
effect of tariffs is translated into an even stronger long run effect, but in a dataset that 
cannot show the true long run implications. The extension of the error correction 
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specification to include the world frontier on level and first difference form in column 2 
does not add new effects. When interaction between tariffs and frontier is added in the 
full error correction model, column 3 in Table 4, the world frontier emerges with 
statistically significant effect. The quantitative effect of the tariff rate is similar to above, 
and again understood as a transition effect. An increase in the world frontier labor 
productivity level raises the labor productivity growth in South Africa. 
Table 4 about here. 
An alternative specification sets the focus directly on the catching up towards the world 
frontier. The effect of tariffs on the productivity gap y/y* is investigated directly. In 
Table 5 different lags of the tariff effect on the productivity gap is shown. The results 
show a consistent negative effect of tariffs on the productivity gap. Higher tariffs increase 
the distance to the world frontier labor productivity, and 10% higher tariffs increases the 
gap by about 2%. Columns 1 and 2 include different lags with both sectoral and year 
fixed effects. When time dummies are excluded in columns 3 and 4 basically the same 
results come out.8
Table 5 about here. 
To investigate the potential bias we report OLS estimates corresponding to Table 2 in 
Table 6. The negative association between tariffs and productivity across industrial 
sectors is less robust in the OLS estimates. The tariff effects are in general much smaller 
than in the instrument variable estimation. The OLS estimates are biased downwards. 
First it should be noticed that bias confirms the need for instruments to control for 
endogenous determination of tariffs. Then the downward bias supports the understanding 
that the government has given priority to tariff reductions in sectors with slow 
productivity growth. The government has attempted to open up for international spillover 
                                                
8
 In Table 5 the Sargan-test is significant and it may point to invalid exclusion of the instruments from the second stage. 
Given our other results, a strict interpretation could be that labor productivity in the U.S. is affected by the tariff 
levels in these countries. We are interested in South Africa’s catch up to the frontier and we interpret the results of 
Table 5 to be consistent with our overall findings.       
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in sectors that needed this most. When we control for this endogeneity we increase the 
productivity enhancing effect of tariff reductions.  
Table 6 about here. 
To investigate the validity of the instruments further we have estimated the relationship 
between South African industrial productivity growth and the tariff rates of the three 
regions. The econometric formulation reported in Table 7 includes sector and year fixed 
effects. The effect of the productivity growth rates is investigated with 1 and 2 lags and 
with and without the world frontier variable. As seen from the Table, there is no 
statistically significant relation between sectoral productivity growth in South Africa and 
the tariffs used as instruments. 
Table 7 about here. 
5. Conclusion 
We have evaluated the effect of tariff policy on labor productivity in industrial sectors in 
South Africa using other countries sectoral tariffs as instruments. The tariff liberalization 
in South Africa has been part of a multilateral process, and other countries’ sectoral tariff 
developments work as good predictors of tariffs in South Africa. In this way we 
circumvent the methodological challenge of tariff policy endogenity in estimating the 
tariff effect on productivity. 
The industrial sectors in South Africa have generally experienced increasing labor 
productivities during the period investigated, 1988-2003. Our analysis confirms that the 
productivity growth has been linked to tariff reductions. Industrial sector tariff changes 
instrumented by other regions tariff development are significantly related to industrial 
labor productivity. It should be noticed that the dataset covers both increases and 
decreases of sectoral tariffs and both improvements and setbacks in sectoral labor 
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productivities. Overall the period can be seen as gradual tariff reductions associated with 
improvements in labor productivity. 
The results are consistent with an understanding of tariff rates as barriers to technology 
adoption. It seems realistic to assume that domestic factors also serve as barriers to 
learning from abroad. It is a challenge for future research to capture such domestic 
barriers, but it will be hard to overcome the endogeneity of such barriers and identify the 
causal effects of them for spillovers and productivity.  
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Table 1: First stage estimation of sectoral tariffs -- corresponding to Table 2 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable tr-1 tr-1 tr-1 x ln y*-2 tr-1 tr-1 x ln y*-2 
tr-2 LAC -0.132 -0.156 -0.013 0.367*** 0.044 
 [0.194] [0.194] [0.315] [0.130] [0.207] 
tr-2 MENA 0.120** 0.121** -0.106 0.168*** -0.092 
 [0.057] [0.057] [0.092] [0.045] [0.072] 
tr-2 SA 0.131** 0.258*** 0.758*** 0.375*** 0.717*** 
 [0.063] [0.097] [0.157] [0.081] [0.130] 
tr-3 LAC 0.303*** 0.295*** 0.124 0.015 0.141* 
 [0.103] [0.103] [0.167] [0.052] [0.082] 
tr-3 MENA 0.007 -0.007 0.045 -0.085* 0.004 
 [0.056] [0.056] [0.092] [0.045] [0.072] 
tr-3 SA -0.017 -0.112 -0.870*** -0.219** -0.762*** 
 [0.073] [0.091] [0.148] [0.085] [0.135] 
ln y*-2  -0.027* 0.277*** -0.041*** 0.274*** 
    [0.016] [0.026] [0.014] [0.022] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 305 305 305 305 305 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.70 0.31 0.68 
R-squared overall 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.67 0.64 
 Note: Column 1 corresponds to column 1 in Table 2, column 2 to column 2 and 3 in table 2, column 3 to column 3 in 
table 2 and column 4 and 5 to column 4 in table 2. tr-X means average applied tariffs among lower middle income 
countries in region Z, lagged X periods. The regions, defined as World Bank regions as of July 2006, are: LAC (Latin 
America and the Caribbean), MENA (Middle East and North Africa) and SA (South Asia). All models include 
contemporaneous capacity utilization. 
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Table 2: First difference of log of labor productivity, labor productivity level of 
world frontier --IV estimation 
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable dln y dln y dln y dln y 
Second stage     
tr-1 -0.840** -0.948** -0.830** 0.087 
 [0.419] [0.411] [0.412] [0.263] 
ln y*-2  0.015 0.082 0.158* 
  [0.022] [0.077] [0.085] 
tr-1 x ln y*-2   -0.194 -0.458* 
      [0.214] [0.238] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage tr-1:     
Shea partial R2 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.22 
Partial R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.30 
F 4.95 5.38 5.38 19.54 
F, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First stage tr-1 x ln y*-2:     
Shea partial R2   0.19 0.13 
Partial R2   0.15 0.17 
F   7.52 9.35 
F, p-value     0.00 0.00 
Df 6 6 6 6 
df_r 260 259 259 269 
Observations 305 305 305 305 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 28 
Sargan statistics 1.85 1.65 1 3.96 
Sargan P-value 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.41 
F-value 4.95 5.38 2.57 3.13 
Fdf1 260 259 259 269 
Fdf2 6 6 6 6 
Note: Instruments are as shown in table 1. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All estimations include contemporary capacity utilization as control variable. df and df_r give 
degrees of freedom in the F-test for the instruments’ prediction power in the first stage. These numbers are the same for 
all first stages within the same column.  
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Table 3: First difference of log of labor productivity, labor productivity growth of 
world frontier -- IV estimation 
  1 2 3 
Dependent variable dln y dln y dln y 
Second stage    
tr-1 -0.848** -0.841** -0.140 
 [0.420] [0.418] [0.212] 
dln y*-2 -0.004 0.136 0.593* 
 [0.037] [0.356] [0.322] 
tr-1 x dln y*-2  -0.396 -1.704* 
    [1.009] [0.913] 
Year FE Yes Yes No 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
First stage tr-1    
Shea partial R2 0.10 0.10 0.29 
Partial R2 0.10 0.10 0.29 
F 4.93 4.93 18.09 
F, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First stage tr-1 x dln y*-2    
Shea partial R2  0.07 0.08 
Partial R2  0.07 0.08 
F  3.15 3.95 
F, p-value   0.01 0.00 
Df 6 6 6 
df_r 259 259 269 
Observations 305 305 305 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 
Sargan statistics 1.84 1.71 4.31 
Sargan P-value 0.87 0.79 0.37 
F-value 4.93 3.14 3.93 
Fdf1 259 259 269 
Fdf2 6 6 6 
Note: Instruments are as shown in table 1. All are included in second and third lag. Standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include contemporary capacity 
utilization as control variable. df and df_r give degrees of freedom in the F-test for the instruments’ prediction power in 
the first stage. These numbers are the same for all first stages within the same column. 
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Table 4: First difference of log of labor productivity, error correction model  
-- IV estimation 
  1 2 3 
Dependent variable dln y dln y dln y 
Second stage    
ln y-1 -0.162*** -0.171*** -0.250*** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.051] 
dtr-1 -0.333 -0.309 0.280 
 [0.387] [0.393] [0.485] 
tr-2 -0.746*** -0.824*** -0.677*** 
 [0.264] [0.247] [0.251] 
dln y*-2  -0.001 0.038 
  [0.036] [0.040] 
ln y*-3  0.016 0.241** 
  [0.023] [0.116] 
tr-2 x ln y*-3   -0.629** 
      [0.319] 
Year FE No No No 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
First stage dtr-1    
Shea partial R2 0.16 0.16 0.10 
Partial R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 
F 6.45 6.40 6.40 
F, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First stage tr-2    
Shea partial R2 0.21 0.24 0.28 
Partial R2 0.17 0.19 0.19 
F 8.81 10.67 10.67 
F, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First stage tr-2 x ln y*-1    
Shea partial R2   0.08 
Partial R2   0.10 
F   4.94 
F, p-value     0.00 
Df 6 6 6 
df_r 267 265 265 
Observations 304 304 304 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 
Sargan statistics 4.78 5.05 1.48 
Sargan P-value 0.31 0.28 0.69 
F-value 4.98 5.35 2.38 
Fdf1 267 265 265 
Fdf2 6 6 6 
R-squared centered 0.02 -0.01 0.05 
Note: Instruments are as shown in table 1. All are included in second and third lag. Standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include one period lagged and 
contemporary first differenced capacity utilization as control variables. df and df_r give degrees of freedom in the F-
test for the instruments’ prediction power in the first stage. These numbers are the same for all first stages within the 
same column. 
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Table 5: Relative productivity--IV estimation 
  1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable y/y* y/y* y/y* y/y* 
Second stage     
tr-1 -1.242*** 0.386 -0.771*** -0.006 
 [0.403] [0.783] [0.186] [0.378] 
tr-2  -1.881** -1.030** 
    [0.743]   [0.438] 
Year FE Yes Yes No No 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage tr-1     
Shea partial R2 0.10 0.06 0.29 0.15 
Partial R2 0.10 0.10 0.29 0.29 
F 4.95 4.95 18.15 18.15 
F, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
First stage tr-2     
Shea partial R2  0.05  0.10 
Partial R2  0.10  0.20 
F  4.71  11.02 
F, p-value   0.00   0.00 
Df 6 6 6 6 
df_r 260 260 270 270 
Observations 305 305 305 305 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 28 
Sargan statistics 65.78 46.77 77.33 65.51 
Sargan P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-value 4.95 2.28 18.15 5.04 
Fdf1 260 260 270 270 
Fdf2 6 6 6 6 
Note: Instruments are as shown in table 1. All are included in second and third lag. Standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include contemporary capacity 
utilization as control variable. df and df_r give degrees of freedom in the F-test for the instruments’ prediction power in 
the first stage. These numbers are the same for all first stages within the same column. 
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Table 6: First difference of log of labor productivity--OLS estimation 
  1 2 3 
Dependent variable dln y dln y dln y 
tr-1 -0.128 -0.129 -0.231** 
 [0.095] [0.095] [0.111] 
ln y*-2  0.005 0.047 
  [0.017] [0.030] 
tr-1 x ln y*-2   -0.128* 
      [0.073] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 409 409 409 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.14 
R-squared overall 0.13 0.13 0.10 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations 
include contemporary capacity utilization as control variable. 
Table7: Instrument validity, the effect of productivity growth for instrument tariffs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  LAC LAC MENA MENA SA SA 
dln y-1 0.021 0.020 0.005 0.009 0.047 0.023 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.042] [0.042] [0.057] [0.046] 
ln y*-2  0.005  -0.032**  0.192*** 
  [0.009]  [0.013]  [0.014] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 413 413 386 386 386 386 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.31 0.33 0.46 0.66 
       
       
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  LAC LAC MENA MENA SA SA 
dln y-2 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.029 -0.006 -0.015 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.042] [0.042] [0.056] [0.045] 
ln y*-2  0.005  -0.032**  0.192*** 
  [0.009]  [0.013]  [0.014] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 413 413 386 386 386 386 
Number of group(code sector) 28 28 28 28 28 28 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.31 0.33 0.46 0.66 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable 
is average applied tariffs among lower middle income countries in the region indicated. The regions, defined as World 
Bank regions as of July 2006, are: LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
and SA (South Asia). All models include contemporaneous capacity utilization. 
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Figure 1: Tariffs in South Africa, LAC, MENA and SA 
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Note: tr and tr Z measure interpolated tariffs in South Africa and region Z respectively. The 
regional measures are simple averages of the specific sectors’ tariff level in year t, across the 
countries in region Z.  
Figure 2: Labor productivity in South Africa and US 
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Note: y and y* measure sectoral labor productivities in South Africa and the U.S. respectively. 
The indexes are scaled relative to the level of 1988.  
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable No. of observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Y 305 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.83 
ln y 305 -2.39 0.83 -3.88 -0.19 
dln y 305 0.04 0.10 -0.40 0.50 
y*-2 305 0.95 1.42 0.23 12.46 
ln y*-2 305 -0.34 0.59 -1.47 2.52 
dln y*-2 305 0.02 0.17 -2.59 0.43 
tr-1 305 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.74 
tr-1 x ln y*-2 305 -0.05 0.21 -0.91 1.21 
tr-2 LAC 305 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.38 
tr-2 MENA 305 0.34 0.15 0.13 1.21 
tr-2 SA 305 0.27 0.32 0.03 2.28 
tr-3 LAC 305 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.85 
tr-3 MENA 305 0.34 0.15 0.13 1.21 
tr-3 SA 305 0.29 0.33 0.05 2.28 
Total 305 0.81 0.06 0.65 0.97 
Note: The sample corresponds to Table 2. tr-X means average applied tariffs among lower middle income countries in 
the particular region. The regions, defined as World Bank regions as of July 2006, are: LAC (Latin America and the 
Caribbean), MENA (Middle East and North Africa) and SA (South Asia). X denotes the number of lags. Scale: average 
tr-1 is 14%, average y is 140 000 1995 Rands per worker, average y* is 95 000 2000 USD per worker. 
Appendix Table 2: Sector concordances 
SA Code SA Name ISICRev2 Code ISICRev2 Name 
SIC87 
Code SIC87 Name 
12101 Food [301-304] 311 Food products 20 Food and kindred products 
12102 Beverages [305] 313 Beverages 20 Food and kindred products 
12103 Tobacco [306] 314 Tobacco 21 Tobacco products 
12111 Textiles [311-312] 321 Textiles 22 Textile mill products 
12112 Wearing apparel [313-315] 322 Wearing apparel  except footwear 23 Apparel and other textile products 
12113 Leather & leather products [316] 323 Leather products 31 Leather and leather products 
12114 Footwear [317] 324 Footwear  except rubber or plastic 31 Leather and leather products 
12121 Wood & wood products [321-322] 331 Wood products  except furniture 24 Lumber and wood products 
12122 Paper & paper products [323] 341 Paper and products 26 Paper and allied products 
12123 Printing, publishing & recorded media [324-326] 342 Printing and publishing 27 Printing and publishing 
12131 Coke & refined petroleum products [331-333]# 353 Petroleum refineries 29 Petroleum and coal products 
12132 Basic chemicals [334] 351 Industrial chemicals 28 Chemicals and allied products 
12133 Other chemicals & man-made fibers [335-336] 352 Other chemicals 28 Chemicals and allied products 
12134 Rubber products [337] 355 Rubber products 30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 
12135 Plastic products [338] 356 Plastic products 30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 
12141 Glass & glass products [341] 362 Glass and products 32 Stone, clay, and glass products 
12142 Non-metallic minerals [342]## 369 Other non-metallic mineral products 32 Stone, clay, and glass products 
12151 Basic iron & steel [351] 371 Iron and steel 33 Primary metal industries 
12152 Basic non-ferrous metals [352] 372 Non-ferrous metals 33 Primary metal industries 
12153 Metal products excluding machinery [353-355] 381 Fabricated metal products 34 Fabricated metal products 
12154 Machinery & equipment [356-359] 382 Machinery  except electrical 35 Machinery, except electrical 
12160 Electrical machinery [361-366] 383 Machinery  electric 36 Electric and electronic equipment 
12171 Television, radio & communication equipment [371-373] 383 Machinery  electric 36 Electric and electronic equipment 
12172 Professional & scientific equipment [374-376] 385 Professional and scientific equipment 38 Instruments and related products
12181 Motor vehicles, parts & accessories [381-383] 384 Transport equipment 37 Motor vehicles and equipment 
12182 Other transport equipment [384-387] 384 Transport equipment 37 Other transportation equipment 
12191 Furniture [391] 332 Furniture  except metal 25 Furniture and fixtures 
12193 Other industries [392] 390 Other manufactured products 39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
Note: Data on tariffs are classified according to ISIC Rev. 2, while BEA-data necessary for calculating labor 
productivity in the US was merged in according to the SIC87 classification. #Represented by 353 rather than 354, since 
353 is the largest (more than ten times the output). ##Represented by 369 rather than 361 since 369 is the largest (more 
than six times the number of employees).
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Abstract
To obtain credible estimates on existence of productivity spillovers through exports one needs to 
account for endogeneity of exports. Studies that attempt to do so offer mixed evidence. By combining 
data on South African manufacturing sectors with bilateral trade data we investigate the link between 
productivity exposure through exports and total factor productivity (TFP). Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates suggest a positive correlation between productivity levels of importers served by 
South Africa and South African total factor productivity. A two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
is implemented to account for potential endogeneity of export market exposure. Exports from groups 
of other countries are used to instrument exports from South Africa aiming to isolate variation in 
exports caused by demand shocks abroad. The 2SLS-results suggest the OLS-estimates to be biased 
upwards and the effect of destination-productivity on TFP to be negligible. Finally, the paper contrasts 
the link between export destinations and productivity to the link between exported products and 
productivity.  
* Norwegian University of Science and Technology and Statistics Norway, P.O.B. 8131 Dep., N-0033 Oslo, Norway, Email: 
torfinn.harding@ssb.no. I would like to thank my advisor Jørn Rattsø for important discussions, endorsements and notes on 
this paper. Thanks also to Joshua D. Angrist, Erik Biørn, Ådne Cappelen, Jon Fiva, Monica Hanssen, Magne Mogstad, Marte 
Rønning, Terje Skjerpen, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Hildegunn Ekroll Stokke, seminar participants at Statistics Norway and members 
of the group on trade and technology at the Advanced Graduate Workshop on Poverty, Development and Globalization in 
Manchester 2008 for helpful comments and suggestions. The project is financed by the Norwegian Research Council.  
41
1. Introduction
A much researched question the last decade is whether exports is a vehicle of productivity spillovers 
across international borders. Intuition and theory suggest potential for such a role. Interaction with 
customers and competitors abroad can open up a range of learning possibilities for exporters, as export 
markets often offer demanding customers and competitors that operate close to international best 
practices. These mechanisms are typically labeled learning-by-exporting in the large, and growing, 
micro literature on the association between exports and productivity.1 Despite intense efforts, a 
consensus on the existence of productivity spillovers through exports seems not to have been reached. 
Keller (2004) surveys the literature and appears to find little support for learning-by-exporting effects. 
Some recent contributions, on the other hand, seem to challenge such a conclusion by claiming 
supporting evidence of learning-by-exporting effects in developing and transition countries 
(Biesebroeck,  2005; Blalock, and Gertler, 2004; Loecker, 2007; Fernandes and Isgut, 2007).  
The debate on exports and growth has recently gained momentum in a more macro oriented literature 
focusing on links between characteristics of countries’ export baskets and their level of economic 
development or growth. Characteristics that have received attention are quality, diversification, 
implied potential for structural change and sophistication of products.     
Self-evidently, the quest for successful strategies creating economic development is of great 
importance and channels for productivity spillovers between countries may be of particular interest. 
Productivity differences account for most of the differences in GDP per capita levels across countries 
(Hall and Jones, 1999). Lucas (2007) argues that flows of production related knowledge from 
successful to less successful economies is the main mechanism by which income inequalities across 
countries can be reduced.
The current paper contributes to the debate on exports and growth by investigating the link between 
exposure to productivity through exports and total factor productivity. The idea is that if exports 
provide a channel of productivity spillovers from export markets to the exporter, such spillovers 
should be higher from export markets with high productivity than from export markets with low 
productivity. Such a mechanism suggests a positive association between the productivity level of the 
exporter and the productivity level met in export markets. To measure the exposure to productivity 
through exports we let us inspire by Hausmann et al. (2007).  They launch a measure, EXPY, which 
classifies an export basket according to the “inherent” productivity level of products exported. We 
1 See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Wagner (2007) for surveys.  
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define a measure, EXCY, which classifies an export basket according to the weighted average 
productivity level of the importers served by the exporter in question.  
We study exports from South Africa. To measure the productivity level of export destinations we 
follow Hausmann et al. (2007) and employ GDP per capita level (measured at PPP-exchange rates). 
EXCY is defined as a weighted average of the GDP per capita levels of the export destinations served 
by a particular sector in a particular year. The weights are value shares of the export destinations. 
South Africa export to 161 different destinations in the data used. The purpose of the paper is to test if 
higher EXCY is associated with higher sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) in South Africa. Firm 
level studies have started to investigate the role of heterogeneity across export destinations (Loecker, 
2007), but we are not aware of any macro oriented studies focusing on heterogeneity across export 
destinations and productivity.  
The paper more generally contributes to a literature that assigns technology spillovers to specific 
channels. Foreign direct investment, imports and exports are the typical channels tested (see 
referenced central contributions in Keller, 2004). As Keller (2004) points out, the single largest 
problem in this literature is likely to be endogeneity of the explanatory factors employed. For instance, 
exports may facilitate productivity spillovers from the export destination to the exporter. Exporters 
may also be the ones able to overcome fixed costs associated with exporting because they are 
productive (Melitz, 2003). Causal effects of productivity on international interaction may therefore 
exist, and a hypothesized causal relationship of international interaction on productivity could be 
overestimated.  
We seek to handle such potential endogeneity by a two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). The 
instrument suggested is imports to South Africa’s export destinations from groups of other exporting 
countries. The common variation in imports from South Africa and imports from other countries is 
interpreted as demand shocks in the importers.  
Trade data from Feenstra et al. (2005) are combined with a panel data set of 25 South African 
manufacturing sectors (TIPS, 2004), data on total factor productivity in US manufacturing sectors 
(NBER, 2000), and GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators (WDI).  We exploit 
variation across 161 importers, 25 sectors and 24 years in the first stage, and 25 sectors and 24 years in 
the second stage.
The OLS-results suggest a link between the productivity of export destinations and export-sector 
productivity. The effect is robust to sector and year fixed effects, measures of the international 
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technology frontier, export value at the sector level and different functional forms.  Comparison 
between OLS-estimates and 2SLS-estimates indicates that the OLS-estimates are severely biased 
upwards and we do not find support for the existence of productivity spillovers through exports in our 
setting.
Finally, the paper addresses the competing hypothesis proposed by Hausmann et al. (2007). In their 
paper, growth is found to be positively associated with the inherent product characteristics measured 
by EXPY. For EXPY we do not find support for a positive link either in OLS or in 2SLS. We suggest 
that more research is needed to conclude on the relative importance of exporting sophisticated 
products versus exporting to sophisticated destinations.   
2. Spillovers through exports
Keller (2004) refers early case studies – written since the 1960s – expressing enthusiasm about 
learning-by-exporting effects in East Asian countries. By now a rather large literature, offering 
econometric evidence mainly at the micro level, has investigated the existence of such learning-by-
exporting effects. The findings seem to be mixed. Exports are found to be associated with higher 
productivity. Two competing hypotheses could explain such a correlation: self-selection and learning-
by-exporting. Keller’s (2004) reading of this literature suggests that learning-by-exporting effects are 
hard to come by (se references within Keller, 2004).2  Some recent findings, on the other hand, support 
learning-by-exporting effects in developing and transition countries (see for instance Biesebroeck 
(2005) on Sub-Saharan Africa, Blalock, and Gertler (2004) on Indonesia,  Loecker (2007) on Slovenia, 
Fernandes and Isgut 2007 on Colombia).     
A more macro oriented literature on links between exports and development and growth has been 
concerned with different characteristics of countries’ exports. Export product quality – typically 
measured as unit values per product category – seems to vary systematically with the level of 
development across countries (Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005). Diversification of export 
baskets in terms of avoiding dependence on a few product markets is seen to be important as it reduces 
the volatility of foreign exchange income (Bertinelli et al., 2006; Levchenko and di Giovanni, 2006). 
The type of products in the export basket across countries is found to vary in terms of how applicable 
the production technology necessary to produce and export them is for other products. Investing in 
knowledge and capital with relevance for a broad set of products enhances capabilities of structural 
change (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006a and 2006b). Hausmann et al. (2007) find support for faster 
2 López (2005) seeks to reconcile the findings of self-selection of exporters with macro-literature suggesting positive 
productivity effects of exports. 
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growth in countries exporting more sophisticated products. In their analysis, sophisticated products are 
defined as products exported intensively by economies with high levels of GDP per capita.  
The current paper investigates heterogeneity across export destinations. To our knowledge empirical 
evidence on the role of heterogeneity in export destination characteristics is currently scarce, but there 
is a growing interest.3 Loecker (2007) exploits cross-sectional information on export destinations in a 
firm-level panel of Slovenian manufacturing firms. His findings lend support to higher instantaneous 
productivity gains for firms exporting to more developed regions. He argues that this is consistent with 
learning from interactions with buyers and competitors in export markets. We build on the same 
argument. If productivity spillovers through exports exist interactions with more productive export 
destinations should induce more productivity spillovers than exports to less productive destinations.  
A challenge is that the choice of export destinations may not be random but a function of exporter 
productivity. If, for instance, the competition met by exporters is more intense in developed (i.e. more 
productive) countries, we would expect only the more productive ones to survive in those markets. 
Other factors correlated with export-destination productivity (like purchasing power and market size) 
can also influence the exporters eager to serve the export destination in question. There are in other 
words reasons to worry that exporters’ choice of export markets is driven by factors correlated with 
both exporter productivity and export destination productivity. Loecker (2007) and Eaton et al. (2008) 
suggest positive correlation between number of markets served by a firm and the firm’s productivity. 
The background understanding is destination specific fixed costs of exporting. Intuitively, if a firm has 
something great going on it would manage to spread its products to many markets.  
As will become clear, our sector data offer an opportunity to test spillovers through exports in a more 
credible way than what have so far been done in the micro literature. Long time series of export 
destinations can be matched to exporters (sectors) for which we can calculate productivity. The long 
time dimension in our data makes it possible to compare the same units across different destination-
exposures. Moreover, we take advantage of the fact that also other countries export the same type of 
goods (we choose three-digit sector level) to the same destinations to control for self-selection into the 
different destinations.
There are several mechanisms through which exports to more productive economies can enhance 
productivity. First, export is hypothesized as a vehicle of foreign technology diffusion. Interaction 
with demanding customers and competitors employing better organization and production techniques 
3 Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) find in a cross-country panel links between relative income levels and growth of trading 
partners and domestic growth. 
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is believed to represent forces making exporters improving their organization and technology. Chuang 
(1998) explains in some detail how this process might take place. In his theoretical model both imports 
and exports are important sources for learning and with whom one trade is a key factor for the trade 
induced technology spillover, as it determines the level of technology of which one can learn. A 
testable implication of the model is that a larger technology gap implies a larger potential for learning 
and growth.4
In our setting of sector level data, productivity changes at the sector level can be caused by structural 
change within sectors in addition to within-firms productivity changes. López (2005) reports how 
resource reallocation towards more productive firms can have considerable productivity effects at the 
sector level. For instance, Bernard and Jensen (1999) find structural change within US manufacturing 
sectors to account for more than 40 percent of total factor productivity growth. Sector productivity can 
in other words increase, even though exports do not increase within-firm productivity.  
3. Empirical strategy and data 
To test the existence of productivity spillovers through exports we take advantage of the productivity 
level met in export destinations. As the choice of which export destinations to serve can be 
endogenous to the productivity level of exporters we need to control for such potential endogeneity. 
Below we explain our strategy to measure productivity exposure through exports, the relationship 
between spillovers and domestic productivity that is of our ultimate interest and how we attempt to 
control for the mentioned potential endogeneity via a two-stage least squares estimation.    
3.1. Measuring trade partners productivity  
Technology has in the spillover literature been measured as R&D efforts, number of patents, or as 
Productivity (TFP). Strategies in the literature to measure international spillovers has been to associate 
R&D efforts of neighbors to TFP or patents in the country of study, to include channels like import as 
in the seminal paper of Coe et al (1995), or to relate TFP to other measures than R&D of foreign 
activity. Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005) argue that as a source of spillovers it is the total available stock 
of technology, rather than the narrower domestically produced stock of R&D, that is the relevant 
measure of the spillover source. This means that spillovers to the source from its other trading partners 
is also relevant, and not only the domestically produced technology in the source. Taking this 
4 In addition to technology spillovers, higher scale can be a source of higher exporter productivity compared to non-exporters. 
Biesebroeck (2005) finds that about half of the productivity premium of exporters is associated with higher scale. Credit 
constraints in combination with contractual problems together with small domestic markets make it hard to exploit economies 
of scale domestically, he argues. In this paper the focus is on the technology spillover channel. We have in robustness checks 
controlled for economies of scale effects by exporters due to larger markets by including export value in the regressions. It 
does not change our results.   
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argument seriously an appropriate measure of the learning potential from trading partners should be 
rather broad. We choose to use GDP per capita as such a broad productivity measure. In addition to 
the obvious strength of being available for all trading partners, it is the broadest measure of 
productivity we can think of. Technology embodied both in physical and organizational capital is 
covered. Institutional factors such as the degree of competition, losses due to corruption or 
expropriation and efficiencies of the public bureaucracy will also all be taken up in GDP per capita. 
Inspired by the measure EXPY defined by Hausmann et al. (2007), we define EXCY as a weighted 
average of the GDP per Capita level of export destination c from sector i in year t. First we define 
destination c’s share of the total export from sector i in year t: 
¦
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cit
cit
x
x
s           (1) 
¦ 
c
ctcitit GDPPCsEXCY         (2) 
We choose to use GDPPC measured at real PPP-exchange rates as it is productivity in terms of real 
resources that is of interest, and not measured productivity differences caused by under- or over-
valued market exchange rates or prices. In our baseline measure EXCY, GDPPC is time-varying.5.
Alternative ways of including export destinations’ GDP per capita in the regressions below could be to 
include ctcitGDPPCs  for each country or groups of countries directly in the regressions. With EXCY 
we impose the same coefficient for all ctcitGDPPCs .
3.2. Relationship of interest 
The question investigated in this paper is whether exposure to productive countries through exports 
leads to productivity spillovers to the exporting country. In the literature on economic growth there 
seems to be broad agreement that differences in growth rates across countries are only transitory.  
Countries grow at a common rate in the long run due to international spillovers, making income level 
differences permanent (Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005; Parente 
and Prescott, 2005). Our panel data covering 28 years suggest that we should look for a long run 
relationship between EXCY and TFP. We believe the appropriate specification is to let the level of 
5 Our data for GDP at PPP-exchange rates start in 1975. In the appendix we show results of EXCY based on the average GDP 
per capita at PPP-exchange rates for the years 1998, 1999 and 200. The results hold.  
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TFP in South Africa be a function of the level of EXCY. Exposure to higher productivity levels in the 
trading partners should be associated with higher productivity levels in South Africa, rather than 
higher growth rates. The estimated specification is as follows:6
(3)
A is total factor productivity defined in the standard way (see below), EXCY is the variable of interest 
indicating the productivity level in the export destinations of the sector, Z is a vector of controls, and 
i0K  and t0O are sector and year fixed effects, respectively.  
To control for unobserved heterogeneity we include sector and year fixed effects in all specifications. 
Sector fixed effects take out all TFP-differences across sectors that are due to time-invariant 
characteristics and the estimated coefficients are therefore estimated based on only within sector 
variation over time. Year fixed effects control for all time-variant macro shocks affecting TFP in all 
sectors the same way. Capacity utilization is in all estimations included in Z since our interest is 
change in technology rather than demand driven productivity fluctuations. Z is varied by including the 
international technology frontier, measured by TFP-level of the corresponding sector in the US.7 In 
our preferred specification Z includes capacity utilization and US TFP.   
3.3. Identification: 2SLS 
As emphasized in the learning-by-exporting literature, a potential self-selection bias is expected to 
occur as the most productive firms are the ones that manage to export. To us, the most relevant self-
selection bias is that only the most productive exporters may be able to sell to sophisticated markets.. 
Running a plain OLS-regression with productivity on the left hand side and EXCY on the right hand 
side is likely to give an upward biased estimate.  At least part of the estimate could reflect that firms 
and sectors serving markets with high GDP per capita levels chose and manage to do so because they 
are productive.     
To address the possibility that exports to specific destinations may correlated with exporter  
productivity, a two-stage least squares estimation is implemented. Exports from high-income countries 
and low-income countries (not middle income countries) to country c are suggested as instrument for 
shares of South African exports to country c, cits . The idea behind is that the correlation between the 
                                                
6 We postulate the function form to be in levels. We choose the level-form as this implies the simplest transformation of the 
predicted outcomes of the first stage regression to the EXCY-variable based on predicted values. We have also estimated the 
relations imposing a log-linear functional form (not shown to save space). Our impression is that the functional form – level 
or logs – does not seem to matter much for the results.  
7We have in robustness checks (not shown to save space) also varied Z by including export value by sector to control for the 
scale effects described by Biesebroeck (2005). We find it to not affect our results.  
ittiititit ZEXCYA 000000 HOKJED  
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two will capture demand shocks in country c. A demand shock in country c should allow all sellers of 
that good to sell more of the good.8 A demand shock in destination c, given unchanged exports to 
other destinations, should increase the destination c’s share of total exports. We are not worried that 
GDP per capita in destination c is endogenous in our estimation. As will be explained below we 
include it at the left hand side of our first stage estimation to make the transition from the first stage 
predictions to the second stage estimation as clear as possible.  The estimated first stage equation is: 
(4)
Where ctcitGDPPCs  is the share of exports from sector i to country c in year t multiplied by GDP per 
capita in country c in year t. We include the GDP per capita on the left hand side to make the 
transformation to our second stage more straightforward. Our instruments assumed to satisfy the 
exclusion restriction (i.e. they are assumed to affect productivity only through EXCY) are HIcitx  and 
L
citx , ctGDPPC  and c1P . The two former are exports to country c from sector i in year t from hi-
income countries (HI) and low income countries (L), respectively. ctGDPPC  is GDP per capita in 
country c in year t. c1P  is importer fixed effects. Then we include the controls that will be included in 
the second stage: Z is a vector of time varying sector controls, i1K  and t1O  sector and year fixed 
effects, as explained for equation (3) above. We use the estimated equation (4) to predict the EXCY to 
be included in the second stage: 
¦ 
c
pred
ctcit
pred
it GDPPCsEXCY )(         (5) 
The estimated second stage equation is: 
            (6) 
The first stage equation (4) is estimated at the country-sector-year level, as the construction of EXCY 
and our instruments demand an aggregation level capturing bilateral trade. Our second stage equation 
                                                
8 This could be seen as an income effect in the demand. In principle, regressing the sales of South Africa on the sales of 
others as we here do, could induce a negative correlation if a substitution between different suppliers were present. We do 
find traces of such a negative correlation for middle income countries. 
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is estimated at the sector-year level. Our proposed EXCY measure is simply the sum of the predicted 
values from the estimated first stage model.  
Our first stage equation is close to a model for predicting trade across countries. cits contains the 
variation we believe it is important to instrument. For given exports to other destinations, explaining 
cits  is like explaining bilateral trade flows from South Africa to destination c. The standard empirical 
framework to predict bilateral trade flows seems to be gravity models.9 One finding in the vast 
literature employing gravity models is that unobservable time-invariant factors in country-pairs are 
important to predict bilateral trade flows. Possible interpretations of such unobservables are 
geographic or cultural distance. Based on this we include importer fixed effects.10 We treat them as 
excludable instruments.11 We are in the second stage interested in changes in EXCY and TFP within 
sectors. Time-invariant sector characteristics do not play a role in our estimations as we include sector 
fixed effects. Importer fixed effects affect only the average EXCY-level over time per sector and the 
exclusion restriction should therefore be satisfied.   
Our underlying instrument idea is to take advantage of demand shocks in export destinations as a 
source of variation to identify sectoral export shares across destinations. Could we think of other 
variables that would reveal demand shocks? GDP, wages or GDP per capita are obvious candidates. 
The latter is already in the analysis and we take it to represent productivity. Identification of 
destination-shares demands an instrument at the sector-year-destination level. This if offered by 
exports from other countries. Given included controls we believe it alos offers variation orthogonal to 
South African TFP.
What about global supply shocks? These could be correlated with productivity in South Africa and our 
time-varying instruments. We include the international frontier to control for such shocks. Also global 
sector-specific demand shocks should be captured by this variable. Worldwide shocks should be 
present in US as well as in South Africa.   
3.4. EXPY
Hausmann et al. (2007) launch a measure to classify how sophisticated countries’ export baskets are. 
First they establish PRODY, which is a weighted sum of the GDP per capita of the countries exporting 
a product. The weights are the revealed comparative advantage of each country in the product in 
                                                
9 See Baldwin (2006) for a discussion of the gravity-model methodology.  
10 Through extensive exploration of different alternative specifications of the first stage we have found that the prediction 
model gives plausible second stage result when importer- or importer-year fixed effects are included.   
11 See Pettersson-Lidbom (2001, p.576) for an application with fixed effects as excluded instruments.  
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question. PRODY intends to capture how sophisticated a given product is. The idea is that products 
typically exported by countries with high GDP per capita levels have higher inherent “productivity”. 
PRODY is then used to calculate EXPY, which is a weighted average of PRODY across all products 
exported by a given country. The weights are the value shares of the products in the total exports of 
the country. Hausmann et el. (2007) base EXPY on a theory of self discovery (see Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2003) which is a country-wide phenomena in their paper.  EXPY is only time-varying within 
each country. We calculate a sector-specific version of EXPY and estimate its link to TFP:     
¦ 
p
ppitit PRODYsEXPY          (7) 
EXPY contains a product’s value share of the exports from a sector, pits , wheras EXCY is based on 
the value shares of importers.12 pPRODY , being a product characteristic, plays then an analogous role 
to the importer characteristics GDP per capita in EXCY.. We will use PRODY as published by 
Hidalgo et al. (2007). It is not time-varying and changing product weights is the only source of time-
variation. Analogous to the procedure followed for EXCY, we estimate the following three equations: 
(8)
(9)
            (10) 
To estimate equation (9) we set up the dataset on the product-year level (each sector consists of 
several products), as the interesting variation is across products within each sector.13 We include 
product fixed effects in equation (9).  This is analogous to the importer fixed effects included in the 
first stage estimation for EXCY, with the exception that they make sector fixed effects superfluous. 
We do not include PRODY on the right hand side of equation (9) as it is captured by product fixed 
effects.
                                                
12 A product’s share of export from sector i in year t: ¦

 
ip
pitpitpit x/xs
13 In contrast, for EXCY the interesting variation was across importers (therefore the C rather than the P in the name), and the 
first stage data used to estimate equation (4) were at the importer-sector-year level. 
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EXCY intends to represent the potential for spillovers from importers, which arguably can be sector 
specific. EXPY builds on the mentioned theory of self discovery, perhaps a country-wide rather than a 
sector-specific mechanism. Secondly, Hausmann et al (2007) estimate the link between EXPY and 
growth in GDP per capita. Compared to our set up this means different functional form – growth 
rather than level as dependent variable – and different productivity measure – value added per citizen 
rather than TFP. The results from our EXPY estimations should be interpreted with these caveats in 
mind.
3.5. Data
The panel data on South African manufacturing sectors is provided by TIPS (Trade and Industry 
Policy Strategies). Our sample contains 25 sectors over the period 1971-1998 (TIPS, 2004). 14 To 
construct our total factor productivity measure, we employ value added (Y), capital (K), labor (L) and 
sector specific time-averaged income shares. Total factor productivity is defined in the standard way, 
where its growth is backed out from a Cobb-Douglas production function under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale using income shares at the factor weights, KJ and LJ  (i and t indicate sector 
and year, respectively):   
itiLitiKitit LlndKlndYlndAlnd JJ        (11) 
The TFP-level, A, is defined by setting the TFP-level to 100 in 1970 and employ the log growth rate 
of equation (1).   
Our information on exports is from the database compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005).15 Value of exports 
is measured in current USD. In the variable of interest, EXCY, export value weights are used and 
measuring in current versus fixed prices should not matter. The trade data are available at the 4-digit 
SITC Rev. 2 classification and they are merged to the South African SIC-classification as explained in 
Table 1. To get a rough check of the concordance we correlated real exports as available in the TIPS-
panel (we do not have current price exports in our TIPS-dataset) with exports in current prices in the 
Feenstra-data. Three sectors had a correlation of less than 0.5 (12101: Food, 12131: Coke & refined 
petroleum prod. and 12142: Non-metallic minerals), and these were therefore excluded from the 
analysis. For 17 of the remaining 25 sectors the correlation was above 0.9, four additional were above 
0.86, three were 0.70 or higher and one was 0.66.  
                                                
14 Data post 1996 are of questionable quality as the last manufacturing survey was undertaken in 1996. We assess this not to 
be a problem for us as we employ these data only up to 1998.  
15 For additional information on the data set, see http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/FAQ_on_NBER-UN_data.pdf and 
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.html.
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As representations of the international productivity frontier we employ total factor productivity in US 
manufacturing sectors. In the literature on cross country differences in productivity, US is often taken 
as representative of the world technology frontier. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) is a recent example. As 
Harding and Rattsø (2007) we let 4-factor TFP provided by NBER (2000) represent the TFP-frontier, 
A*it. NBER presents this measure for 459 4-digit SIC 87-sectors over the period 1958-1996.
16 The 
concordance between sectors was done by manually attaching each 4-digit SIC87 sector to the 
corresponding sector in the TIPS data on South Africa. The matching of sectors is presented in Table 
2. We use an un-weighted average across all 4-digit SIC 87 sectors corresponding to the South African 
sector i as A*it. We normalize A*it to 100 in t=1970. See Harding and Rattsø (2007, 2008) for more on 
the roles of international productivity frontiers in South Africa. Finally, data on PRODY is found at 
Hidalgo et al. (2007). The classification of countries into income groups and geographical regions (not 
shown) are done in accordance to the definition of the World Bank as of July 1 2006.   
4. Results
This paper seeks to test the effect on a middle income country’s TFP of being exposed to high 
productivity export-destinations, as intended measured by EXCY. To avoid that the estimated 
coefficient is not partly capturing other factors affecting TFP and therefore be misleading about the 
effect of EXCY, the first thing we want to do is to explicitly include such other factors in the 
estimation – so these are hold constant under the exercise and the coefficient-estimate is isolated from 
the effects of these factors. Although we include a series of controls, as earlier mentioned, we cannot 
be entirely sure that we have controlled for all relevant factors and the estimates are not biased due to 
omitted variables. A way to get around this problem, which is popular in studies aiming to identify 
casual effects, is to employ the instrumental variable method (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). The idea is 
to use variation in the variable of interest that can be assigned to a known source of variation. To be a 
good instrument, this source of variation should be highly correlated (“relevance”) to the regressor of 
interest, EXCY, but only affect the outcome variable, TFP, via its effect on EXCY (“exclusion 
restriction satisfied”). 
We first present OLS-estimates of the correlation between EXCY and TFP, then we present our 2SLS-
estimates, and finally we present both OLS and 2SLS-results where EXCY is swapped for the 
competing EXPY-measure.   
                                                
16 An earlier version of the data and calculations are documented in Bartelsman and Gray (1996). We chose to use the 4-
factor TFP-measure because this measure is closest to the measure we construct for South Africa (2 factors). In Harding and 
Rattsø (2007) the results are practically identical for the 4-factor and 5-factor measure. According to Bartelsman and Gray 
(1996), the five factor measure is calculated using observed expenditure shares as factor shares. The capital share is 
calculated as a residual under the assumption that the shares add to 1. We assume the same method was used when 
constructing the 4-factor TFP measure.      
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4.1.  OLS
OLS-estimates (i.e. EXCY is based on actual export shares) of equation (3) are presented in Table 7. 
In column 1 we include capacity utilization and sector and year fixed effects. In column 2 we control 
also for the international technology frontier. This exercise is then repeated five times with different 
lag-length of EXCY. All 12 columns indicate significant positive correlations – at the one percent 
level – between EXCY and total factor productivity. The size of the estimated coefficients varies 
between around 1.0 and 1.4, which implies that a one percent increase in EXCY is associated with 
around 0.15-0.22 increase in TFP.17
The estimated coefficients are in general smaller when the international TFP-frontier is included, 
possibly reflecting spillovers captured by EXCY to some extent are associated with the international 
technology frontier. The TFP-frontier itself is always significant at the one percent level and the 
coefficient is roughly 0.6. Capacity utilization is significant when the frontier-TFP is not included, 
consistent with the international TFP-frontier capturing also sector-specific global demand shocks in 
addition to global supply shocks. Our preferred specification includes the international TFP-frontier. 
Its robust and significant coefficients clearly suggest that it should be in the model, a finding 
consistent with Rattsø and Harding’s (2007 and 2008) documentation of links between different 
measures of the international technology frontier and different productivity measures in South Africa. 
Cameron (2005), Cameron et al. (2005) and Griffith et al. (2004) show the importance of the 
international technology frontier in sector data for other countries. Inclusion of the frontier reduces 
potential omitted variable bias due to sector-specific global shocks. Such shocks could drive both the 
observed TFP in South Africa and exports from the sector.18 Inclusion of the frontier arguably also 
reduces potential omitted variable bias due to omitted alternative channels of spillovers. The literature 
suggests for instance imports of intermediates and foreign direct investments as possible vehicles of 
technology spillovers across countries. Including the technology frontier explicitly as a control 
variable may reduce the potential for omitted variable bias due to omitted alternative vehicles, since 
the frontier should be important as source of such spillovers. The omitted variable bias in our 
estimations without the frontier is present but appears to be relatively small. We will in the preceding 
concentrate on a model including the frontier.19
                                                
17 This is found be using the average of A and EXCY (actual) found in Table 4: Elasticity of A with respect to EXCY (actual) 
= dA/dEXCY (actual)*( EXCY (actual)/ A)=1.4*(17/110)=0.22 
18 This would be a challenge also in our proposed first stage regression, as global shocks could affect the proposed 
instruments (exports from other country-groups). The validity of the instruments – being correlated with endogenous 
regressor and uncorrelated with error term given controls included – is more plausible given the inclusion of the frontier.  
19 We have checked the robustness of the results presented in Table 7 to the inclusion of export value, US labor productivity 
instead of TFP as the technology frontier, and to defining EXCY based on time-invariant GDP per capita. We have also 
estimated all models with a log-linear functional form rather than with the direct levels as here. The results are found to be 
robust across all these different specifications.       
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In Table 7 EXCY is defined based on actual export shares and the results are therefore subject to a 
potential endogeneity bias. In the next section we implement the two-stages least squares procedure 
aiming to control for such potential endogeneity bias.   
4.2. 2SLS
Our estimates of the first stage (equation 4) are shown in Table 8. We apply 2SLS procedure over zero 
to five lags on EXCY. This gives us six first stage estimations, where the dependent variable 
ctcitGDPPCs  and the time-varying excluded instruments are lagged from zero to five periods. The 
estimated coefficients of export value from high-income (H) and low-income (L) countries are 
significant at the 1 percent level (with one exception at the five-percent level and one at the 10-percent 
level). F-statistics on excluded instruments should as a rule of thumb be larger than ten, and the bigger  
it is the better (Angrist and Pischke, forthcoming).20 The last rows of Table 8 show that export from 
low income countries is passing this criteria with a huge margin (always larger than 166), while export 
from high-income passes when included with four and five lags. The estimated coefficients of the two 
export-instruments are positive in all six estimations. Based on the average values reported in Table 3 
and the estimates reported in column 1 the coefficients imply an elasticity of 0.021 for high-income 
countries and 0.093 for low income countries.21 The coefficients for both country-groups are 
increasing with lags. This can partly be explained by exports values going down as more lags are used, 
as trade volumes and its values have been increasing over time and the size of the variables employed 
affect the size of the coefficients in our level-linear specification. We interpret the estimates to be 
consistent with a positive demand shock in export destination c positively affecting exports from 
South Africa, high-income and low income countries. A demand shock increasing the exports from the 
group of high-income countries with one percent induces a 0.021 percent increase in the exports from 
South Africa. If South Africa and the high-income countries were selling the same variety and markets 
shares across countries were unchanged, a demand shock of one percent should increase the exports 
from both sources with one percent. When this is not the case we should keep in mind that these 
estimates are based on variation across 25 different sectors, that there may be important differences 
between the corresponding sectors in South Africa and the country-groups and that heterogeneity is 
likely to occur also between the countries within the country-groups. Differences along dimensions 
like product quality, weights of products within sectors and trade costs due to geographical location 
can create different export responses across different sources and drag down the correlation.  
                                                
20 Angrist and Pischke (forthcoming) refer to Stock et al. (2002) for this rule. We report F-statistics for tests of the 
instruments individually rather than a joint test.    
21 Estimating the models of Table 8 in logs gives elasticities around 0.47 for exports from high-income countries and 0.22 for 
low income countries.   
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In our setting we are concerned with the positive sign and instrument relevance indicated by the 
significance level. The positive sign is important for our interpretation of the instrument. With a 
negative sign, we would worry that the instrument were picking up substitution between different 
sellers in country c. Since increased market shares are likely to be associated with high productivity, it 
would raise a concern of reverse causality. Say it was a positive productivity shock in sector i in South 
Africa. ctcitGDPPCs  could then increase at the cost of exports from other countries to country c, 
contributing to a negative correlation. An increase in the total market size is different. A bigger market 
should let all sellers sell more and this is our interpretation of the positive coefficients estimated in 
Table 8. In robustness checks we have run the 2SLS-procedure with exports from lower-middle and 
upper-middle income countries included as additional instruments. The coefficients on exports from 
middle income-countries are estimated to be negative, which we interpret to be consistent with 
substitution between different sellers. Recent trade literature suggests specializations within sectors 
and products across countries. It tends to vary systematically according to levels of development 
(Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005). It is plausible that competition between South Africa and 
groups of countries is the starkest between South Africa and other middle-income countries.22
GDP per capita is in Table 8 significant with three, four and five lags and the elasticities – given the 
averages reported in Table 3 – are between 0.6 and 0.9.23 In addition to HIcitx ,
L
citx  and ctGDPPC
described above, country fixed effects are excluded instruments in our 2SLS. Predictions from the first 
stage are sensitive to the inclusion of these fixed effects in the estimation of the first stage, which 
signals the relevance of these fixed effects for our potentially endogenous variable ctcitGDPPCs .
As earlier explained, the country fixed effects collapse to a time-invariant constant per sector when we 
sum the predictions from the first stage according to equation (5). It is plausible that they are 
uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage given the included sector fixed effects. Regarding 
whether the exclusion restriction is met for the other excluded instruments, HIcitx ,
L
citx  and ctGDPPC ,
we rely on the story behind them.24 Given that the included international technology frontier captures 
common shocks, an estimated positive association between exports from other countries and South 
                                                
22 We have explored the robustness of the first stage estimates by doing the following changes (one at the time):  using 
product-level aggregation rather than sector-level aggregation, employing log-linear functional form, including country-year 
fixed effects and by grouping countries differently (in totals or according to geographic regions). The result, that South 
African export is strongly positively correlated with export from other groups of countries to the same destinations, seem 
overall to be robust. The instruments do therefore in our view meet the relevance criteria. 
23 Estimating the models of Table 8 in logs gives similar elasticities of GDP per capita (0.42-0.97).   
24 Different aggregation levels of our first and second stage explain why this is currently not tested. We are searching for 
formal tests.   
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African exports to country c indicates that the coefficients pick up demand shocks in country c.25 GDP 
per capita of the export destinations should plausibly be uncorrelated with South African TFP beyond 
the effect through EXCY, again given that the included international technology frontier captures 
global supply shocks.    
Now we turn to the second stage estimation. In Table 9 we use the predicted EXCY as expressed in 
equation (5). In contrast to the OLS-estimates of Table 7 the coefficients of EXCY are much smaller 
and none of them are significant.26 The estimates of the coefficients of the technology frontier and 
capacity utilization variable is basically the same in the two tables. Our interpretation of these results 
is that the correlation between EXCY and TFP detected in Table 7 is driven by productive South 
African exporters managing to penetrate developed markets rather than spillovers going from 
developed markets to the exporters. Such a conclusion is in line with evidence referred by Keller 
(2004) and consistent with Helpman et al. (2004) and Melitz (2003). Exporters are on average found to 
be more productive. The understanding is that only the most productive firms can overcome the cost 
of exporting and manage to compete in foreign markets. In our setting, we are concerned with 
variation in exports across different markets. They same logic should apply. Only the most productive 
firms and sectors manage to compete in sophisticated markets. The GDP level of the markets and the 
productivity level of the exporters should therefore be correlated, as we find in the OLS-estimates. 
When we in our 2SLS estimation attempt to shut down the channel of self-selection into sophisticated 
markets, we find no association between the exporting sectors’ TFP and EXCY.  
                                                
25 This interpretation relies on the assumption that supply shocks are global in character, while demand shocks can be 
national. The situation where the country-group in question and South Africa experience a common supply shock that is not 
captured by the international technology frontier could in principle occur. Such a situation could question the validity of the
exclusion restriction for the export instrument because such as shock could be correlated with South African TFP..      
26 Due to a more disaggregated first stage than second stage, we run our 2SLS estimation manually rather than using a 
standard pre-programmed routine. That means that we have to be cautions regarding the standard errors reported in Table 9. 
These are calculated given the predicted values, while they should be calculated given the actual values of our endogenous 
variable, as described in Greene (2008, section 12.3.3). Such a procedure would most likely make our second-stage standard 
errors larger, not threaten the insignificance of our coefficients.      
57
The results presented in Table 9 appear to be robust across a series of robustness checks. In 
estimations not shown to save space we find that the results are robust to changing the instrument set 
in terms of classifying countries in geographical regions rather than in income groups. The same is 
true for playing around with different combinations of income groups or geographical regions. The 
results are also robust to different functional form – log-linear instead of levels – imposed on both 
stages.27
Two additional robustness checks are shown in the appendix. Appendix table 1 and Appendix table 2 
show first and second stage estimations differing from Table 8 and Table 9 in two ways. We impose a 
log-linear functional form and estimate the productivity effect in a one-step procedure, like Harding 
and Rattsø (2007). Log value added is dependent variable and log capital and log labor are added as 
control variables in addition to log of the ones used earlier. The excluded instruments HIcitx ,
L
citx  and 
ctGDPPC  are now significant at the one-percent level in all six models (Appendix table 1). The 
second stage shows as before no support of EXCY-effects on productivity (Appendix table 2).  
Appendix table 3 and Appendix table 4 present the most significant EXCY-coefficients we have 
estimated with our 2SLS estimation. Two changes are done compared to Table 8 and Table 9. Exports 
from all income groups as well as importer-year fixed effects (instead of importer fixed effects) are 
included as excluded instruments. Including all income groups as instruments means that all other 
countries in the world exporting to South Africa’s export destinations are included. This set up make 
us less comfortable as South African exports in some sense may appear as a residual. The results, 
however, seems reasonable and may indicate this to not be a problem. The second change, treating 
importer-year fixed effects – taking out all time-variant country-wide bilateral characteristics – as 
excluded instruments, may be justified by specific circumstances in South Africa’s international 
relations. Trade sanctions as responses to the Apartheid regime were imposed from the mid 1980s to 
the early 1990s. These generated exogenous variation – varying across importers and time as the 
intensity and timing of the reactions varied across countries – in South African exports that are 
difficult for our first stage estimation to overcome in the absence of importer-year fixed effects. On the 
other hand, importer-year fixed effects may capture features of the specific markets that exporters 
respond to. This would invalidate the exclusion restriction as the importer-year fixed effects then 
would be correlated with South African TFP beyond EXCY. Importer-year fixed effects make 
importer GDPPC superfluous in the regressions.  Keeping the above mentioned caveats in mind, 
Appendix table 3 shows that exports from high-income and low-income countries are always 
                                                
27 When we run 2SLS in logs we de-log the predictions from the first stage, then take the sum according to equation (5), for 
then finally to take the log of this sum and estimate the second stage.  
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significant at the one-percent level. Exports from upper-middle and lower-middle income countries 
have little predictive power. Appendix table 4 suggests a significant coefficient of EXCY at the five-
percent level (zero lags) and one at the ten-percent level (5 lags). Those coefficients have about one 
third of the size of the corresponding OLS-coefficients. These results may reveal traces of spillovers 
through exports, but do also suggest that the OLS coefficients of Table 7 are strongly biased upwards.  
4.3. EXCY or EXPY? 
Finally we presents estimation results for EXPY capturing self-discovery (Hausmann and Rodrik, 
2003; Hausmann et al. 2007), a hypothesized mechanism behind positive correlations between exports 
and growth that we regard as competing to the hypothesis of productivity spillovers via exports. Since 
we in EXPY use a time-invariant PRODY, we present in Appendix table 5 OLS-results for an EXCY-
version based on time-invariant GDP per capita to make the comparison more accurate. The estimates 
are then based only on changing export-shares over time.28 The correlation between the time-invariant 
EXCY and TFP is positive (with one exception) and mostly significant, although the significance level 
goes down as the lag-length increases. Table 10 presents OLS-estimates of the links between EXPY 
and TFP, while Table 11 and Table 12 present 2SLS-estimates. The estimated coefficients of EXPY 
are negative and insignificant in OLS and significantly negative in four of six second stage 
estimations. There seems in other words to be hard to find positive EXPY-links to productivity in our 
setting. These results should be read with caution. First, self-discovery may be an economy wide 
phenomena and it may therefore not be appropriate to treat as a sector-specific variable. Second, the 
first stage design used here may not be the most suited for the purpose of predicting ppit PRODYs . We 
find it interesting, however, that exports from the group of high-income countries seem to predict 
ppit PRODYs well, while exports from the group of low-income countries do not (Table 11).  
5. Conclusions
The combination of robust OLS-correlations between productivity and EXCY and insignificant 
estimates in 2SLS found in this paper is interpreted as endogenous destinations imposing a bias in the 
OLS-estimates. This is in line with a series of papers finding endogeneity of exports to seriously bias 
OLS-estimates of the link between exports and productivity. Caution is, however, warranted.   
The main concern may be that our instruments are not predicting well. More precisely, they may not 
predict the variation in exports that have the potential of inducing productivity spillovers. Demand 
shocks, which is our interpretation of the variation exploited in our first stage regression, may be of a 
                                                
28 The time-invariant GDP per capita is defined as the average GDP per capita over the years 1998, 1999 and 2000.  
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temporary character and not picking up more stable export relations with, perhaps, larger  potential for 
productivity spillovers. A natural next step for the research conducted in this paper is to explore more 
instruments and instrument combinations in the search for the relation between export-spillovers and 
productivity.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics first stage EXCY 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EXCY (pred_lag0) 8950 15.158 5.977 -1.201 35.649
s_x_GDPPC 8950 0.917 2.148 1.89E-06 22.525
s 8950 0.048 0.101 8.97E-07 0.977
GDPPC 8950 16.075 7.835 0.485 42.853
Export value prod. from H 8950 1.466 3.494 0.000029 68.667
Export value prod. from UM 8388 0.118 0.539 1.00E-06 18.748
Export value prod. from LM 8651 0.159 0.789 1.00E-06 21.490
Export value prod. from L 8950 0.033 0.174 1.00E-06 5.475
L2. A* 8950 107.987 10.998 86.213 215.782
U 8950 82.473 6.348 58.173 94.829
Year 8950 1975 1998
Note: EXCY is a weighted average of GDPPC met in export destinations, with s as weights. s is the share of a given sector’s export value 
to a given export-destination. GDPPC is GDP per capita measured in thousands 2000 PPP US dollars  Export value is measured as 
millions of current USD of exports to a specific export-destination from the following country groups: high-income (H), upper-middle 
income (UM), lower-middle income (LM), and low income (L). L2.A* is two-period lagged total factor productivity in corresponding
sector in US measured as index set to 100 in 1970. U is capacity utilization, measured in percent. s and Export value from income groups 
vary by sector, year and export-destination, GDPPC by year and export-destination, the others by sector and year.   
Table 4: Descriptive statistics second stage EXCY 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A 563 110.241 27.734 47.920 232.857
EXCY (actual - time-inv. GDPPC) 563 21.953 5.864 1.202 33.232
EXCY (actual) 563 16.945 4.452 1.209 29.023
EXCY (pred_lag0) 547 14.996 6.008 -1.201 35.649
L2. A* 563 106.678 11.193 74.227 215.782
U 563 82.424 6.459 58.173 94.829
Year 563 1975 1998
Note: EXCY is a weighted average of GDPPC met in export destinations, with s as weights (see note Table 3)..”actual”: actual export is used 
to calculate the weights s. “pred_lag0”: based on predictions from first stage with zero lags (column 1 Table 8). A is TFP in South Africa 
measured as index set to 100 in 1970. L2.A* is two-period lagged total factor productivity in corresponding sector in US measured as index 
set to 100 in 1970. U is capacity utilization, measured in percent. All variables vary by sector and year.   
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics first stage EXPY 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EXPY (pred_lag0) 7442 16.623 10.078 0.732 51.798
s_pt*PRODY 7442 0.842 1.704 1.20E-06 16.393
s_pt 7442 0.071 0.145 2.88E-07 1.000
PRODY 7442 12.651 4.701 0.801 24.187
Export value prod. from H 7442 1.849 5.498 1.00E-06 107.152
Export value prod. from UM 7176 0.146 0.561 1.00E-06 12.639
Export value prod. from LM 7280 0.200 0.877 1.00E-06 21.971
Export value prod. from L 7442 0.041 0.249 1.00E-06 7.462
L2. A* 7442 107.518 10.725 76.739 215.782
U 7442 82.591 6.109 58.173 94.829
Year 7442 1971 1998
Note: EXPY is a weighted average of PRODY, with s_pt as weights. s_pt is product p’s share of export value from a given sector. PRODY is 
as published by Hidalgo et al. (2007), and we assume it can be interpreted as measured in thousands of US dollars  Export value is measured 
as millions of current USD of exports of product p from the following country groups: high-income (H), upper-middle income (UM), lower-
middle income (LM), and low income (L). L2.A* is two-period lagged total factor productivity in corresponding sector in US, measured as 
an index set to 100 in 1970. U is capacity utilization, measured in percent. s_pt and Export value from income groups vary by product 
(sector) and year, PRODY by product, the others by sector and year.   
Table 6: Descriptive statistics second stage EXPY 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A 634 108.526 26.440 47.920 232.857
EXPY (actual - time-inv. PRODY) 634 11.275 3.755 0.600 19.211
EXPY (pred_lag0) 619 10.127 7.974 0.732 51.798
L2. A* 634 106.002 10.712 74.227 215.782
L2. (Y/L)* 446 100.094 271.413 13.067 2395.389
U 634 82.973 6.468 58.173 94.829
Year 634 1971 1998
 Note: EXPY is a weighted average of PRODY, with s_pt as weights (see note Table 4). ”actual”: actual export is used to calculate the 
weights s. “pred_lag0”: based on predictions from first stage with zero lags (column 1 Table 11). A is TFP in South Africa measured as 
index set to 100 in 1970. L2.A* is two-period lagged total factor productivity in corresponding sector in US measured as index set to 100 in 
1970. U is capacity utilization, measured in percent. All variables vary by sector and year.   
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8. Tables: Estimation results 
Table 7: EXCY baseline 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
  A A A A A A A A A A A A
EXCY (actual) 1.148*** 1.008***    
 [0.242] [0.225]    
L. EXCY (actual)  1.259*** 1.155***   
  [0.263] [0.234]   
L2. EXCY (actual)   1.284*** 1.149***   
   [0.281] [0.244]   
L3. EXCY (actual)   1.356*** 1.222***   
   [0.297] [0.256]   
L4. EXCY (actual)   1.408*** 1.221*** 
   [0.309] [0.270] 
L5. EXCY (actual)     1.350*** 0.959***
     [0.318] [0.287]
L2. A*  0.640***  0.678*** 0.694*** 0.646***  0.560*** 0.588***
  [0.129]  [0.133] [0.139] [0.147]  [0.155] [0.161]
U 0.137 -0.031 0.410* -0.055 0.668*** -0.019 0.907*** -0.007 0.976*** 0.035 1.107*** 0.162
  [0.204] [0.185] [0.222] [0.193] [0.237] [0.203] [0.255] [0.215] [0.263] [0.222] [0.272] [0.231]
Observations 613 563 615 540 617 517 618 494 595 471 572 448
Number of sector 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.14
R-squared overall 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.10
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 4 for variable definitions. LX 
means lagged X periods.  
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Table 8: First stage EXCY 
Ic Is Iyear  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ctcitGDPPCs ctcitGDPPCsL. ctcit GDPPCsL .2 ctcit GDPPCsL .3 ctcit GDPPCsL .4 ctcit GDPPCsL .5
Export value from H 0.013* 
 [0.007] 
Export value from L 2.572*** 
 [0.109] 
GDP per capita (ppp) 0.005 
 [0.011] 
L. Export value from H  0.015**  
  [0.007]  
L. Export value from L  2.587***  
  [0.125]  
L. GDP per capita (ppp)  0.011  
  [0.014]  
L2. Export value from H  0.022***  
  [0.008]  
L2. Export value from L  2.652***  
  [0.139]  
L2. GDP per capita (ppp)  0.013  
  [0.014]  
L3. Export value from H  0.029***  
  [0.009]  
L3. Export value from L  2.793***  
  [0.168]  
L3. GDP per capita (ppp)  0.033*  
  [0.020]  
L4. Export value from H  0.049*** 
  [0.011] 
L4. Export value from L  2.944*** 
  [0.200] 
L4. GDP per capita (ppp)  0.051** 
  [0.023] 
L5. Export value from H   0.066***
 [0.012]
L5. Export value from L   3.078***
 [0.239]
L5. GDP per capita (ppp)   0.053**
 [0.026]
L2. A* -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
U 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.016*
  [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
Observations 8950 7970 7765 6453 5693 4993
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.44
F:  
Export value from H 3.71 3.95 7.17 9.55 19.9 27.91
Export value from L 556.24 426.25 366.56 276.76 217.60 166.02
GDP per capita (ppp) 0.23 0.66 0.87 2.71 5.08 4.25
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 3 for variable definitions. LX 
means lagged X periods.  
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Table 9: Second stage EXCY 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
  A A A A A A
EXCY (pred_lag0) 0.051  
 [0.148]  
EXCY (pred_lag1)  0.025 
  [0.147] 
EXCY (pred_lag2)   0.030
   [0.152]
EXCY (pred_lag3)   -0.005
   [0.153]
EXCY (pred_lag4)   0.001
   [0.158]
EXCY (pred_lag5)   0.119
   [0.165]
L2. A* 0.669*** 0.688*** 0.705*** 0.672*** 0.622*** 0.665***
 [0.139] [0.144] [0.146] [0.155] [0.163] [0.166]
U 0.059 0.100 0.168 0.183 0.198 0.160
  [0.196] [0.207] [0.212] [0.226] [0.234] [0.236]
Observations 547 520 502 476 452 429
Number of sector 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.14
R-squared overall 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. See Table 4 for variable definitions. LX means lagged X periods.  
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Table 10: EXPY baseline 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  A A A A A A A A A A A A
EXPY (actual - t-inv. PRODY) -0.083 -0.416    
 [0.426] [0.377]    
L. EXPY (actual - t-inv. PRODY)  -0.124 -0.388   
  [0.441] [0.370]   
L2. EXPY (actual - t-inv. PRODY)   -0.190 -0.363   
   [0.454] [0.363]   
L3. EXPY (actual - t-inv. PRODY)   -0.401 -0.418   
   [0.454] [0.349]   
L4. EXPY (actual - t-inv. PRODY)   -0.553 -0.350 
   [0.450] [0.348] 
L5. EXPY (actual - t-inv. PRODY)     -0.629 -0.282 
     [0.444] [0.345]
L2. A* 0.703***  0.706*** 0.696*** 0.670***  0.639*** 0.626*** 
 [0.120]  [0.122] [0.123] [0.123]  [0.124] [0.124]
U 0.361* 0.143 0.659*** 0.134 0.872*** 0.124 1.049*** 0.106 1.088*** 0.145 1.120*** 0.175 
  [0.203] [0.185] [0.211] [0.186] [0.219] [0.188] [0.224] [0.189] [0.225] [0.190] [0.226] [0.191]
Observations 684 634 707 632 730 630 752 628 750 626 748 624 
Number of sector 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.14 
R-squared overall 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 6 for variable definitions. LX 
means lagged X periods.  
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Table 11: First stage EXPY 
Ip Iyear  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ppit PRODYs ppit PRODYsL. ppit PRODYsL .2 ppit PRODYsL .3 ppit PRODYsL .4 ppit PRODYsL .5
Export value prod. from H 0.042*** 
 [0.003] 
Export value prod. from L 0.006 
 [0.063] 
L. Export value prod. from H  0.042***   
  [0.004]   
L. Export value prod. from L  0.014   
  [0.067]   
L2. Export value prod. from H  0.049***   
  [0.004]   
L2. Export value prod. from L  -0.004   
  [0.074]   
L3. Export value prod. from H  0.059***   
  [0.004]   
L3. Export value prod. from L  -0.033   
  [0.082]   
L4. Export value prod. from H  0.072***  
  [0.005]  
L4. Export value prod. from L  -0.082  
  [0.094]  
L5. Export value prod. from H   0.078*** 
 [0.006] 
L5. Export value prod. from L   -0.103 
 [0.106] 
L2. A* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] 
U -0.008** -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.005 
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Observations 7442 7251 7217 6898 6675 6489 
R-squared 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.75 
F:  
Export value prod. from H 162.27 137.88 150.56 171.77 192.94 184.56 
Export value prod. from L 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.77 0.94 
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 5 for variable definitions. LX 
means lagged X periods.  
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Table 12: Second stage EXPY  
 1 2 3 4 5 6
  A A A A A A
EXPY (hatIpHL_l0) -0.575**  
 [0.261]  
EXPY (hatIpHL_l1)  -0.578** 
  [0.260] 
EXPY (hatIpHL_l2)   -0.546**
   [0.260]
EXPY (hatIpHL_l3)   -0.472*
   [0.264]
EXPY (hatIpHL_l4)   -0.259
   [0.275]
EXPY (hatIpHL_l5)   -0.140
   [0.275]
L2. A* 0.700*** 0.697*** 0.686*** 0.658*** 0.673*** 0.656***
 [0.124] [0.126] [0.125] [0.126] [0.127] [0.127]
U 0.143 0.152 0.121 0.114 0.176 0.158
  [0.189] [0.189] [0.191] [0.193] [0.194] [0.194]
Observations 619 617 620 614 613 609
Number of sector 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15
R-squared overall 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. See Table 6 for variable definitions. LX means lagged X periods.  
73
9.  Appendix: 
Appendix table 1: First stage EXCY, one-step 
Ic Is Iyear  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  ls_x_GDPPC ls_x_GDPPC_lag ls_x_GDPPC_lag2 ls_x_GDPPC_lag3 ls_x_GDPPC_lag4 ls_x_GDPPC_lag5 
ln Export value bilateral (H) 0.482*** 
 [0.016] 
ln Export value bilateral (L) 0.215*** 
 [0.009] 
ln GDP per capita (ppp) 0.422*** 
 [0.110] 
L. ln Export value bilateral (H)  0.454***  
  [0.016]  
L. ln Export value bilateral (L)  0.220***  
  [0.009]  
L. ln GDP per capita (ppp)  0.651***  
  [0.140]  
L2. ln Export value bilateral (H)  0.468***  
  [0.016]  
L2. ln Export value bilateral (L)  0.223***  
  [0.010]  
L2. ln GDP per capita (ppp)  0.557***  
  [0.146]  
L3. ln Export value bilateral (H)  0.470***  
  [0.018]  
L3. ln Export value bilateral (L)  0.220***  
  [0.010]  
L3. ln GDP per capita (ppp)  0.890***  
  [0.180]  
L4. ln Export value bilateral (H)  0.472*** 
[0.019] 
L4. ln Export value bilateral (L)  0.219*** 
[0.011] 
L4. ln GDP per capita (ppp)  0.930*** 
[0.204] 
L5. ln Export value bilateral (H)   0.472*** 
 [0.021]
L5. ln Export value bilateral (L)   0.232*** 
 [0.012]
L5. ln GDP per capita (ppp)   0.982*** 
 [0.232]
ln K 0.126* 0.067 0.010 -0.087 -0.176* -0.178* 
 [0.073] [0.077] [0.081] [0.088] [0.094] [0.103]
ln L -0.305*** -0.231** -0.273*** -0.200* -0.204* -0.089 
 [0.088] [0.092] [0.097] [0.108] [0.119] [0.131]
L2. ln A* -0.345 -0.407 -0.316 -0.085 0.465 0.171 
 [0.332] [0.345] [0.369] [0.408] [0.450] [0.506]
ln U -1.181*** -0.963*** -0.645* -0.223 0.066 -0.837* 
  [0.331] [0.351] [0.374] [0.415] [0.448] [0.478]
Observations 8950 7970 7765 6453 5693 4993 
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.73 
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 5 for variable
definitions. LX means lagged X periods.  
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Appendix table 2: Second stage EXCY, one-step 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
  ln Y ln Y ln Y ln Y ln Y ln Y
ln EXCY (pred-ln-onestep_l0) -0.019 
 [0.018] 
ln EXCY (pred-ln-onestep_l1)  -0.007
  [0.022]
ln EXCY (pred-ln-onestep_l2)  0.003
  [0.019]
ln EXCY (pred-ln-onestep_l3)  -0.034
  [0.021]
ln EXCY (pred-ln-onestep_l4)  -0.024
  [0.024]
ln EXCY (pred-ln-onestep_l5)  0.003
  [0.021]
ln K 0.548*** 0.566*** 0.573*** 0.613*** 0.640*** 0.677***
 [0.035] [0.037] [0.038] [0.039] [0.041] [0.041]
ln L 0.635*** 0.643*** 0.643*** 0.685*** 0.704*** 0.712***
 [0.041] [0.042] [0.043] [0.044] [0.047] [0.047]
L2. ln A* 0.957*** 1.003*** 0.980*** 1.035*** 1.030*** 1.083***
 [0.151] [0.156] [0.160] [0.165] [0.174] [0.171]
ln U -0.094 -0.005 0.054 0.153 0.236 0.239
  [0.143] [0.148] [0.152] [0.157] [0.163] [0.157]
Observations 547 520 502 476 452 429
Number of sector 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.61
R-squared overall 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See 
Table 4 for variable definitions. LX means lagged X periods.  
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Appendix table 3: First stage EXCY, given all four income groups and destination-year  
fixed effects as instruments 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  s_x_GDPPC l.s_x_GDPPC l2.s_x_GDPPC l3.s_x_GDPPC l4.s_x_GDPPC l5.s_x_GDPPC 
Export value from H 0.027*** 
 [0.009] 
Export value from UM 0.158*** 
 [0.058] 
Export value from LM -0.096** 
 [0.040] 
Export value from L 2.922*** 
 [0.151] 
L. Export value from H  0.033***  
  [0.010]  
L. Export value from UM  0.117  
  [0.073]  
L. Export value from LM  -0.066  
  [0.046]  
L. Export value from L  2.885***  
  [0.170]  
L2. Export value from H  0.035***  
  [0.011]  
L2. Export value from UM  0.165*  
  [0.091]  
L2. Export value from LM  -0.050  
  [0.051]  
L2. Export value from L  2.880***  
  [0.186]  
L3. Export value from H  0.039***  
  [0.012]  
L3. Export value from UM  0.184  
  [0.121]  
L3. Export value from LM  -0.057  
  [0.063]  
L3. Export value from L  3.017***  
  [0.222]  
L4. Export value from H  0.054***  
  [0.014]  
L4. Export value from UM  0.157  
  [0.151]  
L4. Export value from LM  -0.090  
  [0.074]  
L4. Export value from L  3.262***  
  [0.268]  
L5. Export value from H  0.067*** 
[0.016] 
L5. Export value from UM  0.150 
[0.191] 
L5. Export value from LM  -0.172* 
[0.091] 
L5. Export value from L  3.551*** 
[0.314] 
L2. A* -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] 
U 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.016 
  [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] 
Observations 8269 7374 7113 5976 5300 4699 
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 5 for 
variable definitions. LX means lagged X periods. Importer-fixed effects takes out all bilateral time variation making 
importer GDPPC as control variable superfluous. 
76
Appendix table 4: Second stage EXCY, given all four income groups and  
destination-year fixed effects as instruments 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
  A A A A A A
EXCY (pred-ct_l0) 0.329**  
 [0.156]  
EXCY (pred-ct_l1)  0.253 
  [0.159] 
EXCY (pred-ct_l2)   0.210
   [0.165]
EXCY (pred-ct_l3)   0.207
   [0.169]
EXCY (pred-ct_l4)   0.195
   [0.171]
EXCY (pred-ct_l5)   0.329*
   [0.176]
L2. A* 0.665*** 0.679*** 0.679*** 0.679*** 0.616*** 0.660***
 [0.138] [0.143] [0.146] [0.156] [0.163] [0.165]
U 0.016 0.060 0.158 0.156 0.157 0.129
  [0.195] [0.207] [0.212] [0.227] [0.234] [0.235]
Observations 546 520 501 475 452 429
Number of sector 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.14
R-squared overall 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. See Table 4 for variable definitions. LX means lagged X periods.  
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Appendix table 5: Robustness of baseline, level; time-invariant EXCY 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
  A A A A A A A A A A A A
EXCY (actual - t-inv. GDPPC) 0.534*** 0.408*** 
 [0.171] [0.154] 
L. EXCY (actual - t-inv. GDPPC)  0.476*** 0.380**   
  [0.177] [0.151]   
L2. EXCY (actual - t-inv. GDPPC)  0.439** 0.351**   
  [0.183] [0.148]   
L3. EXCY (actual - t-inv. GDPPC)  0.434** 0.351**   
  [0.188] [0.146]   
L4. EXCY (actual - t-inv. GDPPC)  0.297* 0.206 
  [0.180] [0.141] 
L5. EXCY (actual - t-inv. GDPPC)    0.104 -0.024
  [0.172] [0.135]
L2. A* 0.716*** 0.735*** 0.745*** 0.739***  0.720*** 0.703***
 [0.118] [0.119] [0.120] [0.120]  [0.121] [0.121]
U 0.210 0.055 0.476** 0.040 0.675*** 0.037 0.841*** 0.026 0.889*** 0.066 0.946*** 0.114
  [0.197] [0.180] [0.205] [0.181] [0.212] [0.181] [0.217] [0.182] [0.218] [0.183] [0.218] [0.184]
Observations 705 655 730 655 755 655 779 655 779 655 779 655
Number of sector 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16
R-squared overall 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.09
Note: Standard errors in brackets , * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See Table 4 for variable definitions. LX 
means lagged X periods.  
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Chapter 4 
Developing economies and international investors: Do investment 
promotion agencies bring them together? 
With Beata Smarzynska Javorcik , University of Oxford 
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1. Introduction 
Countries around the globe compete fiercely for foreign direct investment (FDI). Policy makers 
believe that FDI can contribute to a faster economic growth by bringing capital, technology and 
know-how to developing countries. Recent empirical evidence suggests that FDI may also lead to 
positive productivity spillovers to local firms.1 Given these potential benefits of FDI inflows, an 
important question for policy makers in developing countries is how to attract foreign investors. 
Many governments believe that this can be achieved through investment promotion activities. The 
purpose of investment promotion is to reduce the costs of FDI by providing information on the 
host country, helping foreign investors cut through bureaucratic procedures, and offering fiscal or 
other incentives to international investors. Despite its importance for public policy choices, little 
is known about the effectiveness of investment promotion efforts. While the existing literature 
generally finds a positive relationship between investment promotion and FDI, most studies are 
hampered by a low number of observations, rely on cross-sectional data or focus solely on 
industrialized economies.2
During the past two decades, developing countries began to actively engage in investment 
promotion and offer incentives to foreign investors. For instance, the 2005 Census of Investment 
Promotion Agencies (IPAs) revealed that 85 percent of the responding IPAs in developing 
countries were established in 1980 or later (see Figure 1). Moreover, 68 out of 81 developing 
countries reported offering financial, tax or other incentives to foreign investors. However, even 
if some earlier studies suggest that investment promotion appears to work in developed countries, 
it is unclear whether the same conclusion holds in a developing country context. On the one hand, 
investment promotion may be more important in the developing world where information is more 
difficult to access. On the other hand, it is possible that investment promotion may be ineffective 
due to deficiencies of the business environment or superfluous if low labor costs alone are 
powerful enough to attract foreign investors.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature on FDI promotion and FDI determinants in three 
ways. First, using a newly collected dataset, it shows that investment promotion activities lead to 
higher FDI inflows to developing countries. Before this data set became available, it was not 
possible to analyze this question in a convincing manner in the context of developing countries. 
Second, the results suggest that the effectiveness of the investment promotion agency is affected 
by its legal status and its reporting structure. Besides having policy implications, obtaining 
intuitive results on these more nuanced questions gives us more confidence that the analysis 
captures the IPA effect rather than other factors. Third, our analysis provides evidence consistent 
with FDI incentives offered by other IPAs within a geographic region diverting FDI inflows. 
There is no indication of such competition among countries within the same income group but 
located in different geographic regions. 
1
 Recent empirical studies suggest that such spillover may primarily benefit industries supplying 
multinationals (for empirical evidence see Javorcik, 2004a, Blalock and Gertler, 2007, Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2007; for a literature review see Görg and Strobl, 2001, and Görg and Greenaway, 2004). 
2
 See section 2 for the literature review. A related literature evaluates export promotion activities (e.g., 
Görg, Henry and Strobl, 2007, and Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton, 2006). 
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Our analysis employs the data collected through a recent Census of Investment Promotion 
Agencies around the world. The Census contains information on investment promotion efforts in 
109 countries, representing all income groups and geographic regions. About three quarter of 
responses pertain to developing countries. A unique feature of the Census is that it includes time-
varying information on the existence of an IPA, its status and reporting structure, sector targeting 
and incentives offered to foreign investors.  
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the majority of IPAs target particular sectors in 
their efforts to attract FDI. Sector targeting is considered to be best practice by investment 
promotion professionals (Loewendahl, 2001, Proksch, 2004). It also allows us to identify the 
effect of investment promotion using the difference-in-differences approach. We compare FDI 
inflows into targeted sectors, before and after targeting, to FDI inflows into non-targeted sectors, 
during the same time period.3 Our analysis is based on US FDI data, disaggregated by host 
country and sector and available for the period 1990-2004, provided by the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. We control for changes in host country business environment by including 
country-year fixed effects, for heterogeneity of sectors in different locations by including country-
sector fixed effects and for shocks to supply of FDI in particular sectors by adding sector-time 
fixed effects.  
Our results suggest that investment promotion efforts lead to higher FDI inflows to developing 
countries. We find that targeted sectors receive more than twice as much FDI as non-targeted 
sectors. This magnitude is plausible, given that many sectors receive small amounts of FDI in 
absolute terms. For instance, in 2004 the median sector-level inflow of US FDI to developing 
countries in our sample that received some US investment was 11 million dollars. Thus, the 
increase of 155 percent estimated in our analysis would translate into additional 17 million dollars 
of FDI.  
As sector targeting is a choice of the IPA, the targeting decision could be a response to earlier 
experience of the sector, which could present a reverse causality problem. However, when we 
exclude countries that reported in the Census that the targeting decision was based on the past 
success or failure in attracting FDI to the sector, our results hold. In addition, we find no evidence 
suggesting that targeting took place in sectors with relatively high or low inflows in the years 
preceding targeting.  
A series of robustness checks supports our conclusions. First, we show that the results hold if we 
exclude services sectors and utilities. This gives us confidence that our findings are not driven by 
simultaneous opening to FDI and targeting of services industries where entry of foreign investors 
was restricted in the past. Second, we demonstrate that controlling for the past stock of FDI does 
not affect the estimated coefficients. Third, to address the concern that FDI flows may be a poor 
reflection of actual activities of foreign investors (Lipsey, 2007), we demonstrate that our results 
hold if we use sales or employment of US affiliates abroad as our dependent variable. 
3
 Charlton and Davis (2006) use a similar identification strategy in their analysis of FDI inflows into OECD 
countries. 
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The significant positive effect of investment promotion found in the sector-level analysis is 
confirmed when we examine country-level data. The information on country-level FDI inflows 
comes from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and covers the 1972-2005 period. In 
this case, our variable of interest is the existence of an investment promotion agency, deduced 
from the establishment year reported by each agency. The magnitude of the effect is almost 
identical to that found in the sector-level exercise.  
As we are concerned about the potential endogeneity of IPA existence with respect to FDI 
inflows, we also use the instrumental variable approach. As our first instrument, we employ the 
existence of an export promotion agency (EPA) in the host country in the same year. We exploit 
the fact that while EPA activities are typically directed at domestic firms, IPAs and EPAs are 
often established at the same time. Our second instrument is the inflow of foreign aid into the host 
country which is justified on the grounds that multilateral and bilateral donors tend to co-finance 
establishment of IPAs and provide support to agencies. The instrumental variable approach 
confirms our earlier findings.  
In the country-level analysis, we also examine a more nuanced question: are certrain types of 
agencies more successful than others in attracting FDI? The existing case study evidence suggests 
that quasi-government agencies tend to be more effective than subunits of ministries (Wells and 
Wint, 2000). Similarly, it is believed that agencies accountable to external entities are more 
effective than those accountable to a board. The fact that our findings are in line with these 
predictions gives us confidence that our results reflect the effect of investment promotion efforts 
rather than some other factors.  
To confirm that we are not attributing general policy reforms to investment promotion, we 
examine the relationship between IPA existence and domestic capital formation. A general reform 
should affect both domestic investments and inflows of FDI, while investment promotion should 
only affect inflows of FDI. We find that IPA existence has no effect on domestic investment. This 
result is robust across a series of specifications, both with and without controls for inflows of 
FDI.  
We then turn our attention to an aspect of investment promotion that receives considerable 
attention from both policy makers and academics, namely FDI incentives. We use time-varying 
information on the existence of five different types of incentives. These are: financial incentives, 
tax holidays, reduced tax rates, subsidized infrastructure or services, and regulatory concessions. 
Unfortunately, due to a high correlation between the existence of an IPA and the use of 
incentives, it is difficult to distinguish between the two effects. When the existence of investment 
promotion agency and incentives are included simultaneously, the IPA variable is significant 
while the incentive variable is not. When the investment promotion variable is excluded, we find 
statistically significant positive coefficients on tax incentives and subsidized infrastructure or 
services. The magnitude of the effect is about the same as what we typically find for investment 
promotion.  
Last we focus on the concern of government officials that policies in competing countries might 
divert FDI inflows. We test this hypothesis by including the number of competing countries that 
have an investment promotion agency and the number of competing countries that make use of 
85
investment incentives in the same time period. We find that competitors’ general investment 
promotion efforts, as proxied by the existence of an IPA, do not lead to diversion of FDI. 
However, the competitors’ investment incentives negatively affect FDI inflows. This suggests 
that incentives work differently from general investment promotion efforts. The evidence of 
competition effects is present only when competitors are defined as other countries in the same 
geographic region, but not when they are defined as other countries at the same income level. The 
evidence of competition for FDI taking place at the regional level is consistent with practitioners’ 
insight that potential foreign investors first choose a target region, and then choose a country 
within that region as their investment destination (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006).4
Our results have several policy implications. First, they suggest that investment promotion may 
be a viable policy option for developing countries which wish to attract FDI inflows. Second, our 
results confirm the practitioners’ view that subunits of ministries tend to be less effective in 
attracting FDI than agencies with a more autonomous status and that accountability to an external 
entity positively affect agencies’ performance. Third, our findings on the diverting effect of tax 
incentives offered by other countries in the sane geographic region point to potential benefits of 
regional coordination in this area.  
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of investment promotion and 
places the study in the context of the existing literature. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy 
and the data employed. Section 4 presents the results, while section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
2.1 What is investment promotion? 
Wells and Wint (2000) define investment promotion as activities through which governments aim 
to attract FDI inflows. These activities encompass: advertising, investment seminars and 
missions, participation in trade shows and exhibitions, distribution of literature, one-to-one direct 
marketing efforts, facilitating visits of prospective investors, matching prospective investors with 
local partners, help with obtaining permits and approvals, preparing project proposals, conducting 
feasibility studies and servicing investors whose projects have already become operational. Their 
definition of promotion excludes granting incentives to foreign investors, screening potential 
investment projects and negotiations with foreign investors, even though some IPAs may also be 
engaged in such activities. 
Investment promotion activities can be grouped into four areas: (i) national image building, (ii) 
investment generation, (iii) investor servicing, and (iv) policy advocacy. Image building activities 
aim to build a perception of the country as an attractive location for foreign direct investment. 
Investment generation involves identifying potential investors who may be interested in 
establishing a presence in the country, developing a strategy to contact them and starting a 
dialogue with the purpose of having them commit to an investment project. Investor servicing 
involves assisting committed investors in analyzing business opportunities, establishing a 
business and maintaining it. Policy advocacy encompasses initiatives aiming to improve the 
4
 Charlton (2003) reviews case studies on competition in incentives and finds it to be the strongest between 
close neighbors with similar economic conditions and factor endowments. 
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quality of the investment climate and identifying the views of private sector in this area (Wells 
and Wint, 2000).  
2.2 How can investment promotion affect the decision process of a 
potential investor?5
A company that has decided to engage in FDI usually starts the process of selecting the 
investment location by drawing a long list of potential host countries. The list is put together by 
the company executives or by a consulting firm hired for the purpose of site selection. The long 
list typically includes 8 to 20 countries which can be thought of as belonging to three groups: (i) 
most popular FDI destinations in the world, (ii) countries close to the existing operations of the 
investor, and (iii) emerging FDI destinations (that is, countries that the investor may not be 
initially very serious about but which represent “out of the box” thinking). The inclusion of the 
third category presents an opportunity for IPAs. The potential investor or the consulting firm 
working on its behalf is likely to include in the third group countries whose advertisements they 
have recently seen in international media, countries whose IPAs have recently approached them 
or their colleagues, or countries whose IPA representatives they have met at conferences and 
industry fairs.6
Based on the trade-off between costs and the quality of business environment, the long list is 
narrowed down to a short list of up to 5 potential host countries. This is usually done without 
visiting the potential host countries, so the accessibility of the information about the business 
conditions in a host country plays a crucial role. IPAs that provide up-to-date, detailed and 
accurate data on their websites and IPAs that are willing to spend time preparing detailed answers 
to investors’ inquiries and customize these answers to the needs of an individual investor can 
increase the chances of their countries being included in the short list.  
The next step in the decision-making process involves visiting the countries included in the short 
list. This can be done by the potential investor, consultants or both. Multiple sites in each country 
may be visited. A visit often involves interactions with an IPA which has the opportunity to 
emphasize the advantages of locating in its country, answer questions, show executives potential 
investment sites or introduce them to potential local business partners.  
In the final stage of the process, the foreign investor chooses an investment location based on the 
availability of potential sites, costs, the overall quality of business climate and availability of 
incentives. An IPA can assist in providing information on incentives and offering help with the 
registration process.  
As evident from the above outline, IPAs can play a significant role in the selection process of FDI 
sites. The national IPA is often the first entity which a potential investor contacts to obtain 
information. Absence of an IPA not only increases the investor’s cost of gathering information 
5
 This subsection draws on MIGA (2006) and the authors’ interviews with former professional consultants 
assisting companies in establishing facilities abroad. 
6
 For instance, the Polish IPA believes that TV advertising spots increased the number of visitors to its 
website by 43 percent in 2006 (source: Dziennik online. “Wielka promocja rozpoczeta. Polska jak proszek 
do prania” December 29, 2006.  http://www.dziennik.pl/Default.aspx?TabId=97&ShowArticleId=26406). 
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but also sends a negative signal suggesting that the country is not interested in attracting FDI. It 
may constitute a reason to eliminate a location during the selection process. 
2.3 Rationale for public support of investment promotion 
The theoretical justification for public support for investment promotion is based on a market 
failure. Potential foreign investors must incur a cost to gather information about potential returns 
available in alternative investment locations. This cost may be higher in a developing country 
context where published statistics and other information sources are scarce. As argued by 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), markets for information are fundamentally different from other 
markets, and in the presence of imperfect information they may not produce Pareto efficient 
outcomes. The information cost may also be increased by local firms and other foreign investors 
operating in the location who may have an incentive to restrict information flows in order to 
prevent the entry of potential competitors. By disseminating information about potential 
investment opportunities, an IPA can enhance the availability of information to potential foreign 
investors and facilitate more efficient capital allocation. 
The second reason governments may want to subsidize investment promotion is due to positive 
externalities associated with FDI inflows. There is a large literature arguing that foreign direct 
investment may result in knowledge spillovers to the domestic industry. As foreign investors do 
not take into account this externality when making their decisions, they will provide less than the 
socially optimal level of FDI. Public intervention is then needed to increase the amount of 
investment to the socially optimal level.7
2.4 Existing literature on effectiveness of investment promotion 
Despite widespread implementation of investment promotion around the world, little is known 
about how effective these policies are. Pioneering work by Wells and Wint (2000), based on case 
studies and a very limited econometric analysis, found a positive correlation between investment 
promotion and the level of FDI per capita. Subsequent work by Morisset and Andrews-Johnson 
(2004) also concluded that IPAs appear to play a useful role in attracting FDI. However, both 
studies were based on cross-sectional data and a very small number of observations (between 36 
and 58).  
Contributions studying FDI inflows into the US have relied on more detailed data and employed a 
more rigorous methodology. Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) estimated a location choice model 
on a sample of 760 Japanese manufacturing establishments in the US between 1980 and 1992. In 
addition to agglomeration factors and other controls, the authors examined the effects of profit 
taxes, factor subsidies, the existence of a foreign trade zone in the state, the use of unitary 
taxation by the state, and the presence of an investment promotion office in Japan. They did not 
find a significant effect of investment promotion offices in Japan. Bobonis and Shatz (2007) 
analyzed determinants of the FDI stock in US states from eight source countries using Arellano-
Bond dynamic panel data estimator. They measured investment promotion with the number of 
years a state had a full-time state trade or investment office in each of the eight countries. They 
found that a one-percent increase in the number of years with an investment office increased the 
7
 For a detailed discussion of reasons why countries may choose to subsidize FDI see Hanson (2001). 
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FDI stock by between 0.14 and 0.27 percent. In their sample, the latter figure corresponded to a 
one million USD (at the median) or a 2.6 million USD (at the mean) increase in the value of the 
FDI stock.8
The most rigorous analysis to date performed in a multi-country setting was done by Charlton and 
Davis (2006). The authors focused on the question of whether IPAs have been more successful in 
attracting FDI inflows into industries they explicitly target. Industry-level data on FDI inflows 
into 19 industries in 22 OECD countries during the 1990-2001 period combined with information 
on targeted industries collected through a survey of IPAs provided the basis for their study. Using 
propensity score matching and the difference-in-differences specification, the authors found that 
targeting of an industry increased the growth rate of FDI inflows into that industry by 41 percent.  
This study extends the existing literature in several directions. First, it applies a rigorous 
approach, similar to that pioneered by Charlton and Davis (2006), to a large sample of developed 
and developing countries. As mentioned before, little is known about the effectiveness of 
investment promotion in developing countries. One could argue that investment promotion could 
be more effective in the developing world due to scarcity of detailed information on the 
prevailing business conditions, rules and regulations and due to high costs of gathering such 
information. Alternatively, one can argue that in developing countries lacking a “good product to 
market” (i.e. good business climate), investment promotion efforts may be a waste of resources, 
while in developing countries with an acceptable business environment low labor costs may be 
attracting FDI inflows even in the absence of investment promotion. Second, this study examines 
whether the status and the reporting structure of investment promotion agencies matter for their 
effectiveness. Third, our analysis goes beyond the existing literature by examining the effect of 
regional competition in FDI incentives.     
3. Empirical strategy and data 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
Our empirical analysis will rely on two datasets: (i) country-sector panel data and (ii) aggregate 
country-level panel data. The basic empirical specification in the sector-level analysis is 
The dependent variable is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into sector i in country c 
at time t. Sector_targetedcit equals one if country c targets sector i at time t and zero otherwise. Ȗci,
Ȗct and Ȗit are country-industry, country-time and industry-year fixed effects, respectively.  
The question of interest is whether targeted sectors receive higher FDI inflows in the post 
targeting period (relative to pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors). Note that time-
invariant characteristics that differentiate sectors chosen for targeting from other sectors will be 
captured by country-sector fixed effects. Shocks common to all sectors in a particular country in a 
particular year will be captured by country-year fixed effects. Shocks affecting supply of FDI in a 
8
 The literature on location determinants of FDI in the US goes back to at least the 1980s. See Bobonis and 
Shatz (2007) and Coughlin and Segev (2000) for a review.  
cititctcicitcit getedSector_tarFDIflow εγγγβα +++++= 11ln
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particular sector will be controlled for by sector-year fixed effects. The model will be estimated 
on a sample of countries that have or have not practiced sector targeting. Narrowing the sample to 
only countries engaged in targeting does not change the conclusions of the study.     
In the aggregate analysis, we will estimate the following model: 
where the dependent variable is the log of aggregate inflow of foreign direct investment into 
country c at time t. IPAct equals one if country c had an investment promotion agency at time t 
and zero otherwise. ȥc and ȥt are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Xct includes time-
varying country controls. All variables and their sources are described in section 3.3.  
3.2 Econometric issues 
Identifying the relationship between investment promotion efforts and FDI inflows poses several 
challenges. Perhaps the most important challenge is establishing the direction of causality. It 
could be argued that the choice of sectors to be targeted is endogenous; IPAs could be targeting 
sectors which already experienced high inflows. In our sector-level analysis, which compares FDI 
inflows to targeted and non-targeted sectors pre- and post-targeting, we use four different 
strategies to deal with the potential reverse causality. First, we include country-industry fixed 
effects, which take out unobserved time-invariant characteristics specific to country-industry 
combinations. If, for example, the mining sector in South Africa was chosen for targeting because 
of the endowment of gold and this endowment is also the reason for large FDI inflows into the 
sector, this is controlled for by the country-sector fixed effect. Second, we show that our results 
are robust to a specification with first, second and third lags. A change in FDI inflows is unlikely 
to explain a change in policy which precedes it, although the strategy is not robust to forward 
looking behavior of policy makers. Third, we investigate if the sectors targeted were different 
from other sectors in the years before the targeting started. We find no evidence of relatively 
successful or unsuccessful sectors being chosen for targeting. Fourth, as IPAs were asked in the 
Census about the reasons behind targeting a particular set of sectors, we show that the results hold 
even if we exclude targeted sectors in countries that made targeting decisions based on the past 
success or failure in attracting FDI to that sector.  
The measures described above do not address the theoretical possibility that IPAs know which 
sectors will attract a lot of FDI in the future and choose to target them to show results. In the 
Census, IPAs were asked about who decided which sectors to target.9 The incentive to target 
sectors that already have high expected FDI inflows may have been present at the agency board 
level, but it is harder to make the same case for the other entities. Of the 97 agencies that 
responded, only 6 said the decision was entirely left to the agency board, 24 reported the board 
having some input into the decision, and 67 said the agency board was not at all involved in the 
decision. Since the majority of the countries in the sample responded that the agency board was 
not involved in the choice of sectors, we do not view this possibility as a cause for concern.  
9
 The entities involved in the decision were: president’s office, prime minister’s office, ministry of foreign 
affairs, ministry of finance, ministry of industry, ministry of commerce, agency board or the decision was 
based on a national strategy plan. In some cases, several entities were involved.  
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In the analysis based on aggregate data, where we use the existence of an IPA as our investment 
promotion variable, we follow three approaches to deal with the potential reverse causality 
problem. The first approach is to attenuate the problem by including country fixed effects and 
lagging the IPA indicator by one or more periods. The second approach is instrumental variables 
estimation, where information on the existence of an export promotion agency and the amount of 
foreign aid are used as instruments. The third approach is to ask more nuanced questions such as: 
do IPA’s independence and reporting structure matter for its effectiveness in attracting FDI? As it 
is not clear why the amount of FDI inflows should affect the type of an agency being created or a 
change in the agency status or reporting structure, these results give us more confidence that the 
causality goes from investment promotion to inflows and not the other way around, especially 
because the findings are consistent with the conclusions of the case study literature.  
The second challenge in our analysis is to distinguish the effect of an IPA from other changes in 
policies (or anything else relevant for FDI inflows) occurring at the same time. In the sector-level 
analysis, we address this challenge by including country-year fixed effects which capture country-
specific factors that may influence FDI inflows at a particular point in time. For instance, if 
country c started special investment promotion efforts in the automotive sector in year t and at the 
same time simplified registration procedures for foreign investors, to the extent that the latter 
reform affected all sectors equally, it would be captured by the country-year fixed effect. We also 
include sector-time fixed effects to capture factors affecting worldwide supply of FDI in a 
particular sector at a particular point in time. These fixed effects capture global unobserved 
sector-specific shocks. For example, if international investors suddenly decided to increase 
investments in the ICT sector, and a country at the same time started targeting the ICT sector, the 
investment promotion variable could capture the global shock rather than the country’s promotion 
efforts. Inclusion of sector-year fixed effects takes care of this possibility.    
In the country-level analysis, we include controls for various aspects of the business climate in 
the host country and other typical FDI determinants used in the literature. We also show that the 
existence of an IPA does not affect domestic investment. As most policy changes would tend to 
influence both domestic and foreign investment, this gives us more confidence in our results.  
The third challenge is to distinguish between general investment promotion (information 
provision, image building, help with red tape etc.) and tax incentives. There is a high correlation 
between IPA existence and tax incentives, which unfortunately prevents us from separating the 
two effects with confidence. 
3.3 Data
Our data on investment promotion activities comes from the 2005 Census conducted by the 
World Bank’s Research Department in cooperation with the Foreign Investment Advisory 
Services, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the World Association of Investment 
Promotion Agencies. An electronic survey was sent out to all national investment promotion 
agencies around the world. After several weeks reminder e-mails were sent out, and after some 
more weeks phone calls were made to increase the likelihood of response. As the survey forms 
came in, the data were carefully checked for inconsistencies and missing information. Then new 
rounds of phone calls were made to clarify inconsistencies and complete the data. The survey was 
sent out in December 2005, and by April 2006 most of the information was complete. The survey 
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form gave uniformity needed for comparison across countries, while the information collected 
through the phone calls provided guidance on interpretation of the responses. This comprehensive 
process yielded responses from 109 national investment promotion agencies. Additionally, we 
found detailed information on the activities of the Austrian IPA, which did not respond to the 
Census, on its website. The sample covers countries across all geographic regions as well as all 
income levels. Eighty-one of the responses received were from developing countries. The sample 
also includes additional 31 countries that we regard as very likely to not have an investment 
promotion agency. These were identified by their absence in different directories of IPAs, lack of 
websites, by confirmation of national embassies/other national public institutions or by 
consultations with World Bank country economists.10
A potential concern is that high quality agencies are overrepresented in the sample due to self-
selection. We cannot rule out this possibility completely, but a glance at our sample reveals a 
wide representation of countries across all income groups and regions. Also our experience from 
collecting the data suggests the opposite. Some developed countries were among the hardest to 
obtain answers from, while countries in, for example, Sub Saharan Africa were often extremely 
helpful in providing as extensive and precise information as possible. One explanation could be 
the opportunity cost; officers of IPAs in developed countries often appeared to be more busy and 
harder to contact. Therefore, it is not clear which way a potential sample bias would work. If 
anything, it could make investment promotion appear less efficient than it actually is.   
In the design of the survey, special attention was given to collecting time-varying information. 
While this increased the effort needed to collect the data, it also allowed for the use of panel 
estimation techniques and made it possible to control for time-invariant country-specific 
unobservable factors. Attention was also given to sector-specific time-varying measures of 
investment promotion The agencies were asked if they targeted specific sectors and when 
targeting started and ended. 
The Census also included questions on more subtle characteristics of the agencies. For instance, 
IPAs were asked about their legal status (sub-unit of ministry, autonomous public body, semi-
autonomous agency reporting to a ministry, joint public-private entity, private entity), and if the 
status had changed, when the change happened and what the status was before the change. 
Additionally the Census included a question asking to whom the agency was accountable and 
how long they had been reporting to the overseeing entity.  
Investment incentives were another aspect of investment promotion covered in the Census. 
Despite the attention received by investment incentives, to the best of our knowledge, a database 
with broad cross-country and cross-time coverage of investment incentives offered does not exist. 
Collection of such data in itself represents a contribution to the FDI literature.  
Parallel to the survey on investment promotion, Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton (2006) collected 
information on export promotion agencies. Data on the date of establishment of an export 
promotion agency are used in our study as an instrument for the existence of an investment 
10
 The actual number of countries included in the empirical analysis depends on the availability of other 
variables included. 
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promotion agency in a country, since establishment of these two types of agencies have often 
been a part of a more active internationalization strategy of governments. At the same time, the 
exclusion restriction, that the existence of an export promotion agency should not be included 
directly in the equation explaining FDI inflows, should be fulfilled, since export promotion 
agencies primarily help domestic firms.   
FDI data for the sector-level analysis are supplied by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). These data give the stocks of US FDI abroad.11 We use the first difference of the stocks to 
calculate flows. BEA publishes information on 13 sectors until 1998 and 15 sectors from 1999.12
We made two changes to the BEA data. We aggregated “Other manufacturing” and “Other 
industries” into one sector in the pre-1999 data, and “Machinery” and “Computer and electronic 
products” into one sector in the post-1998 data. The second change was to match sectors over 
time. Due to a break in the aggregation in 1998 in the BEA data, sector definitions are not exactly 
the same during the entire period (1989-2004). As our identification strategy is to follow sectors 
over time and test if post-targeting inflows are significantly higher than pre-targeting inflows (and 
inflows to non-targeted sectors), we would like to have long time periods before and after 
targeting. As the break in aggregation appeared around the middle of the period, we would 
typically have either very few years pre-targeting or very few years post-targeting had we not 
implemented the matching procedure.  
After these two changes, we match BEA sectors to the sector classification used in the Census to 
collect targeting information. See Table 1 for the concordance and Figure 2 for summary statistics 
on sectors that are most frequently targeted. We have a maximum of 15 sectors per country. The 
stock data are available from 1989-2004 (first differenced for 1990-2004). Table 2 shows the 124 
countries included in the sector sample.13 For additional statistics on the sectors see Table 3 and 
Table 4. 
The US is one of the top FDI source countries, so by focusing on US FDI we capture a large share 
of the world’s FDI stock. Figure 3, which compares the stock of US FDI to the stock of FDI from 
other OECD countries in 2000, demonstrates that US was the dominant source country in Latin 
America, East Asia and industrialized economies. Additional advantages of using the BEA data 
are their comparability across countries and access to figures on sales and employment of US 
affiliates abroad. We use the latter figures in our robustness checks.  
In the aggregate analysis, flow data from the IMF International Financial Statistics are used. The 
IMF data capture inflows of FDI to each country from any country in the world. The aggregate 
11
 U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one US 
resident of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the 
equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. The data capture the cumulative value 
of parents' investments in their affiliates (source: http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/0395iid/maintext.htm). Data 
points suppressed by the BEA for confidentiality reasons are treated as missing. Data points reported as 
values belonging to the range between -500,000 and 500,000 US dollars are treated as equal to 500,000 
dollars. We interpolated missing information on stocks to increase the number of observations.   
12
 From 1999, the BEA-data are classified under the 1997 North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS).  Previously, data were classified under the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC). 
13
 The number of 124 countries corresponds to the baseline specification in Table 9. 
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analysis covers the period 1972-2005. Table 2 and its footnotes lists the 128 countries that are 
included in the aggregate analysis.14
In both the analysis based on BEA sector data and in the analysis based on IFS aggregate data we 
use the log of FDI inflows as our dependent variable. To deal with zeros we add one US dollar to 
all observations before taking logs. To deal with negative values we follow Blonigen (2004) and 
Eichengreen and Tong (2005) and set all negative values to 0.1 US dollar before taking logs.15
We follow the literature on FDI determinants (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Javorcik, 2004b) 
and control for market size, labor costs, macroeconomic stability and business climate. 
Purchasing power of local consumers is measured as the log of GDP per capita. This variable 
could also be interpreted as a proxy for labor costs; thus the expected sign on the coefficient could 
be either positive or negative. Market-seeking FDI would be attracted to countries with high 
purchasing power, while FDI with the intention of cutting production costs is more likely to flow 
to countries with lower wage cost. GDP growth and the log of population size are proxies for the 
potential market size, and a positive coefficient is expected on these variables. The GDP and 
population variables are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).16 The 
inflation rate, provided by the IMF International Financial Statistics, is a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. High inflation indicates an unstable macroeconomic environment and 
thus we expect a negative coefficient. As measures of political institutions and business climate 
we use an index of civil liberties from Freedom House (available from 1972-2004).17 It ranges 
from one denoting the most free countries to seven denoting the least free countries. A negative 
coefficient is, therefore, expected. The political risk rating provided by the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), available for 1984-2006, is also used.18 A positive coefficient is anticipated 
since the variable ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means very high political risk and 100 very low 
political risk.  
In some specifications, we use gross capital formation or gross fixed capital formation as the 
dependent variable. Both variables come from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. In the 
instrumental variable approach, we use information on aid inflows per capita (in current US 
dollars) and official development assistance and official aid (in current US dollars), both from the 
WDI. The summary statistics are presented in Table 5 – 8. 
14
 The number of years differs across countries, and the number of observations differs across econometric 
specifications due to the availability of control variables. The figure of 128 refers to relevant countries 
(countries from which we got a response, for which IPA existence could not be confirmed, or for which we 
know that they do not have an IPA) with FDI data in IFS.     
15
 As we were concerned about a significant number of cases with zero investment, we also used the Tobit 
specification including regional rather than country fixed effects. The Tobit results confirmed our findings. 
This was true both when the lower censoring limit for the dependent variable was set to log(1) and log(0.1), 
which corresponds to zero and negative FDI inflows, respectively. As a robustness check in the sector-level 
data, we also estimated the models from Table 9 without distinguishing between zeros and negative FDI 
flow values (i.e. we set both zero and negative values to 0.1 before taking logs). The effect of targeting was 
significant at the 1% level for all the specifications in the developing country sample (the coefficient varied 
between 1.018 and 1.454).         
16 http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/
17 http://www.freedomhouse.org/. The results are also robust to using political rights from Freedom house.  
18 http://www.icrgonline.com/
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4. Results 
4.1 Sector-level analysis  
We start our investigation of the effectiveness of investment promotion efforts with a sector-level 
analysis. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that most IPAs focus their efforts on a 
certain number of priority (target) sectors.19 Sector targeting is viewed by investment promotion 
practitioners as best practice as it is believed that more intense efforts concentrated on a few 
priority sectors are likely to lead to greater FDI inflows than less intense across-the-board 
attempts to attract FDI. Targeting means engaging in the standard investment promotion 
activities, such as image building, investment generation, investor servicing and policy advocacy 
(see subsections 2.1 and 2.2), but applying them to a selection of industries rather than to foreign 
investors in general. Thus, an IPA not engaged in targeting will promote its country as a good 
place to do business, while an IPA targeting particular sectors will emphasize why its country is 
an ideal location for investors operating in these industries. Similarly, the former IPA will attend 
many different types of fairs and conferences while the latter will present only at events specific 
to the industries it aims to attract. The idea behind targeting is that a more focused message 
tailored and delivered to a narrow audience will be more effective than general investment 
promotion activities. 
Taking advantage of information on sectors targeted by IPAs (if any), we use the difference-in-
differences approach and examine whether sectors targeted by IPA receive more FDI inflows in 
the post-targeting period relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors. Our goal is 
not to check whether countries with IPAs engaged in sector targeting receive more FDI than 
countries that do not follow this approach. Rather, targeting is used as a convenient identification 
strategy that allows us to ask whether IPAs are successful at bringing the type of FDI they are 
meant to attract.  
The estimated specification includes a set of controls. To take into account heterogeneity across 
sector-country combinations, we include sector-country fixed effects. Rather than including 
explicit country-level controls, we include in the specification country-year fixed effects. These 
control for all country-specific changes taking place over time. To the extent that changes in the 
host country policies, regulations and other factors affect FDI inflows to all sectors in the same 
way, country-year fixed effects will capture them. It is also possible that some global shocks 
affect the supply of FDI in a particular sector. To take this into account, we add sector-year fixed 
effects. To the extent global shocks affect flows of FDI into a particular sector in the same way 
across countries, they will be captured by sector-year fixed effects. 
The results, presented in Table 9, suggest that investment promotion efforts are associated with 
higher FDI inflows to developing countries. The coefficient on the dummy for a sector being 
targeted is positive and statistically significant in the developing country subsample. In the full 
sample, contemporaneous targeting does not appear to matter. In the post-targeting period, 
targeted sectors in developing countries appear to receive 155% higher FDI inflows (column 5). 
This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
19
 86 IPAs, out of the 104 responding to the question on sector targeting, answered that they were using 
sector targeting or had done so in the past. Of these, 56 gave complete timing of the targeting efforts 
towards at least one sector and we were able to include these targeted sectors in the sample. We did not 
include in the sample targeted sectors for which we did not have complete timing.  
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While the magnitude of the effect may seem large, it is not implausible. Many sectors experience 
zero and close to zero inflows, and if we consider only positive flows of US FDI, the median 
2004 value is 21 and 11 million dollars in the full and the developing country sample, 
respectively. Thus, the estimated 155% percent increase would mean an additional annual inflow 
of 17 million dollars for the median sector-country observation in the developing country 
subsample.20 A quick look at the amounts multinational corporations actually invest in developing 
countries reveals that FDI inflows of that magnitude are not uncommon. For example, in 2005 
Wal-Mart planned to open 70 new units in Mexico with an expected investment of 736 million 
dollars21 and in 1995 Pepsi announced a 55 million dollar investment in a snack-food company in 
South Africa,22 Boeing McDonnell Douglas invested 31 million dollars in the Czech Republic in 
1998.23
It is reasonable to expect that some time is needed before the full effect of targeting materializes. 
Therefore, Table 9 also includes specifications with the targeted variable lagged by one, two or 
three periods. Another, already mentioned, positive aspect of using lagged values is that they 
attenuate potential concerns about endogeneity. We find positive and significant effects of lagged 
targeting in all specifications estimated, both in the full sample and for developing countries. 
Lagging appears to make the results stronger.   
To investigate the possibility that our results are driven by reverse causality–that is investment 
inflows determine subsequent targeting rather the other way around–in Table 10 we include a 
dummy variable taking the value of one for targeted sectors in the years before targeting started 
and zero otherwise. In different specifications, we consider one year before the start of targeting 
(column 1 and 5), two years (2 and 6), three years (3 and 7) and four years (4 and 8).24 A positive 
and significant coefficient on the dummy would indicate that sectors receiving higher FDI inflows 
were the ones subsequently chosen for targeting. In other words, it would indicate that the 
investment promotion agencies were picking successful sectors as their priority sectors and thus 
our earlier findings would reflect this selection process rather than the effectiveness of investment 
promotion activities. However, the results presented in Table 10 suggest that this was not the case 
in the developing country subsample. In none of the four specifications, does the dummy appear 
to be statistically significant. The coefficients on the targeting variable remain positive and 
significant. The F-test included in the two lower rows of the table suggests that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the dummy and the targeting variable. In contrast, in 
the full sample, the two effects are not different from each other and the targeting variable is not 
statistically significant. 
In Table 11, we present the results from a probit regression modeling the determinants of sector 
targeting. The dependent variable is equal to one if country c begins targeting industry i at time t, 
20
 The median value of 11 million dollars pertains to those country-sector combinations, included in the 
regression presented in column 5 in Table 9, which received a positive amount of US FDI in 2004. The 
figure of 155% is based on the estimate reported in the same column. 
21 http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=379
22 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE0DF1430F931A15755C0A963958260
23 http://www.factbook.net/countryreports/cz/cz_fdi_us.htm
24
 Thus, for instance, if country c decided to target sector i in year 2000, the dummy will take on the value 
of one in 1999 (columns 1 and 5), in 1998 and 1999 (columns 2 and 6), etc., and zero in all other years. 
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and zero if the industry is not targeted at time t.25 The purpose of the exercise is to find out 
whether past FDI inflows or FDI stocks in industry i in country c (lagged one, two or three 
periods) can predict future targeting of the industry. The model also includes controls for country 
characteristics as well as country and year fixed effects.26 In only one of twelve specifications, we 
find a significant coefficient on the FDI variable. The coefficient bears a negative sign which 
suggests that, if anything, developing countries chose for targeting sectors with lower FDI flows.  
As another robustness check, we remove from the sample observations for targeted sectors in 
countries where the investment promotion agencies reported in the Census that the choice of 
priority sectors was based on the earlier success in attracting inflows to those sectors or the lack 
thereof. As seen in Table 12, removing these countries leads to a stronger rather than weaker 
effect of the investment promotion efforts. 
4.2 Sector-level analysis – additional robustness checks 
A potential concern is that our findings could be driven by simultaneous opening to FDI and 
targeting of services industries where entry of foreign investors was restricted in the past. To 
eliminate this possibility, we exclude from the sample services sectors and utilities and show that 
this change does not affect our findings (see Table 13).  
As agglomeration effects may be important in attracting FDI, we include the lagged FDI stock in 
the sector in Table 14. This additional control variable is not statistically significant and its 
inclusion does not affect our results.    
To address the concern that FDI flows may be a poor reflection of actual activities of foreign 
investors, as suggested by Lipsey (2007), we demonstrate that our results hold if we use sales or 
employment of US affiliates abroad as our dependent variable. To save space, we present only 
results for the developing country subsample. When sales are used, the magnitude of the effect is 
very similar to that found in the baseline specification. When employment figures are considered, 
the size of the effect halves (see Table 15). 
The choice of the control group is an important consideration. In our analysis, we have compared 
targeted sectors before and after targeting with sectors that were not targeted. A potential concern 
is that inclusion of a large number of low performing (in terms of FDI inflows) sectors could 
amplify the effect of targeting and thus exaggerate its effect. To evaluate this concern we estimate 
the effect of targeting on the subsample of 56 countries that targeted at least one sector during the 
period covered by our analysis (for the list see Table 3). These results are not shown, but the 
estimated coefficient on the targeting variable is positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level for 
the subsample of developing countries.27
25
 Thus observations for targeted sectors in years other than the first year of targeting are not included in the 
sample. 
26
 See table note for the list of control variables. 
27
 More specifically, we estimated the baseline specifications from Table 9 on the sample of 56 countries 
which gave us detailed timing information. The coefficient on the targeting variable in the developing 
country subsample varied between 0.767 and 1.244. 
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In sum, our results suggest that investment promotion efforts are associated with higher FDI 
inflows to targeted sectors in developing countries. The results are robust to a large number of 
specifications, and the available evidence suggests that they are unlikely to suffer from reverse 
causality problems. The findings for the combined sample of developing and developed countries 
are less clear. Therefore, we are hesitant to comment on the effectiveness of investment 
promotion efforts in a developed country context.28
4.3 Country-level analysis 
The next part of our analysis focuses on aggregate FDI flows and examines whether the existence 
of an investment promotion agency affects the amount of investment received by all sectors in a 
given country. There are several reasons for extending the analysis to the aggregate level. First, 
the information on sector targeting could be plagued by measurement errors. Employing an 
alternative measure of investment promotion activities reduces the possibility that the results are 
affected by measurement error, as obtaining information on the year of IPA establishment is more 
straightforward than cataloguing targeting information. The second reason for looking at 
aggregate data is that aggregate FDI figures are available for a longer time span (we go back to 
the year 1972 as opposed to 1990 in the case of sector-level information). Similarly, we can 
consider a larger number of countries than in the sector-level analysis where we are forced to 
discard countries with incomplete targeting information. Third, the detailed information on the 
status and reporting structure of the agencies obtained in the Census allows us to focus on more 
nuanced questions and thus can give us more confidence that we are picking up the IPA effect. 
The aggregate analysis confirms the finding of the sector-level analysis. In Table 16, we start with 
a specification with host-country fixed effects, time fixed effects and control variables. The 
variable of interest is a dummy taking on the value of one if a host country has an IPA at time t 
and zero otherwise. As before, we find that developing countries engaged in investment 
promotion receive about two and a half times higher FDI inflows than developing countries not 
having an IPA. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and are very 
much in line with the estimates based on the sector-level data. When developed countries are 
included in the sample, we find a positive effect when the IPA variable is lagged one and two 
periods but not in the other two specifications, which again mirrors our overall conclusions from 
the previous section. An alternative specification where investment promotion efforts are 
measured by the number of years an IPA has been in existence (and its square) leads to the same 
conclusions. 
The estimated effects of the control variables broadly conform to our expectations. We find that 
countries experiencing faster GDP growth tend to attract more FDI. The expected sign on the per 
capita GDP is ambiguous, since this variable can be seen as a measure of the purchasing power of 
local consumers (thus implying a positive relationship for market seeking FDI) or a proxy for 
labor costs (thus implying a negative relationship for efficiency seeking FDI). The estimated 
negative effects might indicate that the latter effect dominates. Population size could be viewed as 
a proxy for the potential market size of the host country. The fact that we find a negative effect is 
somewhat surprising and can perhaps be explained by the inclusion of country fixed effects which 
capture the average country size over the period. Even though the population size tends to change 
28
 When we focus on the subsample of developed countries we fail to detect any positive effect of 
investment promotion. 
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little over time, significant changes are likely to take place during the 30-year period covered by 
our study. As population growth tends to decrease with economic development, the negative sign 
could be a reflection of high population growth being correlated with poor performance in other 
areas of economic performance. As anticipated, we find that countries experiencing 
macroeconomic instability (as proxied by high inflation) receive less FDI. Restrictions on civil 
liberties do not appear to matter in the developing country subsample and enter with a negative 
sign in the full sample. 
In Table 17, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of proxies for political risk, 
restrictions on political rights and general measures of openness. We lag the openness measures 
two periods to reduce the problem of simultaneity. We find that this extension has little effect on 
our earlier findings. As expected, we find that higher political risk reduces the magnitude of FDI 
inflows.29 Restrictions on political rights do not appear to matter, while openness to trade is 
associated with lower inflows of FDI. As these additional controls severely reduce our sample 
size, we do not include them in subsequent estimations. 
A typical challenge presented by this type of regressions is separating the effect of the variable of 
interest, investment promotion efforts in our case, from the effects of other economic, political or 
regulatory changes happening at the same time. Therefore, to gain more confidence in our results, 
we examine whether there is a positive relationship between gross fixed domestic capital 
formation and the existence of an IPA. As the mandate of a typical IPA is restricted to promoting 
investment flows from abroad, there is no reason for a positive relationship between the IPA 
dummy and domestic investment. If a positive relationship were found, it would suggest that the 
IPA dummy may be capturing some policy reforms beneficial for investments in general rather 
than efforts to attract FDI.  
The results, presented in Table 18, indicate the absence of such a relationship and thus give us 
confidence that the IPA variable indeed reflects investment promotion activities. In all eight 
regressions, the coefficient on the IPA dummy (contemporaneous or lagged by one or more 
periods) is negative and not statistically significant. In the four columns to the right we add 
contemporaneous or lagged (by one or more periods) FDI inflows as additional control variable.  
The coefficient on FDI inflows is positive and statistically significant in all regressions. The 
results (not shown) are almost identical when we consider gross domestic capital formation rather 
than gross fixed domestic capital formation as the dependent variable. 
Next we turn to the instrumental variable approach in an attempt to address the potential 
endogeneity between past FDI flows and creation of an investment promotion agency. We use a 
linear probability model to predict existence of an IPA. Our first instrument is the existence of an 
export promotion agency in the host country. The rationale is that countries often decide to 
establish an investment promotion agency and an export promotion agency around the same time. 
To be a valid instrument, the establishment of the EPA should explain the establishment of the 
investment promotion agency, without having any direct effect on FDI inflows. As EPAs 
typically focus on increasing the exports of domestic firms, it is not likely that presence of an 
EPA could directly affect FDI inflows.  
29
 Recall that higher values of the index correspond to lower risk, hence the expected positive sign. 
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To justify our second instrument we use the fact that bilateral and multilateral donors (e.g., the 
World Bank Group, and in particular its Foreign Investment Advisory Services and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) have been actively engaged in assisting developing 
countries in setting up investment promotion agencies. The involvement of donors in supporting 
IPAs has been significant. As shown in Figure 4, in 2004 donors contributed on average 8 percent 
of the IPA budget in developing countries. Donor involvement went beyond financing and 
included technical advice, staff training, etc. Thus our second instrument is defined as the log of 
aid received by the host country at time t either in dollar terms or in dollars per capita. 
As is evident from Table 19, our instruments have a satisfactory predictive power as reflected in 
the high F statistic. We find a positive correlation between the existence of an IPA and an EPA 
and a positive association between the amount of per capita aid received and IPA existence. The 
Sargan test does not reject the validity of the instruments. The results from the second stage 
confirm our earlier findings: the coefficient on the IPA variable is still positive and highly 
significant in all specifications. Some caution is, however, appropriate here given the much larger 
size of the estimated coefficients when compared to the OLS results. Optimistically interpreted, 
this could be an indication of reverse causality: IPAs are more likely to be established in countries 
with low FDI inflows. OLS estimation fails to take this into account and thus underestimates the 
magnitude of the effects. Pessimistically interpreted, the increase in the coefficients in the IV 
estimations could indicate that the exclusion restrictions are not fulfilled and that the instruments 
affect FDI inflows directly. Given the challenge of finding truly exogenous instruments in a panel 
of countries, we do not want to overemphasize the instrumental variable results.30
4.4 Agency characteristics 
In response to the difficulties in teasing out the true effect of investment promotion, we next turn 
to asking questions about the effectiveness of different agency structures. We believe that finding 
patterns consistent with the case study evidence collected by investment promotion professionals 
and conventional wisdom will give us more faith in the results we have found so far.  
The first question we analyze is whether the agency’s legal status affects its performance. 
According to the case study work by Wells and Wint (2000), the nature of investment promotion 
activities suggests that quasi-governmental agencies may be best positioned to fulfill this 
function. On the one hand, there are several reasons why investment promotion should be 
performed by governments. First, the results of investment promotion activities may be difficult 
to translate into direct profits. While there is a market for consulting firms assisting companies in 
finding potential investment destinations, image building activities cannot be translated into 
profits that are readily captured by private companies. Second, agencies linked to the government 
may find it easier to assist investors in getting regulatory approvals, channel their complaints to 
the government and lobby authorities on behalf of foreign companies. On the other hand, the key 
ingredients of investment promotion—marketing a country as an attractive FDI location and 
30
 To further investigate the possible endogeneity of IPA establishment to FDI inflows we also estimated 
several probit models. The dependent variable was equal to one if an IPA was established in country c at 
time t, and zero if there was no IPA in country c at time t. On the right hand side, we included the log of 
FDI inflows as well as the other controls from Table 16. Neither contemporary FDI inflows nor their first, 
second or third lags appeared to be statistically significant in any of the specifications. As the IFS database 
contains very few observations on FDI stocks, we did not repeat the exercise with FDI stocks as an 
explanatory variable. 
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investor servicing—are closer in nature to activities that are better performed by the private 
sector. Successful marketing requires the flexibility to respond to changing business conditions 
and investor needs, calls for close interactions with the private sector and relies on the ability to 
generate and implement consistent promotional strategies throughout a long period of time. 
Usually, government entities are neither flexible nor immune to political interference from 
changing governments. Investor servicing also requires a good understanding of the needs of the 
private sector. Other private sector advantages in investment promotion include cost containment, 
flexibility in hiring and firing and ability to pay salaries above the civil service levels which 
allows the agency to hire highly skilled and motivated staff. 
Our results confirm the intuition of Wells and Wint. In regressions not reported here, we find that 
agencies with a more autonomous status (i.e. agencies which are not subunits of a ministry) are 
more effective in attracting FDI inflows than subunits of a ministry.31 In Table 20 (the first two 
columns), we show that this pattern is confirmed when we consider cases of the status change. 
We find that agencies starting out as subunits of a ministry become more effective when they gain 
more autonomy (that is they change their status to being either an autonomous public body, semi-
autonomous agency reporting to a ministry, joint public-private or private entity), compared to 
those that remain subunits of a ministry.  
In a related exercise (also Table 20), we find that IPAs accountable to external entities (in 
addition to or instead of being accountable to the agency’s board) tend to be more effective. 
Further, we find that agencies accountable to entities dealing with economic issues rather than 
political issues (ministry of finance versus ministry of foreign affairs for example) are more 
effective in attracting FDI.32 An explanation for this result might be that the work of an IPA is of 
economic nature and its involvement in the design of economic policy might make the IPA more 
effective in its mission.  
4.5 Investment incentives 
An aspect of investment promotion that typically receives high levels of attention from both 
policy makers and academics is investment incentives. In the Census, we collected time-varying 
information on five different types of investment incentives: financial incentives, tax holidays, 
reduced tax rates, subsidized infrastructure or services, and regulatory concessions. Our finding is 
that it is in general difficult to distinguish the effect of incentives from a more general effect of 
investment promotion, as there is a high correlation between these variables (see Table 8). When 
both the existence of investment promotion agency and incentives are included simultaneously, 
we generally find that the investment promotion dummy is significant while the incentive variable 
is not, as can be seen in Table 21. When the investment promotion variable is excluded, as in 
Table 22, we find a statistically significant positive correlation between FDI inflows and tax 
incentives and between FDI inflows and subsidized infrastructure or services. The magnitude is 
about the same as what we have typically found for the IPA existence effect in the earlier 
specifications.  
31
 We define “more autonomous” as having a status other than a subunit of a ministry.  In the Census, 30 
IPAs had the status of a sub-unit of ministry, 26 an autonomous public body, 43 a semi-autonomous agency 
reporting to a ministry, 3 a joint public-private entity and 2 a private entity (figures for 2004).    
32
 We defined economic institutions as ministry of finance, ministry of industry, ministry of commerce or 
related institutions. The group of political institutions consists of president, prime minister and ministry 
foreign affairs.  
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4.6 Competition between countries 
Government officials are often concerned about growing competition for FDI among countries. 
To shed some light on this issue we extend our specification to include presence of IPAs and FDI 
incentives in a peer group of host countries. In other words, in each year we count the number of 
countries in the peer group with an existing IPA and with FDI incentives on offer.33 In Table 23, 
the peer group refers to countries within the same geographic region, while in Table 24 to 
countries within the same income group.34 We control for the average GDP growth in the peer 
group (weighted by each country’s GDP).  
Two interesting findings emerge. First, FDI incentives appear to divert FDI inflows, but only 
within the geographic region, not within the income group. FDI competition taking place within a 
geographic region is consistent with the anecdotal evidence cited earlier. Second, the presence of 
agencies in the peer group does not divert FDI inflows.   
Why don’t we find that the presence of IPAs in the peer group leads to diversion of FDI? 
Presence of IPAs in neighboring countries might have three effects. First, positive externalities 
could exist from the marketing and information provision of IPAs in neighboring countries. For 
instance, CzechInvest’s work may induce potential investors to consider not just the Czech 
Republic but also other countries in the region (e.g., neighboring Slovakia). Second, 
CzechInvest’s marketing and hand-holding might convince an investor already considering the 
region to go to the Czech Republic rather than to a neighboring country. Third, the provision of 
investment incentives by the Czech Republic could influence an investor to choose the Czech 
Republic rather than another country in the region. In other words, the first factor is expected to 
have a positive effect on FDI inflows to other countries in the region, while the latter two would 
work in the opposite direction. The expected sign on the coefficient of IPA existence in other 
countries in the region is, therefore, ambiguous. When we do not control for FDI incentives 
offered by the peer group, we do not find a statistically significant coefficient on the number of 
IPAs in the peer group (results not reported to save space). When we explicitly include incentives, 
the effect of incentives is negative as expected. The IPA presence in other countries is still 
insignificant, which is consistent with the first and second effect being present but working in 
opposite directions.        
5. Conclusions 
Recent decades have witnessed an increased competition among countries for FDI inflows. To 
keep up with their peers many countries have engaged in investment promotion efforts and have 
offered incentives to foreign investors. Our analysis, based on newly collected information on  
national investment promotion efforts offers several insights into these developments. First, our 
results suggest that investment promotion may be a viable policy option for developing countries 
which wish to attract foreign investors. Second, our results confirm the practitioners’ view that 
33
 To be more precise the variable enters as the log(number of other countries in the group with z + 0.001), 
where z is an IPA or incentive provision in year t.  
34
 We use the World Bank classification of geographic regions: Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia 
(SA) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We also use the World Bank classification of income 
groups: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, high income. 
102
agencies’ characteristics matter. As expected, subunits of ministries tend to be less effective in 
attracting FDI than agencies with a more autonomous status. Third, our findings on the diverting 
effect of tax incentives offered by other countries in the region point to potential benefits of 
regional coordination in this area. 
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Tables: Information about the data used 
Table 1: Aggregation across sectors and time, and matching Census sectors with BEA data
Sector Targeted sectors matched BEA-data Aggregated Time period in BEA-data 
Petroleum Mining and Quarrying Petroleum  1989-1998 
  Mining  1999-2004 
     
Utilities Electricity, gas and water 
provision 
Utilities  1999-2004 
     
Food Food products Food and kindred products    1989-1998 
  Food  1999-2004 
     
Chemicals   Petroleum, chemical, rubber, 
plastic products 
Chemicals and allied products    1989-1998 
  Chemicals  1999-2004 
     
Metals Metal and metal products Primary and fabricated metals  1989-2004 
     
Machinery Machinery;  Computers and 
electronic equipment 
Industrial machinery and equipment  1989-1998 
  Machinery Yes 1999-2004 
  Computer and electronic products Yes 1999-2004 
     
Electrical 
equipment 
Computers and electronic 
equipment 
Electronic and other electric equipment  1989-1998 
  Electrical equipment, appliances, and components  1999-2004 
     
Transportation 
equipment   
Vehicles and other transport 
equipment 
Transportation equipment    1989-2004 
     
Wholesale 
trade 
Trade and repairs Wholesale trade  1989-2004 
     
Banking Financial intermediation; Back 
office services 
Banking  1989-1998 
  Depository institutions  1999-2004 
     
Other Finance Financial intermediation; Real 
estate and business activities; 
Back office services 
Finance (except banking), insurance and real estate  1989-1998 
  Finance (except depository institutions) and insurance  1999-2004 
     
Services Hotels and restaurants (until 
1998); Real estate and business 
activities; Software; 
Biotechnology; Back office 
services 
Services  1989-1998 
     
ICT Transport and 
telecommunications (from 
1999); Real estate and business 
activities; Software; Back office 
services 
Information  1999-2004 
     
Professional 
services 
Software; Biotechnology Professional, scientific, and technical services  1999-2004 
     
Other 
industries 
Agriculture, Fishing and 
Forestry; Textiles and apparel;  
Wood and wood products;  
Construction;  Hotels and 
restaurants (from 1999);  
Transport and 
telecommunications (until 
1998)
Other industries Yes 1989-2004 
  Other manufacturing Yes 1989-1998 
Note: Aggregated means that we have combined the sectors into one.  
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Table 3: Number of sectors targeted by countries engaged in targeting 
No   Sectors targeted   No   Sectors targeted 
1 Albania  2  29 Kazakhstan  6
2 Armenia  5  30 Latvia  4
3 Aruba  2  31 Lebanon  8
4 Australia  13  32 Lithuania  9
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina  6  33 Madagascar  14
6 Botswana  3  34 Mauritania  8
7 Bulgaria  8  35 Mauritius  8
8 Cambodia  10  36 Mexico  2
9 Canada  7  37 Mozambique  4
10 Chile  8  38 Netherlands  3
11 Congo, Dem. Rep. 4  39 Netherlands Antilles  3
12 Costa Rica  8  40 New Zealand  10
13 Côte d'Ivoire  10  41 Nicaragua  6
14 Cyprus  4  42 Oman  7
15 Czech Republic  7  43 Panama  2
16 Ecuador  3  44 Peru  3
17 El Salvador  10  45 Portugal  11
18 Fiji  4  46 Samoa  2
19 Finland  5  47 Senegal  5
20 France  4  48 Serbia and Montenegro 5
21 Ghana  7  49 Slovenia  10
22 Greece  10  50 South Africa  11
23 Guatemala  5  51 St. Vincent and the Grenadines  4
24 Guinea  8  52 Sweden  11
25 Hungary  4  53 Tunisia  6
26 Iceland  4  54 Uganda  12
27 Jamaica  1  55 Vanuatu  8
28 Jordan  10   56 Venezuela, RB 6
Note: Tables gives maximum number of sectors targeted by a country within one year. Sample corresponds to 
column 1, Table 9. 
Table 4: Sectors included in the sector-level analysis 
Sector  Number of observations  
Petroleum  1,370 
Utilities  526
Food 1,353 
Chemicals  1,430 
Metals  1,435 
Machinery  1,389 
Electrical equipment  1,449 
Transportation equipment  1,429 
Wholesale trade  1,612 
Banking  1,186 
Other Finance  1,356 
Services  473
ICT  445
Professional services  491 
Other industries  1,252 
Total 17,196 
Note: The number of observations corresponds to the regression of column 1, Table 9.  
Table 5: Descriptive statistics corresponding to benchmark table, sector-level analysis 
 All countries    Developing countries   
  No. of observations Mean Std. dev.   No. of observations Mean Std. dev. 
FDI inflow (million current US dollars) 17196 49.20 791.00  13012 10.50 170.00 
L.FDI stock (million current US dollars) 17193 471.00 3120.00  13012 102.00 545.00 
Sector targeting dummy 17196 0.10 0.30  13012 0.10 0.30 
1 year before sect. targ. 17196 0.02 0.14  13012 0.02 0.14 
1 and 2 years before sect. targ. 17196 0.04 0.20  13012 0.04 0.20 
1, 2 and 3 years before sect. targ. 17196 0.06 0.24  13012 0.06 0.24 
1, 2, 3 and 4 years before sect. targ. 17196 0.07 0.27   13012 0.08 0.27 
Note: The period is 1990-2004. L means lagged one period.  
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics corresponding to table using sales 
and employment and the dependent variable, sector-level analysis 
 No. of. obs. Mean Std. dev.
Developing, sales       
Sales (million current US dollars) 3087 1040.00 2470.00
Sector targeting dummy 3087 0.05 0.22 
    
Developing, employment       
Employment 3360 7092.46 18198.19
Sector targeting dummy 3360 0.06 0.23 
Note: The period covered is 1983-2003.  
Table 7: Descriptive statistics aggregate analysis 
 All countries    Developing countries  
  No. of observations Mean Std. dev.   No. of observations Mean Std. dev. 
FDI flow (millions current US dollars) 2644 2050.00 7090.00  1876 918.00 4290.00
IPA 2644 0.43 0.49  1876 0.42 0.49 
GDP growth (based on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2644 0.03 0.05  1876 0.03 0.05 
Inflation 2644 0.40 3.50  1876 0.53 4.14 
GDP per capita  (current US dollars) 2644 5680.00 8230.00  1876 1794.93 1958.76
Population (millions) 2644 26.80 102.00  1876 29.90 119.00 
Restrictions on civil liberties 2644 3.31 1.79  1876 3.90 1.56 
Restrictions on political rights 2644 3.15 2.07  1876 3.77 1.95 
Political risk (ICRG) 1658 65.32 15.76  1143 58.77 12.87 
L2.Exports+Imports  (millions constant 2000 US dollars) 2231 60500.00 125000.00  1627 21300.00 51500.00
L2.(Exports+Imports)/GDP (GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2231 0.66 0.42  1627 0.71 0.46 
Gross fixed capital formation  (millions constant 2000 US dollars) 2146 38800.00 127000.00  1562 13400.00 42500.00
EPA (existence of an export agency) 1618 0.52 0.50  1125 0.48 0.50 
Aid (million current US dollars) 2030 298.00 457.00  1844 308.00 457.00 
Aid per capita  (current US dollars) 2030 49.86 68.27  1844 48.84 64.91 
Time varying dummy agency status: subunit of ministry 2274 0.16 0.37  1561 0.12 0.32 
Time varying dummy agency status: quasi autonomous public body 2274 0.28 0.45  1561 0.32 0.47 
Time varying dummy agency status: other 2274 0.05 0.22  1561 0.07 0.26 
Status change: from subunit of ministry 2644 0.01 0.08  1876 0.01 0.09 
Accountable to external entity 2374 0.32 0.47  1702 0.31 0.46 
Accountable to economic entity 2374 0.29 0.45  1702 0.28 0.45 
Accountable to political entity 2374 0.03 0.18  1702 0.03 0.18 
Accountable to agency board 2374 0.04 0.20  1702 0.06 0.23 
Voice and Accountability 2621 0.21 0.92  1853 -0.13 0.77 
Political Stability 2621 0.04 0.90  1853 -0.28 0.80 
Government Effectiveness 2621 0.26 1.03  1853 -0.28 0.60 
Regulatory Quality 2621 0.26 0.85  1853 -0.14 0.63 
Rule of Law 2621 0.19 1.02  1853 -0.35 0.62 
Control of Corruption 2621 0.25 1.09  1853 -0.34 0.57 
Average of all KKZ 2621 0.20 0.91  1853 -0.25 0.59 
Financial incentives 2351 0.05 0.22  1705 0.04 0.20 
Tax holidays 2327 0.15 0.35  1581 0.18 0.39 
Reduced tax rates 2099 0.12 0.32  1411 0.13 0.33 
Tax hol. or red. tax rates 2383 0.17 0.38  1637 0.21 0.40 
Subsidized infras. or serv. 2353 0.02 0.15  1615 0.03 0.18 
Regulatory concessions 2488 0.01 0.08  1720 0.01 0.10 
Fin. or tax inc. 2550 0.18 0.39  1782 0.21 0.41 
Fin. or tax inc. or subs. 2563 0.18 0.38  1795 0.21 0.41 
IPAs, region level 2644 7.56 4.92  1876 6.89 4.71 
Tax hol. or red. tax rates, region level 2383 3.08 2.83  1637 3.46 3.17 
Fin. or tax inc., region level 2550 3.28 3.10  1782 3.67 3.46 
Fin. or tax inc. or subs., region level 2563 3.30 3.13  1795 3.70 3.50 
IPAs, income gr. level 2644 10.72 6.55  1876 10.91 6.87 
Tax hol. or red. tax rates, income gr. level 2383 4.57 4.52  1637 5.64 5.00 
Fin. or tax inc., income gr. level 2550 4.94 4.63  1782 5.98 5.03 
Fin. or tax inc. or subs., income gr. level 2563 4.96 4.64  1795 6.01 5.04 
GDP growth, region (based on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2644 0.03 0.02  1876 0.03 0.03 
GDP growth, income gr. (based on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2644 0.04 0.02   1876 0.04 0.02 
Note: The sample corresponds to columns 1 and 5, Table 16. Quasi autonomous public body means Autonomous public body or Semi-autonomous 
agency reporting to a ministry. Rest means Joint public-private entity or Private or Other. The period covered is 1972-2004. LX means lagged X periods. 
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Table 8: Correlation between IPA existence and incentives 
 IPA Financial Tax holidays Tax reductions Tax hol. or red. Subsidies Regulations Other Fin, tax or sub. Fin or tax. 
IPA 1.00          
Financial 0.28 1.00         
Tax holidays 0.44 0.34 1.00        
Tax reductions  0.48 0.30 0.61 1.00       
Tax hol. or red.  0.50 0.34 0.92 0.76 1.00      
Subsidies 0.14 0.07 0.38 0.18 0.36 1.00     
Regulations 0.18 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.01 1.00    
Other 0.15 0.07 0.39 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.17 1.00   
Fin, tax or sub. 0.53 0.45 0.89 0.74 0.97 0.35 0.24 0.363 1.00  
Fin or tax. 0.53 0.45 0.89 0.74 0.97 0.35 0.24 0.363 1.00 1.00 
Note: “Subsidies” refers to subsidized infrastructure or services, “Regulations” to regulatory concessions, “Fin, tax or sub.” to offering financial 
incentives, tax holidays, tax reductions or subsidies to infrastructure/services, “Fin or tax” to offering financial incentives, tax reductions or tax holidays.
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Tables: Sector-level analysis 
Table 9: Baseline specification with country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Sector targeting 0.308    0.935***    
 [0.341]    [0.330]    
L. Sector targeting  0.770**    1.159***   
  [0.362]    [0.346]   
L2. Sector targeting   1.033**    1.377***  
   [0.406]    [0.387]  
L3. Sector targeting    0.968**    1.360*** 
    [0.457]    [0.430] 
Observations 17196 17193 16610 16009 13012 13012 12522 12017 
No. of country-sector groups 1570 1570 1570 1568 1203 1203 1203 1201 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. 
Table 10: Controlling for FDI inflows before targeting. Specification with country-year, sector-year 
and country-sector fixed effects 
 All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Sector targeting 0.227 0.307 0.143 0.230 0.920*** 1.052*** 0.770** 0.864** 
 [0.354] [0.367] [0.381] [0.395] [0.343] [0.355] [0.369] [0.384] 
1 year before sect. targ. -0.404    -0.073    
 [0.460]    [0.437]    
1 and 2 years before sect. targ.  -0.004    0.311   
  [0.365]    [0.347]
1, 2 and 3 years before sect. targ.   -0.330    -0.322
   [0.337]    [0.322]
1, 2, 3 and 4 years before sect. targ.    -0.130    -0.113 
        [0.329]       [0.314] 
Observations 17196 17196 17196 17196 13012 13012 13012 13012
No. of country-sector groups 1570 1570 1570 1570 1203 1203 1203 1203
Within R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Test coeff F 1.58 0.57 1.54 0.97 4.30 3.52 8.91 7.76 
Test coeff p 0.21 0.45 0.21 0.32 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. “X year before sect. targ.” is a dummy variable equal to one in the X years before targeting started in a particular sector, and zero 
otherwise. “F” and “p-value” is the F-statistics and the p-value of a test if the coefficient of the dummy before targeting started is different from the 
coefficient of the targeting dummy.  
Table 11: Explaining the choice of sectors to be targeted. Probit specification 
  All All All Developing Developing Developing 
L.FDI flow -0.006   -0.007   
 [0.005]   [0.006]   
L2.FDI flow  0.000   -0.001  
  [0.005]   [0.007]  
L3.FDI flow   -0.008   -0.014** 
   [0.005]   [0.007] 
Observations 4274 4079 3842 3272 3111 2904 
L.FDI stock 0.001   0.001   
 [0.005]   [0.006]   
L2.FDI stock  0.005   0.006  
  [0.005]   [0.006]  
L3.FDI stock   0.005   0.007 
   [0.006]   [0.006] 
Observations 4914 4295 4097 3790 3293 3129 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 
one if country c begins targeting industry i at time t, and zero if the industry is not targeted at time t. LX means lagged X periods. Other controls include 
GDP per capita, population size, GDP growth, inflation, restrictions on civil liberties, country and year fixed effects. Population, GDP per capita, FDI 
flow and FDI stock enter in the log form. 
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Table 12: Removing cases of targeting determined by previous success or failure in attracting FDI to 
the sector. Specification with country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing
Sector targeting 0.866* 1.511***
 [0.488] [0.472]
L. Sector targeting 1.373*** 1.821***
[0.514] [0.489]
L2. Sector targeting 1.166** 1.654***
[0.564] [0.534]
L3. Sector targeting 0.839 0.824
   [0.640] [0.595]
Observations 15285 15282 14750 14204 11699 11699 11246 10782
No. of country-sector groups 1389 1389 1389 1387 1075 1075 1075 1073
Within R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
 Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log 
of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at 
time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. 
Table 13: Removing services sectors and utilities. Specification with country-year, sector-year and 
country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing
Sector targeting 0.590    1.406***    
 [0.438]    [0.420]    
L. Sector targeting  0.801*    1.457***
  [0.467]    [0.446]
L2. Sector targeting   0.838    1.359***
   [0.515]    [0.487]
L3. Sector targeting    0.615    1.329**
        [0.573]       [0.535]
Observations 11107 11104 10894 10678 8400 8400 8217 8028
No. of country-sector groups 868 868 868 868 665 665 665 665
Within R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time t, 
and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods.
Table 14: Controlling for lagged FDI stock in the sector. Specification with country-year, sector-year 
and country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Sector targeting 0.313    0.936***    
 [0.341]    [0.330]    
L. Sector targeting  0.770**    1.160*** 
  [0.362]    [0.346]   
L2. Sector targeting   1.032**    1.377*** 
   [0.406]    [0.387]  
L3. Sector targeting    0.965** 1.360*** 
    [0.457]    [0.430] 
         
L. FDI stock 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.011 0.006 0.006 0.002 -0.004 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
Observations 17193 17193 16610 16009 13012 13012 12522 12017 
No. of country-sector groups 1570 1570 1570 1568 1203 1203 1203 1201 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. FDI stock is included in the log form.
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Table 15: Using US affiliate sales and employment as dependent variables. Specification with 
country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects 
  US affiliate sales US affiliate employment 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Sector targeting 1.033***    0.520***
 [0.363]    [0.143]
L. Sector targeting  1.096***    0.483***   
[0.402]    [0.158] 
L2. Sector targeting   1.054**    0.505***  
[0.452]    [0.186] 
L3. Sector targeting    1.164**    0.507** 
   [0.534]    [0.223] 
                  
Observations 3087 3034 2976 2917 3360 3295 3227 3159 
No. of country-sector groups 227 226 225 225 233 233 233 233 
Within R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. 
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Tables: Country-level analysis 
Table 16: Specification with country and time fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA 0.640    1.337***    
 [0.393]    [0.481]    
L. IPA  1.036***    1.646*** 
  [0.398]    [0.485]   
L2. IPA   0.822** 1.353*** 
   [0.403]    [0.489]  
Age    0.489    1.333*** 
    [0.405]    [0.507] 
Age squared    0.006    -0.253 
    [0.152]    [0.195] 
GDP per capita -1.651*** -1.633*** -1.644*** -1.696*** -2.243*** -2.250*** -2.234*** -2.231*** 
 [0.431] [0.431] [0.431] [0.438] [0.512] [0.512] [0.512] [0.516] 
GDP growth 8.646*** 8.557*** 8.683*** 8.611*** 9.752*** 9.740*** 9.967*** 9.781*** 
 [2.432] [2.430] [2.430] [2.431] [2.744] [2.741] [2.743] [2.744] 
Population -3.267** -3.196** -3.221** -3.261** -8.684*** -8.596*** -8.555*** -8.679*** 
 [1.417] [1.416] [1.417] [1.418] [2.225] [2.222] [2.225] [2.226] 
Inflation -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.081** -0.082** -0.083** -0.082** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
Restrictions on civil liberties -0.222 -0.233* -0.233* -0.252* -0.183 -0.201 -0.200 -0.209 
  [0.140] [0.140] [0.140] [0.141] [0.157] [0.157] [0.157] [0.159] 
Observations 2644 2644 2644 2644 1876 1876 1876 1876 
No. of countries 114 114 114 114 89 89 89 89 
Within R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Age, 
Population and GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting 
least free countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods. 
Table 17: Specification with country and time fixed effects and additional control variables 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA 0.437 0.458 0.544 0.494 1.386** 1.394** 1.307** 1.280** 
 [0.489] [0.489] [0.505] [0.505] [0.589] [0.589] [0.603] [0.605] 
Restrictions on political rights  -0.296    -0.132   
  [0.215]    [0.230]   
L2. Exports+Imports   -1.464** -1.279* 
   [0.676]    [0.713]  
L2. (Exports+Imports)/GDP    -1.737***    -1.001 
    [0.641]    [0.684] 
GDP per capita -2.711*** -2.647*** -1.979*** -2.149*** -3.554*** -3.522*** -3.031*** -3.354*** 
 [0.594] [0.596] [0.727] [0.672] [0.663] [0.665] [0.799] [0.743] 
GDP growth 12.574*** 12.527*** 11.241*** 12.942*** 13.359*** 13.325*** 12.154*** 13.734*** 
 [3.682] [3.681] [4.002] [3.916] [3.997] [3.999] [4.247] [4.143] 
Population -10.336*** -9.931*** -7.413*** -6.971** -13.280*** -13.008*** -13.477*** -12.990*** 
 [2.503] [2.519] [2.698] [2.709] [3.383] [3.417] [3.574] [3.685] 
Inflation -0.089** -0.090*** -0.088*** -0.086** -0.075** -0.076** -0.078** -0.076** 
 [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
Restrictions on civil liberties -0.320* -0.084 -0.373* -0.311 -0.219 -0.106 -0.317 -0.296 
 [0.190] [0.256] [0.193] [0.195] [0.200] [0.280] [0.203] [0.205] 
Political risk (ICRG) 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
Observations 1658 1658 1512 1512 1143 1143 1092 1092 
No. of countries 94 94 89 89 69 69 67 67 
Within R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. 
Exports+Imports, Population and GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free 
countries to 7 denoting least free countries. The index of political risk ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means very high political risk and 100 very low 
political risk. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods. 
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Table 18: The effect of IPA on domestic capital formation 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA -0.040    -0.041 -0.038 -0.035 -0.036 
 [0.027]    [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] 
L. IPA  -0.029       
  [0.028]       
L2. IPA   -0.046      
   [0.028]      
L3. IPA    -0.047     
    [0.029]     
FDI inflows     0.003**    
     [0.001]    
L. FDI inflows      0.004***   
      [0.001]   
L2. FDI inflows       0.003**  
       [0.001]  
L3. FDI inflows        0.003** 
        [0.001] 
L2. GDP per capita 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.424*** 0.372*** 0.362*** 0.349*** 0.340*** 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
L2. GDP growth 1.491*** 1.494*** 1.504*** 1.500*** 1.509*** 1.496*** 1.478*** 1.588*** 
 [0.142] [0.142] [0.142] [0.142] [0.152] [0.150] [0.150] [0.158] 
L2. Population 0.280** 0.280** 0.276** 0.273** 0.028 0.034 -0.003 -0.041 
 [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.130] [0.132] [0.134] [0.135] 
L2. Inflation -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
L2. Restrictions on civil liberties 0.019** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.004 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] 
Observations 1753 1753 1753 1753 1523 1524 1507 1477 
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 77 77 77 77 
Within R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.53 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
gross fixed capital formation in country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. FDI inflows, 
Population and GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting 
least free countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods.  
Table 19: Instrumental variable estimation 
First stage Developing Developing Developing 
EPA 0.362*** 0.360*** 0.362*** 
 [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] 
Aid 0.007*  
  [0.004]  
Aid per capita   0.029** 
      [0.014] 
Within R-squared 0.48 0.47 0.47 
Shea partial R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 
F 99.99 48.35 48.98 
    
Second stage       
IPA 7.706*** 7.011*** 7.141*** 
  [1.773] [1.681] [1.676] 
    
Sargan statistics  0.00 0.12 
Sargan P-value  0.99 0.73 
        
Observations 761 743 743 
No. of countries 44 44 44 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. The first stage is a linear probability model predicting existence of an IPA. The dependent 
variable in the second stage is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA 
equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Control variables both in first and 
second stage are the usual: log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, log of Population, Inflation, Restrictions on 
civil liberties and Political risk (ICRG). All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. The 
instruments used to predict IPA existence are the existence of an export agency (EPA) in country c at time t, 
as well as aid and aid per capita inflows to country c at time t.  
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Table 20: Agency reporting and status 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing
IPA 1.584  -2.067 -0.345 1.413** 1.716***
 [1.083]  [1.553] [1.045] [0.571] [0.571]
Status change: from subunit of ministry 3.217* 3.971*      
 [1.849] [2.096]      
Accountable to external entity   3.783**     
   [1.602]     
Accountable to economic entity    2.130* 1.815***
    [1.110]   [0.594]
Accountable to political entity     -0.499  0.966 
     [1.394]  [1.362]
Accountable to agency board      -3.783** -2.069
      [1.602] [1.553]
GDP per capita -4.374*** -5.795*** -2.216*** -2.320*** -2.292*** -2.216*** -2.246***
 [1.307] [1.958] [0.548] [0.549] [0.551] [0.548] [0.551]
GDP growth 10.720 9.396 9.710*** 9.709*** 9.621*** 9.710*** 9.729***
 [6.667] [9.211] [2.905] [2.907] [2.910] [2.905] [2.906]
Population -17.375*** -20.098 -6.617*** -6.557*** -6.809*** -6.617*** -6.547***
 [4.940] [14.268] [2.403] [2.407] [2.407] [2.403] [2.406]
Inflation 0.307 -0.076 -0.086** -0.086** -0.083** -0.086** -0.087**
 [0.537] [0.547] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035]
Restrictions on civil liberties -0.311 1.004 -0.227 -0.244 -0.233 -0.227 -0.233
  [0.413] [0.697] [0.174] [0.174] [0.174] [0.174] [0.174]
Observations 327 193 1702 1702 1702 1702 1702
Number of group(code) 15 15 88 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.25 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Population and 
GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting least free 
countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. The estimates in the first two columns are based on a sample including counties 
where the IPA either changed its status from being a subunit of a ministry to a more autonomous setup or remained a subunit of a ministry throughout the 
entire period. The model in the first column is estimated on all years available for these countries, while the sample in the second column includes only 
years during an IPA was in operation. Accountable to external entity takes the value of one if either “Accountable to economic entity” takes the value of 
one or the “Accountable to political entity” takes the value of one.         
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Table 21: IPA existence and incentives 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA 1.122** 0.320 0.763 0.373 1.298** 1.030** 1.082** 1.046** 
 [0.495] [0.536] [0.621] [0.534] [0.528] [0.509] [0.510] [0.506] 
Financial incentives -0.686        
 [0.985]        
Tax holidays  0.777       
  [0.615]       
Reduced tax rates   -0.403      
   [0.815]      
Tax hol. or red. tax rates    0.474     
    [0.597]     
Subsidized infras. or serv.     2.460*    
     [1.392]    
Regulatory concessions      -0.202   
      [2.705]   
Fin. or tax inc.       0.232  
       [0.562]  
Fin. or tax inc. or subs.        0.260 
        [0.558] 
GDP per capita -1.940*** -1.625*** -1.906*** -1.543*** -2.178*** -2.325*** -1.767*** -1.767*** 
 [0.543] [0.592] [0.632] [0.581] [0.574] [0.542] [0.547] [0.545] 
GDP growth 10.420*** 10.580*** 11.517*** 10.519*** 8.948*** 8.878*** 10.110*** 9.296*** 
 [2.864] [3.027] [3.254] [2.976] [3.003] [2.850] [2.886] [2.817] 
Population -7.348*** -2.100 -1.452 -2.410 -4.280* -7.256*** -6.103*** -5.845** 
 [2.333] [2.479] [2.678] [2.445] [2.441] [2.335] [2.307] [2.289] 
Inflation -0.076** -0.077** -0.089** -0.081** -0.082** -0.080** -0.079** -0.080** 
 [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
Restrictions on civil liberties 0.018 -0.132 -0.093 -0.116 -0.221 -0.081 -0.271* -0.268* 
  [0.166] [0.169] [0.179] [0.166] [0.171] [0.166] [0.162] [0.161] 
Observations 1705 1581 1411 1637 1615 1720 1782 1795 
No. of countries 81 75 70 79 78 83 85 86 
Within R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Population and 
GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting least free 
countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 22: Incentives when IPA existence is excluded 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Financial incentives -0.718        
 [0.992]        
Tax holidays  1.431**       
  [0.594]       
Reduced tax rates   -0.403      
   [0.752]      
Tax hol. or red. tax rates    1.071*     
    [0.571]     
Subsidized infras. or serv.     2.887**    
     [1.395]    
Regulatory concessions      0.102   
      [2.721]   
Fin. or tax inc.       0.997* 
       [0.539]  
Fin. or tax inc. or subs.        1.008* 
        [0.535] 
GDP per capita -2.191*** -1.883*** -2.167*** -1.794*** -2.414*** -2.522*** -1.951*** -1.952*** 
 [0.541] [0.588] [0.627] [0.578] [0.571] [0.540] [0.545] [0.543] 
GDP growth 10.267*** 10.183*** 11.074*** 10.033*** 8.744*** 8.718*** 9.713*** 9.021*** 
 [2.855] [3.005] [3.230] [2.958] [2.990] [2.837] [2.874] [2.805] 
Population -6.385*** -1.266 -0.559 -1.714 -3.327 -6.282*** -5.130** -4.898** 
 [2.341] [2.475] [2.673] [2.446] [2.447] [2.339] [2.310] [2.292] 
Inflation -0.077** -0.076** -0.089** -0.080** -0.083** -0.080** -0.077** -0.078** 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
Restrictions on civil liberties 0.078 -0.089 -0.026 -0.065 -0.149 -0.027 -0.214 -0.212 
  [0.167] [0.169] [0.179] [0.166] [0.171] [0.167] [0.163] [0.162] 
Observations 1731 1607 1437 1663 1641 1746 1808 1821 
No. of countries 82 76 71 80 79 84 86 87 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Population and 
GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting least free 
countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. 
Table 23: Competition within the geographic region 
    Developing Developing Developing 
Host country variables IPA 0.437 1.093** 1.056** 
  [0.538] [0.512] [0.508] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates 0.527   
  [0.598]   
 Fin. or tax inc.  0.215  
   [0.563]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or subs.   0.246 
        [0.558] 
Regional variables IPAs, region 0.648 0.785 0.751 
  [0.874] [0.810] [0.806] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates, region -0.230** 
  [0.104]   
 Fin. or tax inc., region  -0.291*** 
   [0.097]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or subs., region   -0.291*** 
    [0.097] 
 GDP growth, region -6.830 -10.468 -11.160* 
    [7.022] [6.703] [6.642] 
 Observations 1637 1782 1795 
 No. of countries 79 85 86 
 Within R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable 
is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. Host country variables: IPA equals one if an investment promotion 
agency exists in country c at time t, and zero otherwise. The incentive variables are equal to one if country c provided at least one of the 
relevant incentives at time t, and zero otherwise. Host country control variables (not shown in the table) include: log of GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, log of Population, Inflation, Restrictions on civil liberties. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. Regional 
variables: “regions” are defined following the World Bank classification: Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and the 
Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SA) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
GDP growth is the GDP weighted average of the GDP growth of the other countries in the region (included in the sample). The weights are 
year specific. Other regional variables include the log of the number of other countries in country c’s region that have an IPA or offer one of 
the incentives in year t.   
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Table 24: Competition within the income group 
    Developing Developing Developing 
Host country variables IPA 0.364 1.079** 1.043** 
  [0.536] [0.512] [0.508] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates 0.489   
  [0.598]   
 Fin. or tax inc.  0.194  
   [0.563]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or subs.   0.223 
        [0.559] 
Income group variables IPAs, inc. gr 0.311 -0.045 -0.051 
  [1.018] [0.976] [0.972] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates, income gr. 0.126   
  [0.138]   
 Fin. or tax inc., income group  0.080  
   [0.143]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or sub., income gr.   0.081 
    [0.142] 
 GDP growth, income gr. -15.941 -12.534 -12.539 
    [10.869] [10.453] [10.376] 
 Observations 1637 1782 1795 
 No. of countries 79 85 86 
  Within R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. The dependent variable is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. Host 
country variables: IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t, and zero 
otherwise. The incentive variables are equal to one if country c provided at least one of the relevant incentives at 
time t, and zero otherwise. Host country control variables (not shown in the table) include: log of GDP per capita, 
GDP growth, log of Population, Inflation, Restrictions on civil liberties. All regressions include host country and 
year fixed effects. Regional variables: “income groups” are defined following the World Bank classification: low 
income, lower middle income, upper middle income. GDP growth is the GDP weighted average of the GDP 
growth of the other countries in the region (included in the sample). The weights are year specific. Other regional 
variables include the log of the number of other countries in country c’s region that have an IPA or offer one of the 
incentives in year t.   
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Figures 
Figure 1: Number of IPAs in existence 
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Figure 2: Frequency of targeting by sector 
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Figure 3: US FDI stock versus FDI stock from other OECD countries in year 2000 
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Chapter 5 
Export upgrading through infrastructure policy reforms: evidence 
from 10 new EU members 
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Export Upgrading through Infrastructure Policy Reforms: 
Evidence from 10 New EU members 
Torfinn Harding*
20 June 2008 
Abstract
Is there a link between infrastructure and export upgrading? By utilizing infrastructure reforms taken 
place in ten Eastern European countries since the abolishment of central planning we find evidence 
consistent with higher unit values of export products due to better infrastructure. The link between 
general export diversification and infrastructure needs more justification.  
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forthcoming book “Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification”, edited by Richard Newfarmer, William Shaw and Peter 
Walkenhorst, and published by the World Bank. I thank the editors for comments improving the paper along the way. The 
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1. Introduction
If you are a manufacturing firm in the Czech Republic aiming for exporting car parts to Germany, you 
are likely to have to promise delivery on time, you may need electronic ordering systems, and the parts 
you make need to meet a certain level of quality. Regardless of how good you and your staff are as car 
part makers, you are dependent on access to reliable and efficient infrastructure services to be able to 
get the job. This paper suggests that reforms of infrastructure services in 10 Eastern European 
countries during the 1990s were important for exports from these countries. 
It is widely believed that infrastructure is an integrated part of economic development (Duflo and 
Pande, 2007), and there seems to be some development optimism surrounding policies aimed at 
upgrading infrastructure services such as electric power supply, transportation and 
telecommunications. The World Development Report 1994 of the World Bank emphasized the 
importance of the quality of such services for development.1 Intuitively, it is not hard to make the case 
that better infrastructure can increase economic efficiency, and many studies do indeed find a positive 
association between infrastructure investments and growth. In this chapter, we argue that better 
infrastructure policies, leading to improved infrastructure (quality and quantity), can increase unit 
values of export products as well as make a country’s export basket more diversified. We have two 
mechanisms in mind. Better infrastructure may increase manufacturing productivity. Higher 
manufacturing productivity may increase product quality and unit values. Better infrastructure may 
also reduce trade costs. Shorter delivery time to buyers, for instance, can be as valued as increased 
product quality and can result in higher unit values. 
In several strands of the economics literature, one can see a growing interest in the relation between 
characteristics of countries’ export baskets and countries’ economic performance. Export 
diversification in the most straightforward sense—an export bundle not too concentrated on a few 
products—is argued to be beneficial as it provides a hedge toward price variations in specific product 
markets (Bertinelli et al., 2006; Levchenko and di Giovanni, 2006). The risk in foreign exchange 
earnings is reduced if foreign exchange is earned across different products. Furthermore, there may be 
a link between which products are exported and the potential for structural change, which is often 
necessary for developing countries to climb the development ladder (Hausmann et al., 2007; 
Hausmann and Klinger 2006; Whang, 2006). Change in the export basket in the direction of more 
sophisticated products may also be instrumental for economic growth (Hausmann et al., 2007). A final 
recent observation to mention is that unit values of exports seem to vary greatly across countries. Both 
Schott (2004) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) present evidence suggesting a positive association 
1 See, for instance, World Development Report 1994 and Bogetiü and Fedderke (2006) for more on the role of infrastructure 
in development. 
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between countries’ level of development and the unit values of their export products. The fact that 
export diversification and export product quality and sophistication seem to go together with the level 
of development and growth poses an interesting question: how can developing countries diversify and 
upgrade their export baskets to rich country levels? The results of this paper indicate that infrastructure 
reforms have potential to be part of the answer. 
Despite high levels of attention toward export characteristics both in the economics literature and in 
policy debates, and despite the plausible positive role that infrastructure could play in upgrading 
exports, we are not aware of any other studies investigating the effects of infrastructure on export unit 
values.
To analyze the effects of infrastructure improvements on export diversification and unit values, we 
exploit data on infrastructure services reforms in 10 Eastern European countries. In the period studied, 
1989–2000, these economies went from being governed by central planning to become open market 
economies. Service industries were not regarded as important during the era of central planning 
(Eschenbach and Hoekman, 2006), and since 1989, the countries studied have massively reformed 
these sectors. Moreover, the 10 countries are all now members of the European Union, and the 
variation in our data on service sector reforms is interpreted as variation driven by preparation for EU 
membership. We use indices on the extent of reforms of three infrastructure sectors: electric power, 
roads and telecommunications. Examples of the reforms in question are improved regulatory regimes 
and increased competition in the generation of electric power and road provision. We analyze export 
diversification at the three-digit sector level and export unit values at the four-digit product level. In 
total, we exploit variation across about 1700 observations of export diversification and more than 30 
000 observations of unit values of exports. 
Our findings are consistent with higher export unit values due to infrastructure sector reforms, as 
reforms of all three sectors—electric power, roads and telecommunications—are significantly 
positively correlated with unit values. Across products, better roads seem to be particularly important 
for unit values of differentiated products. The results for diversification need more careful 
justification. On the variation in diversification across sectors, we find roads reforms to be robustly 
tied to higher diversification in sectors with large export quantities, for given export value levels.2 A 
measure of general service reforms (including reforms of both financial and infrastructure sectors), is 
found to be significantly associated with both export characteristics. Reforms of financial sectors, on 
the other hand, do not seem to have a robust positive association with either export diversification or 
unit values. 
2 Export product value = (Export product unit value) * (Export product quantity). A high export quantity for a given export 
value means low unit values. 
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2. Exporters and Infrastructure Reform 
In our setting of exporters we can think of infrastructure effects along two lines. Better infrastructure 
may increase the productivity of the production process, and thereby the volume and quality of the 
products exported. Better infrastructure may also facilitate trade—for instance, by reducing 
transportation and time costs—which also is likely to increase the competitiveness of the export sector 
and therefore result in increased export quantities and unit values. We will now go through evidence 
on both mechanisms in some more detail. 
2.1 Infrastructure and manufacturing productivity 
Infrastructure service sectors provide manufacturers with important inputs like power, transport and 
telecommunications. Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) mention that several types of public capital are 
important for enhancing productivity in the private sector, of which the quality and size of the network 
of infrastructure in an economy is one of the most important ones. They estimate the effects of 
publicly financed infrastructure and R&D capital on the cost structure of 12 two-digit US 
manufacturing sectors. Although their estimated effects are smaller than the previous literature had 
reported, they find infrastructure to positively affect productivity. 
Röller and Waverman (2001) focus specifically on telecommunications infrastructure and economic 
growth. They argue that the economic returns to telecommunications investments are much larger than 
just the direct returns, as they affect communication between firms. Improving telecommunications 
systems lowers the transaction costs of ordering, gathering information and searching for services. For 
instance, better telecommunications services can increase firms’ ability to engage in new productive 
activities, they argue.3 Their estimates, using a simultaneous structural model estimated for 21 OECD 
countries over the period 1970–1990, suggest positive effects of telecommunications infrastructure on 
aggregate output. Their results are also consistent with the existence of positive network externalities 
in telecommunications technologies. 
Fernald (1999) looks specifically at roads and manufacturing productivity in the US and interprets his 
results to suggest that public capital in the form of roads leads to higher productivity in (vehicle-
intensive) manufacturing sectors. Yeaple and Golub (2007) find that infrastructure provision, 
especially roads, helps to explain sectoral total factor productivity (comparative advantage) across 10 
sectors and 18 developed and developing countries. Esfahani and Ramirez’s (2003) findings suggest 
substantial contribution of power and telecom services to GDP in developing countries. Arnold, 
3 For more on the effects of telecommunications, see the literature references in Röller and Waverman (2001). They conclude 
that “preceding studies provide some evidence that telecommunications investment has positive effects on output”. 
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Mattoo and Narciso (2006) use a sample of Sub-Saharan African firms and provide some evidence 
“that firms in regions with more frequent power outages are less productive than others.” 
Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2007) find positive effects of service sector reform on productivity in 
Czech manufacturing firms and interpret their findings as “consistent with service sector liberalization, 
particularly foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the sector, being associated with improved 
availability, range and quality of services, which in turn contribute to improved performance of 
manufacturing firms using services as inputs.”4 Work on the link between service sector reforms and 
economic growth is provided by Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006). Utilizing the source of data on 
service sector reforms that are used in this chapter, they find a positive association between services 
liberalization and economic growth in 24 transition countries over the 1990–2004 period. 
In other words, a positive correlation between infrastructure services and indicators of economic 
development such as productivity and value-added growth seems to be well established, although it 
may be hard to establish convincing causal relationships.5
2.2 Infrastructure and trade costs 
Infrastructure can influence trade costs. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) suggest that of a total 
estimated tax equivalent trade cost for industrialized countries of 170 percent, 21 percent is 
transportation cost.6 These transport costs include directly measured freight costs and a 9-percent tax 
equivalent because of the time value of having goods in transit.7
Limao and Venables (2001) estimate that poor infrastructure accounts for 40 percent of predicted 
transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60 percent for landlocked countries. While only own 
infrastructure is relevant for coastal countries, the figure for landlocked countries can be broken down 
to 36 percent because of own infrastructure and 24 percent because of transit infrastructure. In their 
analysis based on shipping company quotes of transporting a container from Baltimore to different 
destinations, they also estimate that transporting over land is about seven times more costly per unit 
distance than transporting over sea. Bougheas, Demetriades and Morgenroth (1999) find, in 
4 See their literature section for more findings pointing in the direction of positive effects of general service sector reforms,
level of service sector development and economic development. See Sakakibara et al. (1997) on the role of infrastructure for 
successful just-in-time production practices. 
5  A positive correlation between infrastructure and economic development seems to be found in both developed and 
developing countries. See, for instance, Fernald (1999) for works on developed countries. Sachs et al. (2004) seem to assign a 
central role to infrastructure in the development process of the poorest countries. Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) provide 
another example from a developing country context. Fernald (1999) and Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) emphasize that the 
direction of causality is often hard to identify in these studies. Infrastructure investments are likely to increase efficiencies 
and therefore GDP. At the same time, the demand for and supply of infrastructure services are likely to be affected by GDP. 
6 44 percent is because of border-related barriers and 55 percent is because of retail and wholesale distribution costs (2.7 = 
1.21*1.44*1.55). (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, p. 692.) 
7 See Hummels (2007) for more on transportation costs and trade. 
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accordance with their theoretical model and based on bilateral trade for up to nine Western European 
countries, that infrastructure has a positive impact on the volume of trade. Shepherd and Wilson 
(2006) exploit data on minimum distance road routes for 27 European and Central Asian countries, 
and their results suggest a positive association between improved road network quality and 
intraregional trade.8
The nine-percent time costs reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) are estimated for the US 
for 1998 by Hummels (2001), who argues that faster ships and switching from shipping to air have 
taken these costs down from 32 percent in 1950. Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006) find that a one-
day extra delay prior to a product being shipped reduces trade by at least one percent, or the equivalent 
of an extra distance of 70 km on average. They find the effects to be larger for exports from 
developing countries and for time-sensitive products. 
2.3 Summing up: infrastructure and diversification/unit values 
We have argued that better infrastructure can positively affect the quality and efficiency of production 
processes. This channel is consistent with increased unit values of manufacturing exports as it is likely 
that the quality of the export products are positively related to the productivity of exporters.9 The 
channel of reduced trade costs is consistent with better infrastructure leading to higher unit values as 
buyers are willing to pay extra for fast and accurate delivery. Both higher manufacturing productivity 
and lower trade costs should raise competitiveness of exporters increasing the volume of already 
exported products and may make new products profitable, consistent with increased diversification 
due to infrastructure reforms.
3. Empirical Strategy and Data 
In this paper, we estimate reduced form equations for diversification and unit values of exports. The 
variables of which we seek to estimate the effects are infrastructure reforms in the electric power, 
roads and telecommunications services sectors. In this section, we present our arguments for why we 
think the estimated models do identify the link between infrastructure reforms and diversification and 
unit values of exports. 
As will be further explained below, the indices of infrastructure policy reform used in this paper 
measure the extent of policy reforms that have taken place in a given country at a given time. These 
are to be interpreted as stocks of policy reforms. Implementation of one new reform lifts the index 
8 See references within Shepherd and Wilson (2006) for more on effects of infrastructure and trade facilitation on trade. 
9  Schott (2004) states that his data are inconsistent with an inverse relationship between unit values and producer 
productivity, which is the prediction of some new trade theory models. 
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permanently to a higher level. The assumption of the paper is that reforms lift the quality and/or 
quantity of infrastructure services available to exporters. We do not think this is a controversial 
assumption as it is well know that bottlenecks—also in infrastructure—were common in centrally 
planned economies.10 Measures of infrastructure as such are not in our possession, and it is a task for 
future research to evaluate the exact channels through which infrastructure policies may affect the 
export characteristics in question. We interpret these infrastructure policies as instruments for 
infrastructure services and use them directly in the estimations. Having access to policy measures is an 
advantage in the sense that policy may be more exogenous than actual infrastructure (to be discussed 
below). It may, on the other hand, come with the cost of larger measurement errors. To use the policy 
indices as instruments for actual infrastructure outcomes in a two-step least squares estimation could 
be a way to bridge the two approaches. 
The estimation in this paper will be the standard differences-in-differences approach used in panel data 
settings (see equation 1 in Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004), where some “individuals” are 
exposed to an intervention of some kind and unexposed, otherwise similar “individuals” are observed 
in several years before and after the intervention. One issue of concern is the possible endogeneity of 
the intervention in question. An ideal setup for us would be to observe reforms that were randomly 
assigned. Then reformed and nonreformed countries could be compared before and after the reform, 
and the reform would explain the differences. In practice, we do not observe randomly assigned 
reforms. 
On the possible endogeneity of the policy changes, Besley and Case (2000) emphasize that the source 
of variation in the policy change should be fully understood by the researcher. We argue in our setting 
that the 10 countries under study were all changing from being centrally planned economies to 
preparing themselves for EU membership during the period of study. This is interpreted as external 
variation in policy. To identify the coefficient of the infrastructure reform variable, the variable must 
be orthogonal (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) conditionally on the controls included in the 
regression. As will become clear, we include country–sector fixed effects—controlling for all time-
invariant factors relevant for policy variation across the countries—and sector- or product-year fixed 
effects that take out all common time variation across the countries. In addition, we control for a series 
of other factors that arguably could be correlated with both the policy changes and the export 
characteristics. The policy variation we exploit is therefore only the time variation within each country 
not explained by common shocks or our controls. Besley and Case (2000) make the argument that the 
forces driving the policy intervention in question should be identified and controlled for, to achieve 
unbiased estimates of the effects of the policy change. We will leave for future research explicit 
10 For a discussion of socialist systems as resource-constrained economies, see Kornai (1979).  
131
modeling of the political process determining these reforms. Our current understanding is that reforms 
co-varied across these countries suggesting variation driven from outside the countries.11
A second issue raised by Besley and Case (2000) is the control group. A common approach to test the 
effects of policy changes is to compare outcomes across groups of treated and non-treated countries. In 
our setting, we compare within-sector or within-product changes across countries. If we use the 
terminology “control group”, it indicates the corresponding sector(s) or product(s) in countries 
reformed to a different extent. Although we include observable controls, it also strengthens our 
confidence in our results that the countries arguably have many similarities. For instance, they are 
similar in the sense that they are in the same geographic region, they all used to be centrally planned 
economies, they started the movement toward becoming open market economies at the same time and 
they all became EU members. As we include country–sector fixed effects taking out all time-invariant 
characteristics relevant for our independent variables, it is the time-varying aspects of such 
similarities—and the extent to which they would respond similarly to a given intervention—that is 
relevant for us. 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) raise the issue of estimating too-low standard errors in panel 
differences-in-differences models because of serial correlation rooted in three factors: many periods, 
serial correlation in the dependent variable and little variation in the intervention studied within each 
group over time. Our reforms typically took place gradually (see Figure 1), and it may make our 
standard error less vulnerable to such a serial correlation problem. To address dynamic issues better 
than in the standard models, we estimate error correction versions of the standard models. 
The main identification challenge of this paper is separating the effects of infrastructure reforms from 
other reforms that were implemented as part of the transformation from central planning to open 
market economies. Our first measure to tackle this omitted variable problem is to control explicitly for 
other reforms. Following Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006), we capture the reforms of six economic 
aspects other than infrastructure by constructing an investment climate index based on the extent of 
reforms in those six other areas. Second, we investigate more carefully the links between our export 
characteristics of interest and reforms of financial services. Third, perhaps the most convincing test we 
are able to do is to take advantage of heterogeneity in the link between infrastructure and unit values 
across products. By classifying products in differentiated and homogenous products (following Rauch, 
1999), we identify a positive association between roads reforms and unit values for differentiated 
products. As we now have variation across products within each country, we can include country–year 
fixed effects. Comparing the estimates of roads reforms in the models with the explicit controls against 
11 Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2007) use services reforms in Slovakia and Hungary as instruments for services reform in 
Czech Republic, indicating these to have common variation.   
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the (interaction-terms in the) models with country–year fixed effects and no country-wide controls (the 
country–year fixed effects control for all country-wide changes over time), we find that they are very 
similar. At least for roads reforms, this strengthens our confidence that our results are not driven by 
something else going on at the country level.12 We now discuss more explicitly our estimation setup. 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
Like Harding and Javorcik (2007b), we follow Hwang (2006) and measure export diversification with 
a Herfindahl index of export shares in sector i in country c at time t.13 The Herfindahl index, H, 
indicates the level of concentration of export products from sector i for country–sector ci at time t 
given by (sector i consists of several products p): 
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where scpt is product p’s share of country-sector ci’s exports at time t and is given by: 
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where xcpt is the export value of p from country c in sector i at time t and Xcit is the total export value 
from sector i in country c at time t. The measure of concentration, Hcit, ranges from 0 to 100, and in our 
empirical specification we use 100 – Hcit as our measure of export diversification. We estimate the 
following equation linking infrastructure and export diversification: 
                  (3) 
To test the effect of infrastructure reform on export unit values, we estimate the equation: 
            (4)
                                                
12 These estimations are open to the criticism that some other reform could be closely correlated with our infrastructure 
reform and at the same time with unit values through differentiated products. 
13 Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) use as main measures the Gini coefficient, Herfindahl index, coefficient of variation in sector 
shares, the max-min spread and log-variance of sector shares. In this paper, we only employ the Herfindahl index, but in 
future work, we will consider checking the robustness of the results using more measures. 
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Unit_valuepct is the unit value (value of exports/quantity of exports) of product p exported by country c 
at time t. Products are defined at the four-digit SITC level. 
Infrastructurect, which is our variable of primary interest in all estimations, measures the extent of 
reforms that have been undertaken in either of the following three infrastructure sectors: electric 
power, roads or telecommunications. We also estimate a version of equation (1) letting Infrastructurect
equal an average of the five infrastructure sectors: the three above plus trains and water and waste 
water. All these measures of infrastructure policies are country specific and time varying (see Section 
3.2 for details). 
As infrastructure reform is not the only aspect of an economic environment that can affect export 
diversification and unit values, we need to think hard about other potential explanations and attempt to 
include them in our models. Failing to do so would mean that there could be other factors correlated 
with both the export characteristics of interest and our infrastructure reforms that could be picked up in 
our estimated coefficient on infrastructure reform. Explicitly controlling for factors that we believe are 
important for the export characteristics reduces this danger. 
The export value is included to take into account the size of the export sector in question. Motivations 
are that scale can affect aspects like production productivity, transport costs and marketing costs, 
which arguably could affect the export characteristics of interest. For the unit values in particular, 
changes in scale could also imply sliding along the world demand curve. Acemoglu and Ventura 
(2002) point to such an effect in a model with specialization in production across countries. The export 
value variable varies by sector, country and year in the diversification analysis, and product, country 
and year in the analysis of unit values. We lag the export value one period as our dependent variables 
are functions of export value or its unit value component. 
Based on their theoretical model, Feenstra and Kee (2008) instrument export variety across countries 
with tariffs, trade agreements and distance. We control for changes in such factors over time with the 
inclusion of tariffs as a control variable. A simple average of tariffs into high-income OECD countries 
is chosen to represent tariffs, as we do not employ bilateral trade data in this paper. We believe these 
are representative as the most important markets for the countries in question. These tariffs vary by 
exporter country, three-digit sectors and year. Feenstra and Kee (2008) motivate their tariff instrument 
by transport costs. Analogous to costs of other taxes, tariff costs may generally be split between sellers 
and buyers, affecting competitiveness and demand. In other words, export quantity and unit values are 
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likely to be affected by tariffs. Physical distance to any export market, being a time-invariant 
characteristic of each country, will in our estimations be controlled for by country–sector fixed effects 
(see below). 
The vector X consists of time-varying country-level controls: lagged log GDP per capita, inflation and 
an investment climate index. Several papers find export characteristics like diversification and unit 
values to be correlated with the level of development, which we control for by including GDP per 
capita (for instance, Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Brenton and Newfarmer (2007), and 
Cadot, Carrère and Strauss-Kahn (2007)). Hausmann et al. (2007) and Feenstra and Kee (2008) argue 
for links between export characteristics—the sophistication of export products in the former and 
export variety in the latter—and GDP per capita growth and productivity. We lag GDP per capita one 
period to reduce the danger of GDP per capita being a function of our dependent variable. Inflation 
represents general costs in the country in question as well as macroeconomic stability, both potentially 
important for exporter performance. 
The countries in question have also reformed other aspects of their economies during the period of 
study. If such other reforms and policy changes that took place in our period affected export 
diversification or unit values, and if at the same time they were correlated with our infrastructure 
reforms, then our estimated coefficients could be driven by those reforms rather than by the 
infrastructure reforms. To capture other reforms, we follow Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) and 
construct an index reflecting general business climate reforms by combining the following six indices 
published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): large-scale 
privatization, small-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, 
trade and foreign exchange systems and competition policy. To avoid our estimates of infrastructure 
effects being affected by reforms in these six areas, we include this investment climate variable as a 
control variable.
We also include country–sector ( ciK ) and sector–year ( itK ) fixed effects in all diversification 
estimations, and country–sector ( ciO ) and product–year ( ptO ) fixed effects in all unit value 
estimations. Country–sector fixed effects control for all time-invariant characteristics that affect the 
average level of export diversification or unit values in a specific sector in a specific country. For 
instance, if the Czech Republic has systematically different export values on car parts because of their 
geographical proximity to Germany, this will be completely absorbed by the country–sector fixed 
effects. Put differently, including country–sector fixed effects makes us only investigate changes in 
diversification and unit values within each country–sector over time. Sector–year fixed effects control 
for the fact that different sectors have different levels of diversification. Similarly, product–year fixed 
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effects control for the fact that products have different unit value levels; for instance, pencils and 
computers. They also control for shocks in sector diversification and product unit values, respectively, 
that are common to all countries. For instance, if there is a global downward shock in the price of 
computer chips from one year to the next, this will be completely controlled for by the product–year 
fixed effects.14 The same goes for shocks in global demand. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country–year level, because our variables of interest are available at the country–year level. The 
variables and their sources are described below. 
3.2 The country setting and the EBRD indices 
To investigate the link between infrastructure and exports, we take advantage of the transition 
experience of 10 Eastern European countries. 15  Since around 1990, they have gone from being 
centrally planned economies to becoming open market economies. Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) 
describe how Marxist thinking focused on material inputs, while service inputs were left with low 
priority. Bottlenecks in transportation and low-quality telecommunications were two consequences of 
these policies. In other words, the potential for improvements in these sectors seems to have been 
large, and the transition experience through the 1990s involved reforms of sectors providing 
infrastructure services. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
published yearly indices of the extent of such reforms for each of the 10 countries. These indices vary 
from a minimum score of 1 to a maximum score of 4.3. A description of what these indices measure is 
found in the appendix of Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006). For instance, an electric power sector 
achieving a score of 4.3 on the index would be characterized by tariff charges reflecting costs, large-
scale private player involvement, and being well regulated as well as fully liberalized in both network 
access and electricity generation. For roads, 4.3 includes a decentralized road administration, 
competitively awarded maintenance assignments to private companies and user charges reflecting full 
costs. Telecommunications ranked at 4.3 incorporate a coherent regulatory and institutional 
framework for dealing with tariffs, interconnection rules, licensing, concession feed and spectrum 
allocation and reflect that the sector is regulated by an effective, independent entity. EBRD also 
publishes indices for rail and water and waste water. We do not investigate the effects of rail because 
of few observations. The role of water and waste water for export unit values is not clear to us and is 
therefore not investigated specifically. All sectors mentioned above are, however, included in an 
aggregate measure of infrastructure reform that is calculated as a simple average of the five. 
14 A shock that hits all countries in the sample equally is sufficient to be called “global” in our context. 
15 The 10 countries in our analysis are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union on January 1 2007, while the other eight countries 
joined on May 1 2004. Cyprus and Malta also joined on May 1 2004, but these are not included in our study. 
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As a robustness check, we also estimate our model with reforms in financial sectors instead of 
infrastructure sectors. The financial sector index is constructed as an average of EBRD indices on 
“banking and interest rate liberalization” and “securities markets and non-bank financial institutions”, 
also as suggested by Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006). Figure 1 shows the indices measuring the 
extent of reforms in infrastructure services and financial services, as well as the investment climate 
index. All data necessary to construct the indices mentioned (subcomponents of infrastructure, 
financial and investment climate) are published by EBRD (EBRD, 2007).16
3.3 Other data 
Following Harding and Javorcik (2007a), we use four-digit SITC Rev. 2 classified export data 
compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005), which are available from before our period start of 1989 until 
2000.17 We exclude products from agriculture and natural resource extraction activities. Table 3 shows 
the sectors included. The data set used to analyze diversification at the sector level includes the same 
countries, sectors and years as the product-level data set, as it is only an aggregation of the product-
level data set. Unit values are calculated by dividing the export value by the quantity of exports. Value 
of exports is measured in current USD.18 GDP per capita is measured in current USD and is found in 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) 19  provided by the World Bank. Inflation figures are 
measured in shares—0.01 means one-percent inflation—and their source is the International Financial 
Statistics provided by the IMF.20 Tariffs are country and sector specific and calculated as a simple 
average of the tariffs a specific country meets in high-income OECD countries in a specific year. They 
are measured in percentage points and linearly interpolated to avoid unnecessary loss of observations 
(WITS, 2007).21 We use the classification of Rauch (1999) to identify differentiated products. 
4. Results: Infrastructure Reforms and the Diversification of Export Baskets 
Reforms leading to provision of better infrastructure services such as electric power, roads and 
telecommunications may decrease the costs of producing and transporting potential export products. 
This can induce exports of new products, higher quantities sold of already exported products and 
higher unit values on exported products. All these changes can make the export bundle of the given 
16 For data description and downloading, see: http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm.
17 For additional information on the data set, see http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/FAQ_on_NBER-UN_data.pdf and 
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.html. We classify sectors according to the NAICS 1997 classification, and the 
concordance between four-digit SITC Rev. 2 and NAICS 1997 is found at: http://www.nber.org/lipsey/sitc22naics97.
18 When there are multiple observations on value and corresponding quantities for a certain product-country-year observation 
(the quantity can be measured differently, for instance a part by weight and a part by number of units), we calculate the unit 
value as a weighted average. Shares of the total country-product-year value are used as weights. This is the strategy followed 
by Schott (2004). 
19 http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/
20 http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/
21 See http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb/ for downloading. 
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country more diversified, as measured with our export diversification measure, 100-H. In Table 4, we 
present results suggestive of a positive effect of reforming telecommunications services on export 
diversification. The results for electric power are not convincing, as there is only one incidence of 
significance at the 10-percent level. Telecommunications reforms seem to make a change quickly, as 
the largest coefficient is estimated for the same year as the reform takes place. The coefficient is 
reduced as we use more lags, but also one- and two-period lags are significant. This may be 
reasonable, as changes in, for instance, telecommunications regulations could turn up as increased 
efficiency almost immediately. The size of the contemporaneous coefficient for telecommunications is 
1.8, which implies that a one-index-point increase in the reform index raises export diversification by 
1.8 points (the dependent variable 100-H runs from 0 to 100, with an average of 74). Reforming 
telecommunications by one index point would, according to our measures, imply a 2.5-percent more-
diversified export basket for an average export sector. 
The process of implementing a policy reform to improve infrastructure services that again improve 
conditions for exporters may take some time. There could be important differences in the link between 
such reforms and exporter performance between the short and the long run. We estimate error 
correction (ECM) versions of the models described above to better take into account potential dynamic 
adjustments. The error-correction setup separates out short- and long-run effects. We still include 
sector–year fixed effects. Table 5 shows that the ECM results are much in line with our baseline 
results in Table 4. Telecommunications may still show the clearest effect, and the estimated (long-run) 
coefficient is a little larger, about 2.2.22 The interesting difference compared with Table 4 is the 
coefficient of roads, which is now clearly significant for three lags (corresponding to the situation with 
two lags in Table 4).23
Although in the results described above there are traces of links between infrastructure reforms and 
export diversification, our overall assessment is that the evidence is not overwhelming at this stage. 
Clearer support for such links is found when we let the effect vary across sectors. The idea is that 
diversification contains several aspects that could be differently influenced by different infrastructure 
services. Our diversification measure is a function of value shares of different products exported by a 
22 We only estimate models using zero, one and two lags in Table 4 as more lags make our sample rather short (the ECM 
setup adds one lag to all level variables). First we observe that there is robust support for cointegration between our 
dependent variable and our independent variables, as the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in level form is 
negative in all the estimations. We then focus on the coefficients of the level forms of the variables, which represents the 
“long-run” relation estimated. To find the size of the effect, we divide the coefficient of interest on the (negative) of the 
coefficient in front of the lagged level of the dependent variable. 
23 Two caveats should be kept in mind regarding our ECM results. First, the long-run relationship should be interpreted as the 
within-sample long-run relationship, indicating the relation between these variables over the 12 years or so we include in our 
sample. That is not necessarily equal to a long-run “steady-state” relationship between these variables. Second, we do only 
have a maximum of 12 years in the time dimension here. This is likely to be on the border line for fixed-effects estimations to
be unbiased, because the fixed effects by definition are correlated with the lagged dependent variable. This problem 
diminishes with increasing sample length. With these caveats, overall the ECM results of Table 5 support the findings of 
Table 4. 
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particular country-sector in a particular year. The export value of each product is a product of quantity 
and unit values. In Table 6 we investigate heterogeneity in the infrastructure estimates according to 
variation in export quantity for a given export value. Our idea is that there are likely to be differences 
in the impact of infrastructure reforms across inherent product characteristics. Our split into “quantity-
intense” vs. “quality-intense” products is only a first attempt at investigating whether there are such 
characteristics that matter in our context. Export “quantity-intense” sectors seem to be more 
diversified in their exports as roads reforms are implemented (Table 6). The roads reforms interacted 
with the sum of export quantity at the sector level are significant in all four models, three of them at 
the one-percent level. The variation in quantity can here be driven both by differences across sectors 
and changes within country–sectors over time. The sizes of the coefficients are between 1.6 and 2.1. 
Electric power reforms are, if anything, linked to export diversification through the general term. For 
telecommunications, the picture is a little more complicated. The main message seems to be that 
telecommunications reforms are linked to diversification through the general term. The sizes of the 
coefficients, roughly around 1.5, are recognizable from Table 4.  
We also conducted the analogues exercise of differentiating along “unit-value-intensive” sectors, by 
interacting average unit values by country–sector–year with the infrastructure indices (see Appendix 
table 1 and Appendix table 2). For this, we used both a value-share-weighted average and the simple 
average. When the value-weighted average is used in the interactions, we find results very similar to 
Table 4 and no significant heterogeneity. When the simple average of the unit values is used, there are 
indications of heterogeneity across sectors in the links between electric power services reform and 
export diversification. Interactions of the simple average of sector unit values and roads services 
reforms are significantly negative in two of the four models. The indications of heterogeneity in the 
infrastructure links according to “quantity-intense” and “quality-intense” sectors suggest that there 
may be interesting effects of infrastructure on export diversification that our analyses are not fully 
capable of revealing. Further research is needed to uncover more precisely which sectors or product 
characteristics we have seen traces of above.24
Finally we present results indicating that infrastructure reforms in general seemed to be positively 
associated with export diversification in our 10 countries, while that is not the case for reforms of 
financial services. Table 7 presents the results. General service sector reform—including financial and 
24 An example of such a characteristic could perhaps be transportation costs, for which we do not have any data available for 
the countries analyzed. For instance, say, exports of stone or food—sectors that have high transport costs according to 
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006)—may benefit more from improved roads than, say, computer parts. Investigation of 
heterogeneity across sectors according to other characteristics has not led us to find any systematic pattern in the estimated 
infrastructure effects. The cross-sectional sector characteristics investigated are research-and-development intensity, 
marketing intensity, and financial external dependency. 
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infrastructure services—is positively associated with diversification, but it seems like the effect is 
driven by the infrastructure component rather than the financial services component. 
5. Results: Infrastructure Reforms associated with Higher Unit Values 
We have argued that there are reasons to expect better infrastructure services to increase the quality 
and therefore the unit values of products exported. Table 8 shows our estimates of the effects of 
electric power, roads and telecommunications services on unit values of exports. The sizes of the 
estimated coefficients imply that a one-index-point increase, say from 2 to 3, would increase unit 
values by between 5.3 and 7.0 percent.25 For roads, we find that an increase in the road index of one 
point increases unit values by 6.5 percent, while for telecommunications, we estimate that a one-point 
increase leads to an increase of between 5.5. and 7.6 percent in unit values. In other words, the size of 
the effects compared across the three infrastructure sectors is rather similar. For electric power, the 
estimated coefficients are significant when the index is included contemporaneously and with one and 
two lags. Roads are significant only with one lag, while telecommunications-reform is manifested 
within the year of reform and the following year.   
To take dynamic adjustment in export unit values in relation to the infrastructure reforms into account 
we estimate error correction-versions of the models in Table 8. The estimated significant coefficients 
imply long-run coefficients of around 0.12 and 0.10 for electric power and telecommunications, 
respectively (Table 9). These are larger than the estimates in Table 8. It is reasonable that all effects do 
not show up immediately. For roads, the error correction specification does not produce significant 
results. We note that the error correction setup chosen is demanding as it includes product–year fixed 
effects that remove much of the time variation that the ECM is designed to capture. 
To investigate further exactly what is at work, we look at heterogeneity across products. Rauch (1999) 
classifies products into differentiated and homogenous products.26 We replicate the estimations of 
Table 8 but now also include a variable interacting with the infrastructure index in question and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the product is a differentiated product or not. These estimations, 
presented in Table 10, indicate that the relationship between roads and unit values is present only for 
differentiated products. The interaction variable turns out to be significant at the one-percent level in 
all three versions (zero, one and two lags), while the roads variable turns out to be insignificant. The 
size varies between 5.0- and 6.6-percent increase in unit values for a one-point increase in the index. 
25 This is found by the following calculation (we let U indicate unit values and use column 2 as an example): 
1ee/)ee(e/)ee(U/)UU(Index*07.0Uln 07.02*07.02*07.03*07.0Index*07.0ndex*07.0Index*07.01t1tttt
1t1tt      .
26 Rauch divides products into three categories: differentiated products, products with a reference price and products traded 
on organized exchanges. The latter two are, in other words, seen as homogeneous goods. We apply Rauch’s conservative 
classification, which minimizes the number classifications: reference priced or organized exchange. 
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For electric power the interactions are insignificant and the other coefficients about the same as before. 
Telecommunications services do not work differently for differentiated products either, as the 
interaction variable is always insignificant. The estimated coefficients for zero and one lag are still 
significant, although a little smaller than before. 
To examine the differentiated products further, we replicate the estimations of Table 8 with two 
changes: we include the interaction variables described in the last paragraph and we include country–
year fixed effects instead of explicit country controls.27 We can now only identify the interaction 
variables, which turn out to be very similar to the estimations described above (see Table 11). They 
are all significant at the one-percent level, with magnitudes varying between a 5.5 and 7.2 percent unit 
value increase for a roads index increase of one point. These results make us more confident in the 
estimated effect of roads on differentiated products. 
Conceivably of greater importance, the results also strengthen our confidence in our other estimates. A 
reason for caution toward the estimation results in Table 8 is that there could be other changes at the 
country level affecting unit values that are not included in our regressions. We recognize that 
controlling for other reforms—correlated with the infrastructure reforms, which may have affected the 
export characteristics in question—may be the most important identification challenge in this paper. A 
policy change not captured by our investment climate index could be an example. If such a policy 
change is correlated with our infrastructure measure, we could wrongly assign its effect to 
infrastructure. The country–year fixed effects used in Table 11 control for any country-wide change 
over time and should completely remove the possibility of omitted variable bias caused by omitted 
time-varying country-wide variables. The fact that the results for roads are almost identical given 
country–year fixed effects as with country controls gives us more comfort that our results are not 
driven by omitted variables. 
Understanding exactly why roads matter more for differentiated products than for other products is a 
matter for future research. Rauch (1999) uses trade costs between Japan and the US to get some 
insights on the transportability of different products. This measure suggests that differentiated 
products are roughly twice as tradable as homogeneous products. On the one hand, such products are 
likely to be traded more. On the other hand, we would perhaps expect that infrastructure such as roads 
should matter more for products that are expensive to transport. 
27 We can only include country-year fixed effects when we consider variation in the effect of infrastructure across sectors or 
products, which is the case when, through the interaction variables, we open up the possibility that infrastructure affects 
differentiated products differently than other products. We also investigated heterogeneity across sectors because of their 
differences in intensity of marketing and research and development expenses and because of their dependency on external 
financing. No systematic patterns were found. 
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In this paper, we have focused our attention on infrastructure services rather than financial services. In 
Table 12, we replace infrastructure with a variable capturing the extent of service sector reforms in 
general. We find a positive association between general service reforms and unit values. When we 
break down this general service sector reform measure into its two subcomponents, namely the 
aggregate indices on financial and infrastructure sectors, we see that infrastructure is significant while 
the financial sector is not. In other words, the positive association estimated between the extent of 
general service sector reform and unit values seems to be driven by the infrastructure component. This 
also supports the view that our results are not driven by some other, correlated, reform. 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Evidence presented in Section 4 is consistent with the existence of a positive relationship between 
infrastructure policy reforms and export diversification as measured by a Herfindahl index.28 Dennis 
and Shepherd (2007) employ export cost data from the World Bank’s Doing Business database and 
find that a one-percent reduction in export costs is associated with 0.3-percent more diversified 
exports. A one-percent reduction in international transportation costs is associated with 0.4-percent 
higher export diversification. We estimate that a 1.8-percent change in export diversification requires a 
one-reform-index-point change for telecommunications. This should then correspond to about six 
percent lower export costs and four-percent lower international transport costs, according to the 
estimates of Dennis and Shepherd (2007). Cost reductions of such magnitudes do not seem 
implausible given, for instance, the reported reductions in transportation costs seen since the 1950s 
(Hummels, 2001). 
Francois (2007) estimates the contribution of infrastructure, institutions and tariffs in explaining trade 
volumes across countries and finds the first two to be considerably more important in magnitude than 
the latter. A one-standard-deviation increase in communications and transport infrastructure implies in 
his full sample estimations nine- and four-percent increases in the volume of trade, respectively.29 The 
corresponding number for a tariff change is two percent. Although our reform indices are not directly 
comparable with the infrastructure measures employed by Francois (2007), infrastructure in his 
28 For empirical analyses of variation in export baskets along different dimensions (intensive vs. extensive margin etc), see 
Hummels and Klenow (2005), Brenton and Newfarmer (2007), Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008). Brenton and 
Newfarmer (2007) argue that a key policy concern should be “lowering the costs of backbone services” 
29 The infrastructure measures of Francois (2007) are based on information from the World Development Indicators database 
and include, for instance, telephone coverage and air transport freight. 
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estimations is found to be potent in increasing trade. Cadot, Carrère and Strauss-Kahn (2007) seem to 
find effect magnitudes comparable with our estimates.30
Schott (2004) shows that unit values of the same export product vary greatly across countries. In their 
exports, countries seem to specialize within products rather than across products.31 Unit values within 
products are found to increase by 1.3, 4.4, and 5.0 percent for a 10-percent increase in GDP per capita, 
capital per worker and skill per worker, respectively (Schott, 2004, p. 669). Our estimates of unit value 
increases linked to a one-index-point increase in the infrastructure reform indices are about 5.5 to 7.5 
percent. In other words, a one-index-point increase in our reform indices corresponds very roughly to 
about a 40-percent increase in GDP per capita, a 15-percent increase in capital per worker and a 10–
15-percent increase in skill per worker. The comparable changes necessary in for instance GDP per 
capita may seem large. However, we should keep in mind that Schott estimates these figures in a 
cross-country panel setting (48 countries, including low-, middle- and high-income countries, 1972–
1994). Product–year fixed effects are included, but not country fixed effects. Variation between 
countries is therefore also driving Schott’s results. As we include country-sector fixed effects, 
focusing on within-country-sector changes, the results are not exactly comparable.  
We are not aware of other studies specifically estimating the relationship between infrastructure and 
unit values. The results of Harding and Javorcik (2007) suggest that inflows of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) (proxied by actively performed investment promotion policies) can increase the unit 
values of developing countries by about 11 percent. FDI can therefore contribute to bridge the gap 
between developing countries’ and developed countries’ unit values. The size of their estimates is 
comparable to the ones presented in this chapter. For developing countries, they do not find systematic 
differences in the FDI-unit value relationship between differentiated and homogenous products. For 
developed countries, however, the link found—if any—between FDI and unit values seems to go 
through differentiated products. 
30 Cadot, Carrère and Strauss-Kahn (2007) estimate public infrastructure—measured as a composite of World Development 
Indicator (WDI) data on the proportion of paved roads and densities of telephones, railroads and roads—to reduce export 
concentration along the intensive but not the extensive margin. In their estimations, applying a Herfindahl index as a 
concentration measure, they seem to find (based on our reading of their Table 9) that a one-index-point increase in their 
infrastructure index (which varies between 0.02 to 2.35, with an average of 1.02 and a standard deviation of 0.622) leads to a 
three-point increase in an export diversification measure comparable to our 100-H.30 A one-standard-deviation increase in 
their infrastructure measure (about 0.6 index points) leads to about a 1.8-point increase in diversified exports, while the 
corresponding figure for telecommunications reforms in our estimations is also about 1.8 (mean 2.49, standard deviation 0.98 
and coefficient 1.789 in column 7, Table 4). The indices in question are not directly comparable The magnitudes of our 
estimates do not seem unreasonable. 
31 Schott (2004) mentions as an example that both Japan and the Philippines export cotton shirts for men, but Japan achieves 
a price 30 times higher than the Philippines. 
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Based on the analyses of unit values provided by Schott (2004) and Harding and Javorcik (2007), we 
consider our estimates of the link between unit values and infrastructure reforms to be of reasonable 
magnitudes.
During the 1990s, the 10 new EU members studied in this paper underwent massive policy changes 
aimed at improving infrastructure services. We found the extent of these changes to be positively 
correlated with the unit value of products exported from these countries, which we interpret to be 
consistent with better infrastructure services increasing the quality of the products exported. There is 
also some support for positive correlations between these reforms and export diversification. For 
countries with less than perfect infrastructure policies, the findings of this paper therefore suggest that 
reform of infrastructure policies is one measure available to policy makers with the potential of 
inducing upgrading of the country’s export basket. 
As the debate on exports and growth is turning away from exports as such, and toward the quality and 
sophistication of export products, identification of policy measures available to developing and 
transitional countries capable of raising export product quality appears to us as an important task for 
research. The results of this paper point to some possible areas for further research. First, there seems 
to be heterogeneity across sectors in the relation between infrastructure reforms and export 
diversification. Which characteristics drive this heterogeneity is not yet fully explored. A second open 
question is what lies behind the estimated strong link between unit values and roads reforms for 
differentiated products. Third, Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2007) find foreign direct investment to be 
an important channel through which service sector reforms enhance manufacturing productivity. The 
role of FDI and other factors in accommodating and generating the effects of infrastructure reforms is 
another interesting avenue for future research. 
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8. Figures
Figure 1: Extent of reforms in financial and infrastructure services sectors and investment climate 
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9. Tables: About the Data 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, sector level analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
100-H 1771 73.433 20.716 0 97.383
Average unit values (levels) 1768 21.350 82.653 0.036 1317.881
Average unit values (log) 1768 1.911 1.252 0.035 7.185
Weighted average unit values (level) 1768 6.837 64.918 0.009 1317.881
Weighted average unit values (log) 1768 0.481 0.794 0.009 7.185
Sum of export value by sector (log) 1781 –2.320 1.969 –9.171 1.884
Sum of export quantity by sector (log) 1768 0.339 0.552 0.000001 4.643
Note: This table uses data from the sample corresponding to columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table 4. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, product level analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln u (unit values) 32603 0.936 1.817 –9.028 9.786
u (unit values) 32603 16.055 176.244 0.0001 17781.000
Electric power 32603 2.313 0.768 1.000 4.000
Roads 32603 2.283 0.683 1.000 3.300
Telecommunications 32603 2.541 0.984 1.000 4.000
EBRD reform infrastructure 32603 2.205 0.706 1.000 3.700
EBRD reform financial 32603 2.558 0.666 1.000 3.850
EBRD reform services in general 32603 2.382 0.649 1.000 3.775
EBRD investment climate 32603 3.229 0.629 1.000 3.867
Tariffs hiOECD simple average 32603 4.443 5.729 0.000 74.440
L.Export value of product 32603 0.017 0.045 0.000 1.274
L.GDP per capita 32603 8.049 0.571 7.004 9.288
Inflation 32603 0.547 1.348 0.008 10.584
Year 32603   1989 2000
Note: The table uses data from the sample corresponding to columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table 8. Export values and GDP per capita are measured 
in logs. LX means lagged X periods.  
Table 3: Countries and sectors included 
NAICS97 NAICS97 description Bulgaria Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak Re Slovenia Total
311 Food manufacturing 420 411 118 658 142 216 659 323 350 372 3669
312 Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 51 45 17 64 21 12 51 29 51 41 382
313 Textile mills 184 197 65 276 69 108 285 193 156 186 1719
314 Textile product mills 110 91 48 169 30 42 160 117 73 70 910
315 Apparel manufacturing 277 182 176 308 154 168 310 243 174 205 2197
316 Leather and allied product manufacturing 75 80 44 120 40 42 112 80 62 85 740
321 Wood product manufacturing 121 88 92 152 75 82 159 120 87 86 1062
322 Paper manufacturing 118 108 53 144 31 51 163 69 103 110 950
323 Printing and related support activities 19 42 24 65 11 14 63 21 39 48 346
324 Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 54 56 33 94 37 38 80 64 54 43 553
325 Chemical manufacturing 658 621 136 943 168 177 996 575 507 517 5298
326 Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 101 97 44 138 23 23 147 94 90 101 858
327 Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 174 196 79 303 55 83 321 191 148 183 1733
331 Primary metal manufacturing 290 261 124 347 128 164 393 257 194 229 2387
333 Machinery manufacturing 489 537 183 790 139 173 835 481 453 512 4592
334 Computer and electronic product manufacturing 192 253 106 384 50 91 402 154 225 222 2079
335 Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 149 116 52 189 44 51 183 117 104 131 1136
336 Transportation equipment manufacturing 142 224 81 254 84 78 329 213 185 186 1776
337 Furniture and related product manufacturing 24 14 16 24 16 16 24 20 14 16 184
483 Water transportation 8 0 0 0 1 3 12 8 0 0 32
 Total 3656 3619 1491 5422 1318 1632 5684 3369 3069 3343 32603
Note: For agricultural products, there are typically important tariff and nontariff barriers restricting trade flows. We exclude the following 
NAICS-sectors: Crop production (111), animal production (112), forestry and logging (113), fishing, hunting and trapping (114), oil and gas 
extraction (211), mining (except oil and gas) (212). For the sectors fabricated metal product manufacturing (332), motion picture and sound 
recording industries (512), professional, scientific, and technical services (541) and utilities (221), we do not have observations. 
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10. Tables: Results Diversification 
Table 4: Diversification and specific infrastructure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H
Electric power 0.521  
 [0.714]  
L. Electric power  1.285*
  [0.664] 
L2. Electric power   0.978   
   [0.597]   
Roads   –0.886   
   [0.904]   
L. Roads   –0.599   
   [1.123]   
L2. Roads   0.145   
   [1.021]   
Telecommunications   1.789**
   [0.757]  
L. Telecommunications   1.179*
    [0.659] 
L2. Telecommunications   1.142*
     [0.588]
L. Sum of export value by sector 0.916 0.757 0.881 0.881 0.845 0.986 0.869 0.798 0.799
 [0.754] [0.785] [0.791] [0.690] [0.718] [0.739] [0.796] [0.758] [0.730]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average –0.010 –0.011 0.022 0.001 –0.002 0.018 –0.023 –0.007 0.027
 [0.083] [0.084] [0.083] [0.085] [0.084] [0.082] [0.082] [0.086] [0.084]
L. GDP per capita –1.129 –2.791** –4.099*** –0.989 –2.572* –4.118*** –1.365 –3.093*** –4.426***
 [1.208] [1.127] [1.181] [1.300] [1.376] [1.490] [1.042] [1.161] [1.279]
EBRD investment climate 0.198 –1.079 0.185 1.182 –0.491 –0.399 –0.341 –1.232 –1.027
 [2.134] [1.705] [1.862] [1.701] [1.728] [2.040] [1.878] [1.635] [1.775]
Inflation –0.492** –0.391** –0.370** –0.529* –0.450** –0.344** –0.527** –0.430** –0.394**
 [0.240] [0.187] [0.171] [0.270] [0.210] [0.168] [0.237] [0.187] [0.180]
Observations 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 100-H, where H is a Herfindahl index based on export value shares, as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. 
Tariffs are included in percent and linearly interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. Infrastructure 
measures and the investment climate measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All 
estimations include sector–year and country–sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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Table 5: Diversification and specific infrastructure, ECM 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 d(100-H) d(100-H) d(100-H) d(100-H) d(100-H) d(100-H) d(100-H) d(100-H) d(100-H)
L. 100-H –0.573*** –0.573*** –0.560*** –0.573*** –0.569*** –0.560*** –0.577*** –0.572*** –0.560***
 [0.049] [0.051] [0.052] [0.048] [0.050] [0.051] [0.048] [0.051] [0.051]
L. dElectric power 1.011*
 [0.599]  
L2. Electric power 1.008  
 [0.609]  
L2. dElectric power  0.452 
  [0.530] 
L3. Electric power  0.818 
  [0.555] 
L3. dElectric power   0.863   
   [0.520]   
L4. Electric power   –0.094   
   [0.570]   
L. dRoads   –0.197   
   [0.965]   
L2. Roads   1.184   
   [1.131]   
L2. dRoads   0.973   
   [1.052]   
L3. Roads   1.859**
   [0.769]   
L3. dRoads   0.965   
   [0.874]   
L4. Roads   1.178   
   [0.997]   
L. dTelecommunications   0.794  
   [0.552]  
L2. Telecommunications   1.284**
   [0.581]  
L2. dTelecommunications   0.813*
    [0.452] 
L3. Telecommunications   0.909*
    [0.475] 
L3. dTelecommunications     0.437
     [0.494]
L4. Telecommunications     –0.359
     [0.523]
L. dSum of export value by sector –1.664 –1.765 –1.841 –1.693 –1.692 –1.806 –1.692 –1.759 –1.842
 [1.204] [1.247] [1.309] [1.205] [1.277] [1.315] [1.203] [1.263] [1.328]
L2. Sum of export value by sector –0.325 –0.300 –0.505 –0.309 –0.188 –0.435 –0.354 –0.304 –0.406
 [0.791] [0.837] [0.907] [0.812] [0.850] [0.922] [0.791] [0.877] [0.969]
dTariffs hiOECD simple average –0.032 –0.026 –0.041 –0.021 –0.024 –0.036 –0.021 –0.019 –0.028
 [0.083] [0.084] [0.085] [0.082] [0.085] [0.085] [0.083] [0.083] [0.085]
L. Tariffs hiOECD simple average –0.066 –0.047 –0.071 –0.043 –0.049 –0.078 –0.054 –0.043 –0.074
 [0.135] [0.135] [0.136] [0.132] [0.134] [0.136] [0.136] [0.134] [0.136]
L. dGDP per capita –4.255** –1.179 –1.059 –4.050* –2.402 –1.919 –4.633** –1.463 –2.251
 [2.064] [3.357] [3.391] [2.326] [2.983] [3.370] [2.023] [3.169] [3.619]
L2. GDP per capita –4.544*** –2.304 –2.670 –5.060*** –4.081** –4.718** –4.886*** –2.710 –4.462**
 [1.089] [2.016] [2.233] [1.089] [1.599] [1.848] [1.029] [1.901] [2.174]
dEBRD investment climate –2.144 –0.433 –1.463 –3.362 –2.033 –1.308 –2.831 –1.295 –2.485
 [1.953] [2.332] [2.540] [2.476] [2.410] [2.585] [1.754] [1.912] [2.289]
L. EBRD investment climate –3.458* –0.872 –0.484 –3.078* –3.122* –1.515 –3.657** –2.228 –1.774
 [1.811] [1.959] [2.218] [1.659] [1.677] [2.163] [1.732] [1.657] [2.109]
dInflation –0.195 –0.108 –0.012 –0.021 –0.038 –0.066 –0.213 –0.132 –0.015
 [0.163] [0.172] [0.196] [0.180] [0.187] [0.227] [0.167] [0.159] [0.199]
L. Inflation –0.309 –0.256 –0.142 –0.149 –0.134 –0.191 –0.386** –0.298 –0.166
 [0.186] [0.204] [0.221] [0.209] [0.244] [0.282] [0.192] [0.193] [0.229]
Observations 1513 1455 1378 1513 1455 1378 1513 1455 1378
R-squared 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.48
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. d (100-H), where H is a Herfindahl index based on export value shares, as dependent variable. d in front of variable name 
means first difference. LX. means lagged X periods. Tariffs are included in percent and linearly interpolated for missing values. Export 
values and GDP per capita are in log form. Infrastructure measures and the investment climate measure are included as indices going from 1 
to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All estimations include sector–year and country–sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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Table 6: Diversification, heterogeneity with respect to quantity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H
Electric power 0.336    
 [0.726]    
Electric power x L. Sum of export quantity by sector 0.724    
 [0.668]    
L. Electric power 1.156*    
[0.688]    
L. Electric power x L. Sum of export quantity by sector 0.460    
[0.691]    
L2. Electric power 0.762    
[0.609]    
L2. Electric power x L. Sum of export quantity by sector 0.738    
[0.761]    
Roads –1.488    
[1.011]    
Roads x L. Sum of export quantity by sector 1.594***    
[0.571]    
L. Roads –1.202    
[1.212]    
L. Roads x L. Sum of export quantity by sector 1.870***    
[0.654]    
L2. Roads –0.545   
[1.074]   
L2. Roads x L. Sum of export quantity by sector 2.073***
[0.691]   
Telecommunications 1.467*
 [0.767]  
Telecommunications x L. Sum of export quantity by sector 1.514**
 [0.659]  
L. Telecommunications 1.179*
  [0.672] 
L. Telecommunications x L. Sum of export quantity by sector   0.064 
  [0.503] 
L2. Telecommunications    1.496***
   [0.553]
L2. Telecommunications x L. Sum of export quantity by sector    –1.099*
   [0.623]
L. Sum of export quantity by sector –0.662 0.072 –0.493 –2.503 –2.831 –3.062* –3.403* 0.889 3.118
 [1.804] [1.954] [1.980] [1.966] [1.872] [1.748] [1.773] [2.117] [2.408]
L. Sum of export value by sector 0.871 0.696 0.836 0.837 0.827 0.985 0.867 0.718 0.640
 [0.770] [0.815] [0.820] [0.698] [0.729] [0.747] [0.801] [0.788] [0.746]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average –0.013 –0.014 0.018 –0.003 –0.008 0.014 –0.028 –0.010 0.028
 [0.083] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.082] [0.082] [0.086] [0.084]
L. GDP per capita –1.324 –2.852** –4.237*** –1.427 –3.099** –4.717*** –1.863* –3.072** –4.078***
 [1.250] [1.183] [1.256] [1.359] [1.462] [1.578] [1.099] [1.169] [1.312]
EBRD investment climate 0.226 –0.920 0.346 1.559 –0.051 0.066 –0.343 –1.136 –1.298
 [2.134] [1.727] [1.889] [1.715] [1.766] [2.057] [1.880] [1.654] [1.794]
Inflation –0.507** –0.408** –0.393** –0.543* –0.474** –0.354* –0.543** –0.446** –0.393**
 [0.244] [0.193] [0.182] [0.275] [0.222] [0.178] [0.242] [0.194] [0.186]
Observations 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 100-H, where H is a Herfindahl index based on export value shares, as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. 
Tariffs are included in percent and linearly interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. Infrastructure 
measures and the investment climate measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All 
estimations include sector–year and country–sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. Export quantity, q, is calculated as: q = (Export value 
of product)/(unit value of product), and then aggregated by summing up at the sector level. 
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Table 7: Diversification and financial vs. infrastructure services 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H
EBRD reform services in general 2.103 
 [1.859] 
L. EBRD reform services in general  3.559**
  [1.601]
L2. EBRD reform services in general  3.746**
  [1.450]   
EBRD reform financial  1.166   
  [1.282]   
L. EBRD reform financial  2.134*
  [1.158]   
L2. EBRD reform financial  1.732   
  [1.235]   
EBRD reform infrastructure  1.207
[1.208]  
L. EBRD reform infrastructure  1.896*
 [1.056] 
L2. EBRD reform infrastructure  2.567***
  [0.961]
L. Sum of export value by sector 0.914 0.655 0.617 0.907 0.697 0.772 0.952 0.786 0.792
 [0.778] [0.793] [0.815] [0.748] [0.741] [0.798] [0.752] [0.787] [0.795]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average –0.016 –0.017 0.014 –0.008 –0.014 0.014 –0.013 –0.008 0.019
 [0.083] [0.086] [0.081] [0.084] [0.086] [0.080] [0.084] [0.086] [0.083]
L. GDP per capita –1.532 –3.941*** –6.014*** –1.368 –3.495*** –4.969*** –1.343 –3.401*** –5.362***
 [1.165] [1.182] [1.476] [1.200] [1.203] [1.533] [1.193] [1.151] [1.308]
EBRD investment climate –0.148 –1.778 –1.654 0.778 –0.910 –1.212 –0.178 –1.714 –0.827
 [2.074] [1.840] [2.172] [1.604] [1.665] [2.141] [2.223] [1.859] [1.979]
Inflation –0.475** –0.326** –0.320* –0.496** –0.365** –0.342** –0.491** –0.378** –0.324*
 [0.215] [0.158] [0.167] [0.227] [0.168] [0.162] [0.224] [0.171] [0.168]
Observations 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 100-H, where H is a Herfindahl index based on export value shares, as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. 
Tariffs are included in percent and linearly interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. Infrastructure 
measures and the investment climate measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All 
estimations include sector–year and country–sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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11. Tables: Results Unit Values 
Table 8: Unit values and specific infrastructure reforms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u
Electric power 0.053*  
 [0.029]  
L. Electric power  0.070** 
  [0.029] 
L2. Electric power   0.060**   
   [0.028]   
Roads   –0.005   
   [0.033]   
L. Roads   0.065**   
   [0.032]   
L2. Roads   –0.008   
   [0.031]   
Telecommunications   0.076***  
   [0.020]  
L. Telecommunications    0.055*** 
    [0.018] 
L2. Telecommunications     0.014
     [0.017]
L. Export value of product 0.546*** 0.543*** 0.564*** 0.549*** 0.558*** 0.577*** 0.555*** 0.557*** 0.577***
 [0.095] [0.095] [0.096] [0.095] [0.097] [0.096] [0.096] [0.096] [0.096]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
L. GDP per capita 0.141*** 0.168*** 0.192*** 0.143*** 0.127*** 0.183** 0.130*** 0.148*** 0.174***
 [0.033] [0.048] [0.072] [0.036] [0.047] [0.071] [0.031] [0.043] [0.060]
EBRD investment climate 0.032 0.106 0.243** 0.125 0.105 0.216* 0.051 0.106 0.205*
 [0.057] [0.076] [0.110] [0.084] [0.076] [0.110] [0.076] [0.088] [0.104]
Inflation –0.003 –0.004 –0.003 –0.005 –0.005 –0.003 –0.007 –0.006 –0.003
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Observations 32603 31588 30529 32603 31588 30529 32603 31588 30529
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Log unit values as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. Tariffs are included in percent and linearly 
interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. Infrastructure measures and the investment climate 
measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All estimations include product–year and country–
sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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Table 9: Unit values and specific infrastructure, ECM 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u
L. Unit value –0.467*** –0.471*** –0.463*** –0.467*** –0.471*** –0.462*** –0.467*** –0.471*** –0.462***
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022]
dElectric power –0.017  
 [0.021]  
L. Electric power 0.034  
 [0.031]  
L. dElectric power  0.046*
  [0.023] 
L2. Electric power  0.056*
  [0.031] 
L2. dElectric power   0.050*
   [0.029]   
L3. Electric power   0.059   
   [0.040]   
dRoads   –0.005   
   [0.051]   
L. Roads   0.037   
   [0.032]   
L. dRoads   0.012   
   [0.042]   
L2. Roads   –0.016   
   [0.049]   
L2. dRoads   –0.010   
   [0.034]   
L3. Roads   –0.050   
   [0.030]   
dTelecommunications   0.035*
   [0.019]  
L. Telecommunications   0.045**
   [0.020]  
L. dTelecommunications    0.026 
    [0.018] 
L2. Telecommunications    0.010 
    [0.020] 
L2. dTelecommunications     0.001
     [0.021]
L3. Telecommunications     –0.006
     [0.022]
L. dSum of export value by sector 0.682** 0.696** 0.667** 0.692** 0.691** 0.677** 0.686** 0.706** 0.685**
 [0.306] [0.307] [0.308] [0.304] [0.306] [0.307] [0.304] [0.306] [0.308]
L2. Export value of product 0.032 0.057 0.051 0.040 0.066 0.056 0.042 0.067 0.058
 [0.115] [0.115] [0.118] [0.116] [0.116] [0.118] [0.117] [0.116] [0.117]
dTariffs hiOECD simple average 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
L. Tariffs hiOECD simple average 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
L. dGDP per capita 0.179* 0.300** 0.573*** 0.168* 0.307** 0.493*** 0.148 0.284** 0.462***
 [0.096] [0.132] [0.203] [0.098] [0.118] [0.174] [0.100] [0.124] [0.159]
L2. GDP per capita 0.091 0.174** 0.393** 0.075 0.185** 0.350*** 0.083 0.165** 0.298**
 [0.056] [0.086] [0.151] [0.056] [0.073] [0.126] [0.059] [0.077] [0.115]
dEBRD investment climate 0.090 0.140 0.267** 0.035 0.133 0.222** 0.037 0.125 0.202**
 [0.073] [0.088] [0.114] [0.069] [0.105] [0.096] [0.077] [0.081] [0.088]
L. EBRD investment climate 0.150 0.233* 0.393** 0.172 0.319** 0.376** 0.130 0.275* 0.338*
 [0.092] [0.121] [0.196] [0.122] [0.138] [0.177] [0.126] [0.142] [0.170]
dInflation 0.001 0.009 0.017** 0.006 0.011 0.015* 0.001 0.011* 0.016*
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008]
L. Inflation –0.005 0.008 0.014 –0.002 0.006 0.009 –0.007 0.007 0.012
 [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010]
Observations 27585 26620 25620 27585 26620 25620 27585 26620 25620
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.46
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. First difference of log unit values as dependent variable. d in front of variable names means first difference. LX. means 
lagged X periods. Tariffs are included in percent and linearly interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log 
form. Infrastructure measures and the investment climate measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as 
percent/100. All estimations include product–year and country–sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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Table 10: Specific infrastructure reforms and differentiate products 
 1 2 3 4 4 6 7 8 9 
  ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u 
Electric power 0.057*         
 [0.030]         
Electric power*Diff. prod. con. –0.009         
 [0.013]         
L. Electric power  0.072**        
  [0.031]        
L. Electric power*Diff. prod. con.  –0.004        
  [0.015]        
L2. Electric power   0.051*       
   [0.030]       
L2. Electric power*Diff. prod. con.   0.013       
   [0.016]       
Roads    –0.043      
    [0.034]      
Roads*Diff. prod. con.    0.058***      
    [0.014]      
L. Roads     0.024     
     [0.034]     
L. Roads*Diff. prod. con.     0.066***     
     [0.013]     
L2. Roads      –0.039    
      [0.033]    
L2. Roads*Diff. prod. con.      0.050***    
      [0.014]    
Telecommunications       0.058***   
       [0.021]   
Telecommunications*Diff. prod. con.       0.009   
       [0.012]   
L. Telecommunications        0.042*  
        [0.022]  
L. Telecommunications*Diff. prod. con.        0.008  
        [0.012]  
L2. Telecommunications         0.012 
         [0.021] 
L2. Telecommunications*Diff. prod. con.         0.002 
         [0.012] 
L. Export value of product 0.511*** 0.514*** 0.532*** 0.509*** 0.519*** 0.539*** 0.519*** 0.525*** 0.544*** 
 [0.088] [0.090] [0.090] [0.088] [0.089] [0.089] [0.090] [0.090] [0.089] 
Tariffs hiOECD simple average 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
L. GDP per capita 0.139*** 0.172*** 0.195*** 0.141*** 0.129*** 0.186*** 0.130*** 0.153*** 0.179*** 
 [0.034] [0.048] [0.066] [0.035] [0.046] [0.067] [0.033] [0.043] [0.055] 
EBRD investment climate 0.034 0.111 0.250** 0.125 0.109 0.225** 0.062 0.115 0.213** 
 [0.057] [0.077] [0.108] [0.084] [0.077] [0.109] [0.077] [0.089] [0.104] 
Inflation –0.006 –0.007 –0.005 –0.008 –0.007 –0.005 –0.009 –0.008 –0.005 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] 
Observations 30238 29281 28282 30238 29281 28282 30238 29281 28282 
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.87 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Log unit values as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. “Diff. prod. con.”  means a dummy taking one if the 
product in question is a differentiated product according to Rauch’s (1999) conservative strategy. Tariffs are included in percent and linearly 
interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. The infrastructure measures and the investment climate 
measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All estimations include product–year and country–
sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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Table 11: Unit values and specific infrastructure, differentiated products, country–year FE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u
Electric power*Diff. prod. con. –0.004 
 [0.014] 
L. Electric power*Diff. prod. con.  0.002   
  [0.015]   
L2. Electric power*Diff. prod. con.  0.016   
  [0.016]   
Roads*Diff. prod. Con.  0.062***
  [0.014]   
L. Roads*Diff. prod. con.  0.072***
  [0.013]   
L2. Roads*Diff. prod. con.  0.055***
  [0.014]   
Telecommunications*Diff. prod. con.  0.011
[0.012]  
L. Telecommunications*Diff. prod. con.   0.008 
 [0.013] 
L2. Telecommunications*Diff. prod. con.    0.001
  [0.012]
L. Export value of product 0.593*** 0.592*** 0.626*** 0.588*** 0.587*** 0.623*** 0.592*** 0.592*** 0.628***
 [0.092] [0.095] [0.096] [0.092] [0.094] [0.095] [0.092] [0.094] [0.095]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Observations 30726 29520 28282 30726 29520 28282 30726 29520 28282
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Log unit values as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. “Diff. prod. con.”  Means a dummy taking one if the 
product in question is a differentiated product according to Rauch’s (1999) conservative strategy. The infrastructure measures are included as 
indices going from 1 to 4.3. Differentiated products classified according to Rauch’s conservative definition. All estimations include product–
year, country–sector and country–year fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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Table 12: Unit values and financial vs. infrastructure services 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u
EBRD reform services in general 0.046 
 [0.043] 
L. EBRD reform services in general  0.106**
  [0.049]
L2. EBRD reform services in general  0.113**
  [0.046]   
EBRD reform financial  –0.018   
  [0.026]   
L. EBRD reform financial  0.012   
  [0.026]   
L2. EBRD reform financial  0.041   
  [0.027]   
EBRD reform infrastructure  0.071**
[0.032]  
L. EBRD reform infrastructure  0.099**
 [0.049] 
L2. EBRD reform infrastructure  0.083**
  [0.037]
L. Export value of product 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.568*** 0.553*** 0.552*** 0.572*** 0.548*** 0.551*** 0.575***
 [0.095] [0.096] [0.096] [0.095] [0.095] [0.096] [0.095] [0.096] [0.096]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
L. GDP per capita 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.126** 0.144*** 0.154*** 0.158** 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.141**
 [0.036] [0.046] [0.062] [0.034] [0.046] [0.062] [0.035] [0.044] [0.060]
EBRD investment climate 0.096 0.102 0.176* 0.125 0.137 0.193* 0.047 0.077 0.196**
 [0.075] [0.077] [0.094] [0.078] [0.089] [0.105] [0.077] [0.067] [0.095]
Inflation –0.005 –0.004 –0.002 –0.006 –0.006 –0.002 –0.004 –0.004 –0.001
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 32603 31588 30529 32603 31588 30529 32603 31588 30529
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Log unit values as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. Tariffs are included in percent and linearly 
interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. The infrastructure measures and the investment climate 
measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All estimations include product–year and country–
sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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12. Appendix 
Appendix table 1: Diversification, heterogeneity with respect to weighted average of unit values 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H
Electric power 0.441    
 [0.766]    
Electric power x L. Weighted average unit values 0.100    
 [0.467]    
L. Electric power 1.306*
[0.708]    
L. Electric power x L. Weighted average unit values –0.089    
[0.433]    
L2. Electric power 1.062    
[0.643]    
L2. Electric power x L. Weighted average unit values –0.177    
[0.499]    
Roads –0.843    
[0.921]    
Roads x L. Weighted average unit values –0.123    
[0.455]    
L. Roads –0.382    
[1.115]    
L. Roads x L. Weighted average unit values –0.381    
[0.533]    
L2. Roads 0.400
[0.999]   
L2. Roads x L. Weighted average unit values –0.508
[0.625]   
Telecommunications 1.943**
 [0.835]  
Telecommunications x L. Weighted average unit values  –0.388  
 [0.411]  
L. Telecommunications 1.329*
  [0.684] 
L. Telecommunications x L. Weighted average unit values   –0.301 
  [0.385] 
L2. Telecommunications 1.063*
   [0.603]
L2. Telecommunications x L. Weighted average unit values    0.194
   [0.403]
L. Weighted average unit values –0.960 –0.578 –0.432 –0.605 –0.146 0.028 –0.011 –0.225 –1.007
 [0.901] [0.719] [0.754] [0.801] [0.821] [0.862] [0.796] [0.642] [0.644]
L. Sum of export value by sector 0.923 0.760 0.881 0.880 0.835 0.987 0.840 0.794 0.785
 [0.749] [0.777] [0.781] [0.678] [0.703] [0.731] [0.779] [0.746] [0.726]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average –0.006 –0.008 0.024 0.004 0.002 0.020 –0.019 –0.003 0.028
 [0.082] [0.083] [0.082] [0.083] [0.082] [0.081] [0.080] [0.084] [0.083]
L. GDP per capita –0.990 –2.646** –3.961*** –0.870 –2.480* –4.008*** –1.331 –2.992** –4.235***
 [1.206] [1.150] [1.213] [1.287] [1.393] [1.496] [1.057] [1.186] [1.315]
EBRD investment climate 0.176 –1.103 0.162 1.129 –0.491 –0.380 –0.391 –1.237 –1.081
 [2.114] [1.696] [1.840] [1.678] [1.713] [2.009] [1.868] [1.619] [1.739]
Inflation –0.487** –0.387** –0.366** –0.522* –0.444** –0.339** –0.523** –0.426** –0.390**
 [0.238] [0.187] [0.171] [0.269] [0.208] [0.167] [0.236] [0.187] [0.180]
Observations 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 100-H, where H is a Herfindahl index based on export value shares, as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. 
Tariffs are included in percent and linearly interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. Infrastructure 
measures and the investment climate measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All 
estimations include sector–year and country–sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. A weighted average of unit values u, wu, are calculated 
using the product value weights per country-sector as weights: ¦

 
ip
cptcptcit uswu .
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Appendix table 2: Diversification, heterogeneity w.r.t. average unit values 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
  100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H 100-H
Electric power 0.955 
 [1.237] 
Electric power x L. average unit values –0.226 
 [0.391] 
L. Electric power  2.777***
  [1.014]   
L. Electric power x L. average unit values  –0.782**   
  [0.348]   
L2. Electric power  2.473**
  [0.990]   
L2. Electric power x L. average unit values  –0.787**   
  [0.344]   
Roads  –0.149   
  [1.106]   
Roads x L. average unit values  –0.426   
  [0.258]   
L. Roads  0.666   
  [1.433]   
L. Roads x L. average unit values  –0.757**   
  [0.345]   
L2. Roads  1.609   
  [1.443]   
L2. Roads x L. average unit values  –0.838*   
  [0.441]   
Telecommunications 1.947
[1.199]  
Telecommunications x L. average unit values  –0.084
[0.336]  
L. Telecommunications   1.462 
 [0.958] 
L. Telecommunications x L. average unit values   –0.152 
 [0.270] 
L2. Telecommunications    1.277
  [0.882]
L2. Telecommunications x L. average unit values    –0.073
  [0.258]
L. Average unit value 0.539 1.477** 1.390** 0.874* 1.438** 1.449** 0.317 0.425 0.265
 [0.786] [0.605] [0.625] [0.480] [0.577] [0.714] [0.720] [0.532] [0.470]
L. Sum of Export value by sector 0.894 0.737 0.870 0.814 0.745 0.920 0.838 0.770 0.775
 [0.786] [0.824] [0.830] [0.723] [0.747] [0.773] [0.830] [0.793] [0.770]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average –0.013 –0.015 0.021 0.003 0.001 0.019 –0.024 –0.008 0.026
 [0.082] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084] [0.084] [0.082] [0.082] [0.086] [0.085]
L. GDP per capita –1.116 –2.761** –4.127*** –0.970 –2.525* –3.995*** –1.387 –3.118*** –4.446***
 [1.220] [1.101] [1.150] [1.324] [1.359] [1.447] [1.056] [1.171] [1.284]
EBRD investment climate 0.187 –1.042 0.225 1.252 –0.376 –0.355 –0.337 –1.224 –1.046
 [2.138] [1.697] [1.863] [1.703] [1.706] [2.034] [1.868] [1.629] [1.786]
Inflation –0.487** –0.371** –0.359** –0.525* –0.442** –0.346** –0.524** –0.426** –0.393**
  [0.238] [0.178] [0.163] [0.270] [0.204] [0.163] [0.237] [0.186] [0.180]
Observations 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653 1771 1713 1653
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 100-H, where H is a Herfindahl index based on export value shares, as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. 
Tariffs are included in percent and linearly interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. Infrastructure 
measures and the investment climate measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All 
estimations include sector–year and country–sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. Average unit values are calculated as simple averages 
across products per sector.   
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Appendix table 3: Unit values and specific infrastructure reforms, controlled for contemporaneous export 
quantity
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
  ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u
Electric power 0.062**  
 [0.030]  
L. Electric power  0.068** 
  [0.028] 
L2. Electric power   0.050*   
   [0.027]   
Roads   0.003   
   [0.033]   
L. Roads   0.051   
   [0.031]   
L2. Roads   –0.018   
   [0.034]   
Telecommunications   0.077***  
   [0.019]  
L. Telecommunications    0.046*** 
    [0.017] 
L2. Telecommunications     0.004
     [0.017]
Export quantity of product –1.503*** –1.531*** –1.557*** –1.507*** –1.536*** –1.560*** –1.504*** –1.534*** –1.560***
 [0.124] [0.127] [0.129] [0.123] [0.126] [0.128] [0.123] [0.125] [0.128]
Tariffs hiOECD simple average 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
L. GDP per capita 0.160*** 0.169*** 0.186*** 0.160*** 0.136*** 0.191*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.177***
 [0.033] [0.048] [0.067] [0.038] [0.048] [0.069] [0.032] [0.043] [0.058]
EBRD investment climate –0.024 0.050 0.172 0.077 0.051 0.157 0.008 0.053 0.144
 [0.063] [0.076] [0.106] [0.080] [0.078] [0.108] [0.074] [0.085] [0.101]
Inflation –0.001 –0.002 –0.001 –0.003 –0.003 –0.001 –0.004 –0.004 0.000
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006]
Observations 36268 35106 33939 36268 35106 33939 36268 35106 33939
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Log unit values as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. “Diff. prod. con.”  means a dummy taking one if the 
product in question is a differentiated product according to Rauch’s (1999) conservative strategy. Tariffs are included in percent and linearly 
interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. The infrastructure measures and the investment climate 
measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All estimations include product–year and country–
sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
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Appendix table 4: Unit values and specific infrastructure reforms, controlled for lagged export quantity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u ln u 
Electric power 0.052*         
 [0.029]         
L. Electric power  0.069**        
  [0.029]        
L2. Electric power   0.060**       
   [0.028]       
Roads    –0.003      
    [0.033]      
L. Roads     0.065**     
     [0.032]     
L2. Roads      –0.010    
      [0.031]    
Telecommunications       0.076***   
       [0.020]   
L. Telecommunications        0.054***  
        [0.018]  
L2. Telecommunications         0.013 
         [0.017] 
L. Export quantity product –0.637*** –0.637*** –0.643*** –0.638*** –0.641*** –0.645*** –0.638*** –0.639*** –0.645*** 
 [0.107] [0.112] [0.117] [0.107] [0.112] [0.117] [0.107] [0.112] [0.117] 
Tariffs hiOECD simple average 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
L. GDP per capita 0.144*** 0.170*** 0.193*** 0.146*** 0.129*** 0.187*** 0.133*** 0.150*** 0.176*** 
 [0.032] [0.048] [0.072] [0.036] [0.047] [0.071] [0.030] [0.042] [0.059] 
EBRD investment climate 0.022 0.093 0.231** 0.113 0.092 0.205* 0.040 0.094 0.193* 
 [0.057] [0.075] [0.108] [0.083] [0.075] [0.109] [0.075] [0.088] [0.103] 
Inflation –0.002 –0.004 –0.002 –0.005 –0.004 –0.002 –0.006 –0.005 –0.002 
  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] 
Observations 32603 31588 30529 32603 31588 30529 32603 31588 30529 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (std. errors are clustered on country–year.). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Log unit values as dependent variable. LX. means lagged X periods. “Diff. prod. con.”  means a dummy taking one if the 
product in question is a differentiated product according to Rauch’s (1999) conservative strategy. Tariffs are included in percent and linearly 
interpolated for missing values. Export values and GDP per capita are in log form. The infrastructure measures and the investment climate 
measure are included as indices going from 1 to 4.3. Inflation is included as percent/100. All estimations include product–year and country–
sector fixed effects. Period: 1989–2000. 
162

